Jason Van Iles v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 18, 2004
• Docket: 01-03-00666-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued November 18, 2004.

In the

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-03-00666-CR

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JASON VAN ILES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 232nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 923748

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          A jury found appellant, Jason Van Iles, guilty of delivery of cocaine weighing less than one gram, and the trial court sentenced appellant to one year confinement.

In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for instructed verdict and (2) sentencing him to the cruel and unusual punishment of one year’s confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

          On September 10, 2002, Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Officer Mark Ong and his partner, Officer Michelle Vana, conducted an undercover investigation at an apartment complex where Officer Ong suspected that appellant was dealing drugs. Officer Ong testified that appellant waved him into a parking lot where both appellant and another man, Richard Harelston, were standing. Appellant asked Officer Ong what he “was looking for,” and Ong replied that he wanted “a couple dimes,” which Ong testified meant two rocks of crack cocaine worth $20. Appellant told Harelston to “serve him up.” Harelston asked Ong what he wanted, and, when Ong repeated his request for “a couple dimes,” Harelston sold him two rocks of cocaine. Ong drove away, and uniformed officers arrested appellant and Harelston.

          Officer Vana testified that it appeared that both appellant and Harelston were working together during the drug transaction. In her opinion, drug dealers often work together, with one giving orders to the other to complete the transaction. Both Officers Ong and Vana testified that it was common practice for drug dealers to work in pairs: one approaches the car and the other sells the drugs. Vana testified that such practices stem from the mistaken belief that the non-seller cannot be charged with a crime if he is not handling the drugs or the money. Appellant testified that he was not in any way involved with the drug transaction between Harelston and Officer Ong.

Instructed Verdict

          Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for an instructed verdict. Appellant also contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree.

Legal Sufficiency 

          A motion for an instructed verdict is an attack on the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Rohrscheib v. State, 934 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Howley v. State, 943 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). Although a legal-sufficiency analysis entails a consideration of all evidence presented at trial, we may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for the jury’s. King, 29 S.W.3d at 562. The jury, as trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Reece v. State, 878 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.).

          A delivery of a controlled substance conviction requires that the State prove that appellant knowingly delivered a controlled substance by either actual transfer, constructive transfer, or by an offer to sell. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.002(8), 481.112(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). The verdict stands if the evidence supports any one of the three alternative manners of delivery that the State alleged in the indictment. See Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

           In this case, the jury charge authorized the jury to convict appellant if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Harleston delivered cocaine by actual transfer and appellant was a party to the delivery, or if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant delivered cocaine by constructive transfer.

          At trial, the State presented evidence that appellant flagged down Officer Ong, approached Ong’s car, and asked Ong what he was looking for. Officer Ong answered a “couple dimes,” which is street slang for two rocks of crack cocaine. Appellant then told Harleston, “serve him up.” Appellant stood next to Harleston and watched while Harleston handed Ong the crack cocaine and while Ong handed Harleston $20.

          Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Harleston in delivering the cocaine. Accordingly, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of constructive transfer. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for an instructed verdict.

Factual Sufficiency

          Appellant further contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction.     In a factual-sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light, and we will set the verdict aside only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W. 3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

     In conducting the factual-sufficiency review, we must also employ appropriate deference to the fact finder so that we do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W. 3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Our evaluation should not intrude upon the fact finder’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any witness’s testimony. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The weight to be given contradictory testimonial evidence is within the sole province of the fact finder because it turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. at 408. The fact finder is entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses and may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Id. at 407.In this case, Officer Ong testified that appellant flagged him down and asked him what he was looking for. When Ong indicated that he wanted to purchase crack cocaine, appellant told Harelston, “serve him up.” Officer Ong testified that he paid Harelston $20 for two rocks of crack cocaine while appellant stood by and watched. Furthermore, Rosario Rodriquez, an HPD chemist, testified that the two rocks were crack cocaine weighing under one gram. Both Officers Ong and Vana testified that drug dealers often work together, with one dealer instructing the other to sell the drugs. Ong and Vana testified that, in their opinion, appellant and Harelston were working together; Vana testified that drug dealers operated under the mistaken belief that, if one of them does not touch the drugs or money, he cannot be charged with a crime.

      In opposition to Officers Ong’s and Vana’s testimony, appellant testified and denied involvement in the drug transaction and claimed that the transaction was solely between Officer Ong and Harelston. Appellant testified that he was sitting on a generator next to the apartment complex’s entrance waiting for the mail to arrive when he saw the transaction between Officer Ong and Harelston occur. Appellant claimed to have been five feet or more from Officer Ong’s car and that he never waved Ong’s car into the parking lot or spoke with him. Appellant denied ever selling drugs with or working with Harelston. Appellant testified that his only relationship with Harelston was that they occasionally asked each other for cigarettes.

     Harelston, at the time of this offense, had recently completed an unrelated sentence for delivery of a controlled substance, corroborated appellant’s testimony. Harleston testified that appellant did not move from where he was sitting on the generator, that Harelston conducted the drug deal with Officer Ong by himself, and that Officer Ong had been flagged down by someone other than appellant. Finally, Luciana Lee, another defense witness, testified that she saw appellant sitting by the generator and that appellant was not involved in the drug transaction. Lee also testified that she previously had been convicted of delivery of a controlled substance and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Lee testified that, in her experiences as a drug dealer, she did not use “scouts” to contact potential clients.

     Having viewed all of the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the evidence supporting appellant’s conviction is not too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; nor was the contrary evidence so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. As we stated earlier, the fact finder is entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses and may choose to believe all, some or none of the testimony presented. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407. When the evidence is conflicting, the jury's verdict is generally regarded as conclusive. McGarity v. State, 5 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1999, no pet). We hold that the evidence demonstrates that the jury was rationally justified in finding appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See King, 29 S.W. 3d at 562.

     We overrule appellant’s issue.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

          In his final issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the cruel and unusual punishment of one year’s confinement. We disagree.

          To preserve error on appeal, the record must show that appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, may be waived if the proper request, objection, or motion is not asserted in the trial court. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d). The failure to make a specific objection at trial waives an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

          In this case, when appellant’s sentence was announced, he did not object to the sentence as violating his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant also failed to raise the argument in a post-trial motion. Accordingly, appellant has not preserved this issue for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).

          We overrule appellant’s final issue.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                             George C. Hanks, Jr.

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Hanks, and Higley.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).