Jared Galen Stombaugh v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 06-25-00103-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00103-CR

JARED GALEN STOMBAUGH, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 196th District Court Hunt County, Texas Trial Court No. 34909CR

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jared Galen Stombaugh pled guilty to possessing less than one gram of heroin, a state jail

felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b) (Supp.). Pursuant to a plea-

bargain agreement with the State, Stombaugh was placed on deferred adjudication community

supervision for two years. After the State alleged that Stombaugh used fentanyl, heroin, and

THC, the trial court modified the terms and conditions of Stombaugh’s community supervision

by confining him to a substance abuse felony punishment facility (SAFPF). The trial court also

ordered Stombaugh to “obey all rules and regulations of said facility and participate in all

treatment programs required by said facility.” The State moved to adjudicate Stombaugh’s guilt

on the allegation that he “was unsuccessfully discharged from” the SAFPF “for receiving a TDC

case for threatening to inflict harm on an officer.” After finding the allegation true, the trial

court adjudicated Stombaugh’s guilt and sentenced him to eighteen months’ confinement in state

jail.

On appeal, Stombaugh argues that the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating his

guilt because the State did not offer evidence of the rules or regulations of the SAFPF. We

interpret Stombaugh’s argument as raising a question on the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the revocation. Because we find that the State proved that Stombaugh violated a term

and condition of his deferred adjudication community supervision by a preponderance of the

evidence, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

2 I. Standard of Review

“We review a decision to adjudicate guilt in the same manner as we review a decision to

revoke community supervision—for abuse of discretion.” Hammack v. State, 466 S.W.3d 302,

304 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.); see Lively v. State, 338 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006); In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.)). A “trial court

does not abuse its discretion if the order revoking community supervision is supported by a

preponderance of the evidence; in other words, the greater weight of the credible evidence would

create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of his or her community

supervision.” Lively, 338 S.W.3d at 143 (citing Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64; In re T.R.S., 115

S.W.3d at 320).

“In conducting our review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s ruling.” Id. (citing Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); In re

T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 321).

II. The Evidence at the Adjudication Hearing

Derrick Bercher, with the Hunt County Community Supervision and Corrections

Department, testified that Stombaugh was confined to a SAFPF as a modified term and condition

of his deferred adjudication community supervision. Bercher testified that Stombaugh “went to

the East Texas [SAFPF] on October 24[,] 2024,” but did not “successfully complete the

program.” According to Bercher, the SAFPF contacted him in February 2025 to report “the

violations that Mr. Stombaugh had completed while he was at the [SAFPF].”

3 Bercher testified that he invited Stombaugh to “a treatment team meeting, between

[Bercher] and the staff there at the facility,” but Stombaugh did not participate in the meeting.

As a result, the meeting yielded a recommendation of “[p]rogram removal” from the SAFPF.

According to Bercher, the SAFPF’s “final removal report” “listed all the TDC cases against

him.” Bercher expressly clarified that Stombaugh was removed from the SAFPF “for violation

of the rules and regulations,” “specifically for threatening an officer.” Also, Stombaugh testified

to the following:

Q. [BY THE STATE:] Let’s talk about what happened in [the SAFPF]. From your perspective, why were you kicked out of the program?

A. I’m not sure, to be honest.

Q. You received some cases, is that right?

A. Yeah.

After hearing this evidence, the trial court found the State’s allegation true.

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Adjudicating Stombaugh’s Guilt

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence as to an alleged violation of a condition of

community supervision is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke community

supervision and adjudicate guilt. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Here, the State alleged that Stombaugh violated the condition of his community supervision that

required him to “obey all rules and regulations of said facility and participate in all treatment

programs required by said facility.” The State alleged that Stombaugh violated the condition by

being unsuccessfully discharged “for receiving a TDC case for threatening to inflict harm on an

officer.” 4 Here, a sealed copy of Stombaugh’s “SAFPF PROGRESS REPORT” was filed with the

trial court. Bercher and Stombaugh noted the existence of “TDC cases” against Stombaugh.

Although Stombaugh is correct that the State did not offer the text of the rules and regulations of

the SAFPF into evidence, Bercher’s testimony was sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that Stombaugh violated the rules and regulations of the SAFPF and was discharged by

the SAFPF “specifically for threatening an officer.” Further, in addition to Bercher’s testimony,

the trial court could “use common sense and apply common knowledge” to conclude that

threating an officer was against the rules and regulations of the SAFPF. See Acosta v. State, 429

S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, we

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating Stombaugh’s guilt.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice

Date Submitted: December 29, 2025 Date Decided: December 30, 2025

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