Jarman v. Jarman

540 So. 2d 444, 1989 WL 20721
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 28, 1989
DocketCA 87 1812, CA 87 1813
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 540 So. 2d 444 (Jarman v. Jarman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jarman v. Jarman, 540 So. 2d 444, 1989 WL 20721 (La. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

540 So.2d 444 (1989)

Kathleen Dowty JARMAN
v.
G. William JARMAN.

Nos. CA 87 1812, CA 87 1813.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

February 28, 1989.

*445 J. Minos Simon, Lafayette, for Kathleen Dowty Jarman.

Alan S. Fishbein, Baton Rouge, for George William Jarman.

Before COVINGTON, C.J., and LOTTINGER and FOIL, JJ.

FOIL, Judge.

On November 4, 1986, Mrs. Kathleen Dowty Jarman filed a petition for separation from her husband George William Jarman, alleging cruel treatment on his part and abandonment. Mr. Jarman also filed suit on November 4, seeking a separation based upon Mrs. Jarman's cruelty. Both spouses answered each other's petitions and the two actions were later consolidated on joint motion of the parties.

After a trial on the merits on May 28 and 29, 1987, the trial judge took the matter under advisement. On July 9, 1987, judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Jarman, and against Mrs. Jarman, finding her guilty of cruelty and solely at fault in the dissolution of the marriage. The trial judge further granted joint custody of the children to the parties, and ordered Mr. Jarman to pay educational, medical and insurance expenses for the children, as well as $2,000.00 per month as child support. Mrs. Jarman was granted the exclusive use of the matrimonial domicile. The trial judge ordered Mr. Jarman to pay, as alimony pendente lite, the first and second monthly mortgage payments, totaling $3,662.00, and to maintain Mrs. Jarman's medical insurance.

Mrs. Jarman appeals the separation judgment, alleging the trial court erred:

(1) In making an award of alimony pendente lite to her that failed to include any amount for her support;
(2) In finding her guilty of fault (cruel treatment); and
(3) In finding her daughter's testimony was not reliable.

We will discuss each area of complaint, in turn, below.

ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE

In her first assignment of error, Mrs. Jarman contends that, in ordering Mr. Jarman to pay the mortgage notes on the matrimonial domicile and to maintain her health insurance as alimony pendente lite, the trial judge failed to award an amount for the basic necessities of life, such as food and clothing. She further argues *446 that, as a matter of law, a trial judge may not convert a spouse's obligation to pay alimony pendente lite into a preferred obligation to pay community debts.

The applicable Civil Code provision for alimony pendente lite is Article 148, which provides:

If the spouse has not a sufficient income for maintenance pending suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce, the judge may allow the claimant spouse, whether plaintiff or defendant, a sum for that spouse's support, proportioned to the needs of the claimant spouse and the means of the other spouse.

The purpose espoused by this article is the maintenance of the spouse at a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed prior to the separation. In essence, alimony pendente lite is no more than a judicial enforcement of the spouse's support obligation. This alimony must be gauged in proportion to the needs of the claimant spouse and the means of the supporting spouse. See Hall v. Hall, 348 So.2d 707 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977).

It is well settled that trial judges are vested with much discretion in fixing awards for alimony pendente lite. A reviewing court will not disturb such an alimony award in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of said discretion. Hall, supra.

Payment of a community loan may be made a part of the alimony or support obligation of a spouse. See Lovell v. Lovell, 490 So.2d 330 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 495 So.2d 302 (La.1986). In Cox v. Cox, 447 So.2d 578 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), the trial judge ordered plaintiff to maintain the first and second mortgages on the family home and explained in oral reasons that the mortgage payment was neither alimony nor child support, but the ordered payment of a community debt. The plaintiff argued that, in so doing, the trial judge went beyond the statutory jurisdiction established for the family court. This Court disagreed, and stated:

The word alimony refers to the nourishment, lodging, and support of the person who claims it. La.C.C. art. 230. By ordering plaintiff to maintain the mortgages on the home, the trial judge was providing living accommodations for defendant and her minor child. We find that the furnishing of the family home without payment by Mrs. Cox is a part of the support for plaintiff's wife and child. The order to pay the mortgages was a means of assuring the continued availability of that family home.... The granting of the occupancy of the family home is considered in awarding alimony and child support. La.R.S. 9:308. Therefore, the fact that plaintiff has been ordered to maintain the mortgage on the family home must also be considered in meeting the wife's and child's needs. Cox, id, at 579 (Emphasis added).

We find no error in the trial judge's order that Mr. Jarman pay the monthly mortgage notes on the family home. Furthermore, these payments are certainly part of the support for Mrs. Jarman and the two children.

In written reasons, the trial judge considered in great detail the needs of Mrs. Jarman based upon her customary lifestyle and the ability of Mr. Jarman to pay support based upon his income less his expenses. However, by ordering Mr. Jarman to pay, as alimony pendente lite, the first and second monthly mortgage notes and Mrs. Jarman's medical insurance premiums, the trial court failed to include an amount, in cash, to meet other needs and expenses of Mrs. Jarman. We feel that said failure constitutes an abuse of the trial court's wide discretion in such matters. Therefore, we will award to Mrs. Jarman the additional sum of $500.00 per month alimony pendente lite. We believe this figure represents a sufficient sum to provide for Mrs. Jarman's basic necessities of life.

CRUELTY

By means of her second assignment of error, Mrs. Jarman asserts the actions of her and her husband evidenced nothing more than mutual incompatibility, fussing and bickering. Alternatively, she claims that Mr. Jarman provoked her alleged "cruel *447 treatment", which he used as grounds for obtaining the judgment of separation.

Louisiana Civil Code article 138 sets forth the grounds for separation from bed and board. It provides in pertinent part:

Separation from bed and board may be claimed reciprocally for the following causes:
. . . . .
3. On account of habitual intemperance of one of the married persons, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of one of them toward the other, if such habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable.

A finding of cruelty requires a dual analysis of the facts. First, the judge must decide whether or not the objective factual conduct, which is alleged to be cruel, actually occurred. Second, if the trial judge finds that the conduct in fact occurred, he must make a further, largely subjective, determination as to whether or not that conduct rendered the parties' living together insupportable under the terms of article 138(3). Cruse v. Cruse, 498 So.2d 1153 (La.App.3d Cir.1986).

It would serve no useful purpose to enumerate the many acts, traits, and characteristics of Mrs. Jarman that Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
540 So. 2d 444, 1989 WL 20721, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jarman-v-jarman-lactapp-1989.