Jason Bainbridge v. Attorney General United States of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: June 5, 2026
• Docket: 25-2434
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2434

JASON E. BAINBRIDGE, Appellant

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _____________________________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. Judge Keli M. Neary, No. 3:21-cv-01895

Before: PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted May 29, 2026; Decided Jun. 5, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*

BOVE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff appeals the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment on two of his employment-discrimination claims. He has failed, however, to

identify a material factual dispute. Accordingly, we will affirm.

I.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and

issues on appeal. The Bureau of Prisons employed Plaintiff for 22 years, including six

years as a correctional counselor at a federal prison in Pennsylvania. Toward the end of

his career, Plaintiff struggled on the job because of issues outside of work.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. In January 2020, Plaintiff sent an email to the prison administrator indicating that

he was “in a very rough spot” and at his “wits end.” A352. The administrator referred

Plaintiff to the Employee Assistance Program. The following month, based on a doctor’s

recommendation, the administrator placed Plaintiff on a Temporary Job Modification. In

September 2020, Plaintiff formally requested an accommodation. In response, the Office

of Personnel Management concluded that Plaintiff was disabled from his position.

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and later filed five federal claims.

As relevant here, he pursued failure-to-accommodate and disability-discrimination theories

under the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Following discovery, the District

Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff timely appealed.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conduct de novo review of the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment. Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, 169 F.4th 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2026).1

III.

Plaintiff has not identified reversible error in the District Court’s thorough opinion.

As to the failure-to-accommodate claim, Plaintiff requested an accommodation four

months after he admits he became unable to work with or without an accommodation. In

any event, we agree with the District Court that Plaintiff’s accommodation request was

1 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, alterations, and subsequent history.

2 legally deficient even if well-intentioned. Plaintiff asked to be “excused” from certain of

his core duties as a counselor. A404. But “employers are not required to modify the

essential functions of a job in order to accommodate an employee.” Donahue v. Consol.

Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s willingness to “consider offers of

reassignment” was also too vague to suffice. A404. Summary judgment was appropriate

because, “after a full opportunity for discovery,” Plaintiff could not point to a suitable

available position. Donahue, 224 F.3d at 234. That proposition holds even if, as Plaintiff

claims, his employer “failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process.” Id.

Plaintiff references but hardly explains—and therefore abandons—his appeal

relating to the disability-discrimination claim. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8); see also Sec’y

United States Dep’t of Lab. v. Nursing Home Care Mgmt. Inc., 128 F.4th 146, 158 n.1 (3d

Cir. 2025). In any event, the District Court dutifully and correctly applied the McDonnell

Douglas framework. The “ultimate question” was whether “the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Plaintiff did not adduce enough evidence to create a factual dispute regarding

a discriminatory adverse employment action in light of the undisputed evidence regarding

tardiness, absenteeism, an admitted inability to do important parts of the job, and an

incident in which Plaintiff expunged two incident reports without following appropriate

procedures. Accordingly, we will affirm.