MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED court except for the purpose of establishing Dec 30 2016, 7:26 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK Indiana Supreme Court estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR STATE Jason Tye Myers APPELLEES Stockwell, Indiana Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General
Aaron T. Craft Elizabeth M. Littlejohn Deputies Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason Tye Myers, December 30, 2016 Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A02-1604-PL-929 v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court Nalin Desai, et al., The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack, Appellees-Defendants. Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D04-1309-PL-42
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 1 of 16 Case Summary [1] In November of 2013, Appellant-Plaintiff Jason Tye Myers stayed in a hotel
that was owned and operated by Appellees-Defendants Nalin Desai, Bena
Desai, and Kinjal, Inc. (collectively, “the Hotel Appellees”) for a number of
weeks. On September 27, 2013, Myers filed a complaint for invasion of privacy
against the Hotel Appellees, alleging that they had invaded his privacy by
requiring him to provide the identification of a guest staying with him in the
hotel and, upon request, subsequently providing this identification information
to local law enforcement authorities. Myers subsequently amended his
complaint to include various state and federal claims against the State of
Indiana; Tippecanoe County Deputy Prosecutor Jonathan R. Dee; Tippecanoe
Superior Court Judge Gregory Donat; Deputy Attorney General Cynthia L.
Ploughe; Indiana Court of Appeals Judges John G. Baker, Paul D. Mathias,
Melissa S. May, and Margret G. Robb; and Indiana Supreme Court Justices
Brent Dickson, Robert D. Rucker, Steven H. David, and Mark S. Massa
(collectively, “the State Appellees”). These claims pertained to the denial of
Myers’s 2012 related petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”).
[2] The trial court eventually entered default judgment against the Hotel Appellees,
after which the trial court awarded Myers zero dollars in damages. The trial
court also dismissed the State Appellees from the lawsuit. Myers subsequently
filed a motion to correct error, which was denied by the trial court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 2 of 16 [3] On appeal, Myers challenges the trial court’s award of zero dollars in damages
and the dismissal of the State Appellees. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History A. Facts Relating to Related Criminal and Post- Conviction Proceedings [4] With respect to the facts leading to the instant appeal, this court’s
memorandum decision in Myers’s related post-conviction proceedings provide
as follows:
As part of an ongoing criminal investigation involving Felicia Norris, Tippecanoe law enforcement officials learned that Myers and Norris were staying together at the Lincoln Lodge on U.S. Highway 52. There were outstanding arrest warrants for Norris in both Clinton and Pulaski counties.
On November 13, 2003, police officers went to Myers’s room and asked him if Norris was there. Myers responded that a woman by the name of “Becky Best” was staying with him. Appellant’s App. p. 74. The officers warned Myers that he would be charged with harboring a fugitive if he was lying to them about the woman’s identity.
Thereafter, the police officers learned that Norris was, in fact, staying with Myers after the motel manager supplied them with Myers’s motel room registration card that listed Norris as the co- occupant. The police officers then returned to Myers’s room and arrested Norris. Myers was also arrested and charged with possession of a legend drug, a class D felony, assisting a criminal, a class A misdemeanor, and false informing, a class A misdemeanor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 3 of 16 On June 15, 2004, Myers pleaded guilty to false informing, a class B misdemeanor, and was later sentenced to 180 days of incarceration. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges.[1]
On May 30, 2012, Myers filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Myers contended, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective for failing “to move to suppress evidence that [Myers] had lied about the fact that ... Norris ... was staying in his motel room.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4. The State responded that even if Myers’s assertions were true, he failed to present any material facts that entitled him to post-conviction relief. Thus, the State argued that the post-conviction court should deny Myers’s request for relief without a hearing.
On August 24, 2012, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed Myers’s petition, concluding that Myers had failed to allege any facts or issues not known to him at the time of the guilty plea, and that:
6. [Myers] had no expectation of privacy in the motel ledger.
7. Entry into the motel room was obtained by consent.
8. There is no colorable suppression issue in the case at bar.
1 At some point, Myers was placed on probation in lieu of incarceration following his guilty plea. While on probation, Myers was charged with nine unrelated felony counts, including several Class A felony drug charges. He was eventually convicted of four counts of Class A felony dealing in cocaine and sentenced to a term of thirty years.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 4 of 16 9. [Myers] failed to allege that he would have been acquitted had he proceeded to trial on this matter, nor has he alleged facts that would rise to a constitutional violation under the Indiana and Federal Constitutions.
Appellant’s App. p. 87.
Myers v. State, 2013 WL 1858430 *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. May 2, 2013), trans. denied.
Myers appealed the post-conviction court’s August 24, 2012 summary dismissal
of his petition. Id. at *2. Upon review, this court affirmed the judgment of the
post-conviction court. Id. at *3. Myers’s subsequent petition for rehearing was
denied on August 16, 2013. Myers then sought transfer to the Supreme Court
of Indiana. On November 7, 2013, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Myers’s
petition seeking transfer.
B. Facts Relating to the Civil Claims at Issue in This Appeal 1. The Hotel Appellees [5] On September 27, 2013, Myers filed a civil complaint for invasion of privacy
against the Hotel Appellees. Specifically, Myers argued that the Hotel
Appellees had violated his privacy by requiring him to provide them with the
identification of the individual staying with him in his hotel room and by
turning this identification over to representatives of the Clinton County Sheriff’s
Department. Default Judgment was entered against the Hotel Appellees on
June 22, 2015. The trial court then allowed Myers to plead damages via
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 5 of 16 affidavit. In an order dated February 4, 2016, the trial court awarded Myers
zero dollars in damages.
2. The State Appellees [6] On October 28, 2014, Myers amended his September 27, 2013 complaint to
include various state and federal claims relating to the denial of his 2012 PCR
petition against the State Appellees. In making these claims, Myers sought an
order directing the named trial judge, the named judges of this court, and the
named justices of the Indiana Supreme Court to further review his previously-
considered PCR petition. Myers also sought that the deputy prosecutor and the
deputy attorney general be ordered to “[f]urther prosecute the action underlying
this one … in a manner that is consistent with [his/her] ethical duty[.]”
Appellant’s App. pp. 252, 253. The State Appellees sought dismissal under
Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing, among other things that each of the named parties
was entitled to immunity. The trial court subsequently dismissed the claims
against the State Appellees.
3. Motion to Correct Error [7] On March 9, 2016, Myers filed a motion to correct error, challenging both the
award of zero dollars in damages and the dismissal of the State Appellees. This
motion was denied by the trial court on April 1, 2016. This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 6 of 16 [8] Myers appeals following the denial of his motion to correct error. On appeal,
we review a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct error for an abuse of
discretion. Knowledge A-Z, Inc. v. Sentry Ins., 891 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, and
inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Id. (citing Palmer v. Comprehensive
Neurologic Serv., P.C., 864 N.E.2d 1093, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
I. Award of Damages [9] With respect to the Hotel Appellees, Myers challenges the trial court’s award of
zero dollars in damages. “‘The computation of damages is strictly a matter
within the trial court’s discretion.’” Harlan Bakeries, Inc. v. Muncy, 835 N.E.2d
1018, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369, 382
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied). “‘No degree of mathematical certainty is
required in awarding damages as long as the amount awarded is supported by
evidence in the record; however, an award may not be based upon mere
conjecture, speculation, or guesswork.’” Id. (quoting Romine, 782 N.E.2d at
382). To support an award of damages, “‘facts must exist and be shown by the
evidence which afford a legal basis for measuring the plaintiff’s loss.’” Id. at
135 (quoting Romine, 782 N.E.2d at 382). “‘To that end the damages must be
referenced to some fairly definitive standard, such as market value, established
experience, or direct inference from known circumstances.’” Id. (quoting
Romine, 782 N.E.2d at 382-83).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 7 of 16 [10] In awarding zero dollars in damages, the trial court found as follows:
[Myers] has failed to prove that the [Hotel Appellees] violated his right to privacy by cooperating with the police. Even if this violation was proven, [Myers] has failed to prove that it resulted in damage. Any damage claimed by [Myers] was self-inflicted and flowed from the fact that he entered a guilty plea to False Informing, a Class B Misdemeanor, pursuant to a plea agreement on June 15, 2004.
Appellant’s App. pp. 455-56.
[11] In challenging the trial court’s award of zero dollars in damages, Myers argues
that his guilty plea did not act as a bar to recovery of damages from the Hotel
Appellees. While Myers’s guilty plea might not act as a bar to recovering
damages, it was within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether the
evidence provided by Myers proved that the alleged invasion of his privacy by
the Hotel Appellees resulted in measurable damage to him. Upon review, we
conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in making such a
determination and, as a result, awarding zero dollars in damages.
II. Dismissal of the State Appellees [12] With respect to the State Appellees, Myers challenges the trial court’s order
dismissing the claims levied against the State Appellees.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief. See Kitco, Inc. v. Corp. for Gen. Trade, 706 N.E.2d 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, while we do Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 8 of 16 not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to their adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario in which a legally actionable injury has occurred.
A court should “accept[ ] as true the facts alleged in the complaint,” Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), and should not only “consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but also “draw every reasonable inference in favor of [the non-moving] party.” Newman v. Deiter, 702 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). However, a court need not accept as true “allegations that are contradicted by other allegations or exhibits attached to or incorporated in the pleading.” Morgan Asset Holding Corp. v. CoBank, ACB, 736 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted).
Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134-35 (Ind. 2006). On
review, we will affirm the trial court’s grant of a Rule 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss “if it is sustainable on any theory or basis found in the record.” Deiter,
702 N.E.2d at 1097.
A. Dismissal of Federal Claims [13] Although Myers’s arguments below and on appeal are somewhat unclear, it
appears that Myers has asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§
1983”) against all of the State Appellees. § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 9 of 16 injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
(Emphasis added).
[14] The United States Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In reaching this holding, the United
States Supreme Court explained the following:
Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
[15] In determining whether an individual was sued in their official or personal
capacity, we look to the caption of the case and the allegations and language
used in the body of the complaint. See Lake Cty. Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671
N.E.2d 429, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
If a plaintiff seeks to sue public officials in their personal capacities or in both their personal and official capacities, the plaintiff should expressly state so in the complaint. We also note that courts ordinarily assume that an official is sued only in her
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 10 of 16 official capacity when a plaintiff alleges that a state official acted under the color of state law giving rise to liability under § 1983.
Id. (internal citations ommitted).
[16] In filing suit against each of the State Appellees, Myers indicated that each was
being sued in their official capacities only. Further, the nature of the claims
brought against each of the State Appellees indicates that they are being sued in
only their official capacities. Therefore, we will review the propriety of the
dismissal only as it relates to claims brought against the State and State officers
in their official capacities.
[17] Neither a state nor a state agency is a person under § 1983 regardless of whether
the claims raised sought retrospective or prospective relief. See Severson v. Bd. of
Trustees of Purdue Univ., 777 N.E.2d 1181, 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). As such,
the trial court correctly dismissed the claims levied against the State of Indiana
under § 1983. Further, if a plaintiff requests retrospective relief, then a state
official sued in his official capacity is also not a “person” under § 1983. See id.
The trial court, therefore, also correctly dismissed the claims levied against the
remaining State Appellees by Myers which sought retrospective relief because
the State Appellees were not “persons” under § 1983.
[18] If, however, a plaintiff requests prospective relief, then a state official may be
considered a “person” under § 1983. See id. It appears that at least some of
Myers’s claims are seeking prospective relief. Specifically, it seems that Myers
is seeking a court order or injunction that would authorize him to seek another
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 11 of 16 round of PCR, during which the State Appellees would be compelled to
conduct said review in a manner consistent with Myers’s view of the law.
[19] In Martin v. Heffelfinger, 744 N.E.2d 555, 558-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), we
concluded that in order to seek prospective injunctive relief against a state
official under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his remedies at law are
inadequate before he can state a claim for equitable relief. A legal remedy is
adequate “where it is as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its
prompt administration as the remedy in equity.” Martin, 744 N.E.2d at 559.
[20] In Martin, the plaintiff filed a complaint under § 1983 against a number of state
officials, including the judge who revoked his probation. Id. at 557. Martin
sought declarative and injunctive relief to bar the judge from presiding over any
action involving him, claiming that he was entitled to relief because the
revocation of his probation had caused him to lose his job. Id. The trial court
dismissed Martin’s claim against the judge. Id. Upon review, we affirmed,
concluding that the trial judge was entitled to judicial immunity because Martin
had failed to prove that he was entitled to declarative or injunctive relief. Id. at
559. Specifically, we concluded that Martin had failed to prove why the
remedies available to him at law were inadequate. Id. In reaching this
conclusion, we noted that Martin could raise the issues presented through the
proper channels on a direct appeal from his conviction or in post-conviction
proceedings. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 12 of 16 [21] Just as in Martin, here Myers has failed to show that the legal remedies
available to him are inadequate. Myers filed an unsuccessful PCR petition.
Myers does not cite to any authority suggesting that he is entitled to relief under
§ 1983 merely because his PCR petition was subsequently denied. Further, the
Indiana Post-Conviction Rules set forth a procedure by which one may request
permission to file a second or successive PCR petition. Nothing in the record
indicates that Myers has been denied, or even sought, permission to file a
successive PCR petition. Because we conclude that Myers has failed to show
that the legal remedies available to him are inadequate, we further conclude
that the trial court correctly dismissed the claims levied against the remaining
State Appellees by Myers which sought prospective relief.
B. Dismissal of State Claims 1. Named Judges and Justices
[22] It is well-established that judicial officers are protected by a common law
immunity from suit brought on the basis of their judicial acts. See Cato v. Mayes,
270 Ind. 653, 655, 388 N.E.2d 530, 532 (1979) (citing Alexander v. Gill, 130 Ind.
485, 489, 30 N.E. 525, 527 (1892)). “The reason for this rule is that such a
liability for a judicial act would be inconsistent with the proper discharge of
judicial duties.” Id. at 655, 388 N.E.2d at 532.
The test by which the question of the liability of a judicial officer is to be governed is twofold: (1) was the act complained of an exercise of judicial authority? and (2) did the court have jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter? If these two
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 13 of 16 questions are answered affirmatively, judicial immunity will be accorded to the officer.
Id. at 655, 388 N.E.2d at 532 (internal citation omitted).
[23] Review of the record clearly establishes that acts complained of by Myers were
exercises of judicial authority and that the named judges and justices had both
personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and claims before the
respective courts. As such, judicial immunity covers each of the named judges
and justices.
2. Deputy Prosecutor and Deputy Attorney General
[24] The Indiana Supreme Court has also recognized that prosecuting attorneys and
the Attorney General and his or her deputies are protected by absolute
immunity for acts reasonably within the general scope of authority granted to
prosecuting attorneys. See Foster v. Pearcy, 270 Ind. 533, 537-38, 387 N.E.2d
446, 449 (1979).
This decision will insure that the prosecutor will be able to exercise the independent judgment necessary to effectuate his duties to investigate and prosecute criminals and to apprise the public of his activities. It will also allay the apprehensions about harassment of prosecuting attorneys from unfounded litigation which deters public officials from their public duties.
Id. at 537, 387 N.E.2d at 449.
[25] Again, review of the record clearly establishes that the acts complained of by
Myers were acts within the general scope of authority granted to prosecuting
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 14 of 16 attorneys and the Attorney General. As such, both the deputy prosecutor and
the deputy attorney general were protected against Myers’s claims by
prosecutorial immunity.
3. The Indiana Tort Claims Act
[26] The State Appellees are further immune from liability under the Indiana Tort
Claims Act (“ITCA”). The ITCA governs lawsuits against political
subdivisions and their employees. Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267, 1278 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016) (citing Irwin Mortg. Corp. v. Marion Cnty. Treasurer, 816 N.E.2d
439, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied.
The ITCA provides substantial immunity for conduct within the scope of a public employee’s employment “to ensure that public employees can exercise the independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.” Irwin Mortg. Corp., 816 N.E.2d at 445; see also Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (setting forth twenty-four separate categories for which immunity attaches). Compliance with the ITCA is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. Generally, whether the tortious act of an employee is within the scope of employment is a question of fact; however, under certain circumstances the question may be determined as a matter of law. Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ind. 2003).
Maxson, 51 N.E.3d at 1278-79. It is specifically of note in this matter that
Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(6) provides that “[a] governmental entity or an
employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 15 of 16 a loss results from the … initiation of a judicial or an administrative
proceeding.”
[27] As is discussed above, each of the State Appellees was sued only in their official
capacities. It is evident from Myers’s complaint that each were acting within
their scope of authority and performing discretionary functions of the
government in relation to a judicial proceeding. The deputy prosecuting
attorney and the deputy attorney general both acted in accordance with their
duty to defend against Myers’s PCR petition. Each of the judicial officers were
acting in accordance with their duty to adjudicate cases, including cases
involving a request for PCR, which have come before their respective courts.
As such, each of the State Appellees were entitled to immunity under the
ITCA.
Conclusion [28] In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1)
awarding Myers zero dollars in damages with respect to the Hotel Appellees or
(2) dismissing the claims levied against the State Appellees. As such, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
[29] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-PL-929 | December 30, 2016 Page 16 of 16