FOR PUBLICATION ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
RONALD L. WILSON PAUL L. FIELDS Badell & Wilson, P.C. The Law Offices of the Liberty Rushville, Indiana Mutual Group Carmel, Indiana
FILED Mar 28 2012, 9:20 am IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court
JANET STEWART, ) ) Appellant-Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) No. 93A02-1108-EX-793 ) RICHMOND COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, ) ) Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION BOARD OF INDIANA Linda P. Hamilton, Chairman Cause No. C-178177
March 28, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
SHARPNACK, Senior Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Janet Stewart appeals the final judgment of the Worker’s Compensation Board of
Indiana (“the Board”) affirming a Single Hearing Member’s (“the Member”)
determination of permanent partial impairment. The Board had previously reversed the
Member’s determination that Stewart was permanently and totally disabled and had
remanded the determination to the Member to establish Stewart’s degree of permanent
partial impairment. We affirm.
ISSUE
Stewart raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the Board’s determination
that she is not permanently and totally disabled is supported by sufficient evidence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stewart worked for the Richmond Community School Corporation (“the School”)
as a physical education teacher. On December 5, 2003, Stewart was spotting a student as
he attempted a gymnastic maneuver. The student fell onto Stewart, causing her to break
her right leg. The injury required surgery and other treatment. Stewart applied for, and
received, worker’s compensation benefits for the surgery and other treatment.
After surgery, Stewart continued to experience pain and difficulty putting weight
on the leg. On December 5, 2004, she fell at home and broke her right hip. Stewart
contended that the fall was caused by continuing problems with her right leg. She did not
return to work at the School after the hip injury.
Stewart applied for worker’s compensation benefits related to her hip injury.
After a hearing, the Member determined that the hip injury was related to Stewart’s
2 work-related leg injury and that Stewart was permanently and totally disabled. The
School appealed the decision to the full Board. The Board affirmed the Member’s
conclusion that Stewart’s hip injury was a compensable claim. However, the Board
reversed the Member’s determination that Stewart was permanently and totally disabled
and remanded for a calculation of her permanent partial impairment. Neither party
appealed the Board’s decision.
On remand, the parties filed factual stipulations and statements of contentions. In
Stewart’s statement of contentions she argued, as she had at the prior hearing, that she
was permanently and totally disabled. In the alternative, she asserted that she “has 39%
impairment.” Appellant’s App. p. 33. The Member concluded that Stewart had sustained
a “39% permanent partial impairment in the amount of $60,100.00.” Id. at 31. Stewart
sought review from the full Board, which affirmed the Member’s determination. This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
In reviewing a worker’s compensation decision, an appellate court is bound by the
factual determinations of the Board and may not disturb them unless the evidence is
undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion. Christopher R. Brown,
D.D.S., Inc. v. Decatur Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 892 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ind. 2008). We
examine the record only to determine whether there is substantial evidence and
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom to support the Board’s findings and
conclusions. Id. As to the Board’s interpretation of the law, an appellate court employs a
deferential standard of review to the interpretation of a statute by an administrative
3 agency charged with its enforcement in light of its expertise in the given area. Id. The
Board will only be reversed if it incorrectly interpreted the Worker’s Compensation Act.
Id.
Stewart argues that the evidence establishes that she is permanently and totally
disabled and the Board’s decision must be reversed. The School contends that Stewart
has waived her claim of permanent and total disability because she did not appeal the
Board’s determination that she was not permanently and totally disabled.
Stewart has not filed a Reply Brief or otherwise responded to the School’s claim
of waiver. When an appellee fails to file a brief responding to the appellant’s arguments,
we may apply a less stringent standard of review, reversing the judgment below if the
appellant establishes prima facie error. Ferguson v. Stevens, 851 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006). In this case, Stewart’s failure to respond to the School’s claim of waiver
is substantially like an appellee’s failure to file a brief. The School’s claim, if
meritorious, is dispositive of Stewart’s appeal. Therefore, we determine that the School
need only establish a prima facie case in support of its claim. Prima facie is defined as at
first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id.
To address the School’s claim of waiver, we must determine whether the Board’s
decision that Stewart was not permanently and totally disabled was a final, appealable
judgment. The School cites no cases in support of its argument and relies solely on
Indiana Code section 22-3-4-8(b) (1986), which governs appeals of the Board’s
decisions. We have found more direct guidance on this subject in our Supreme Court’s
decision in Cox v. Worker’s Comp. Bd., 675 N.E.2d 1053 (Ind. 1996). In that case, a
4 group of injured workers filed a federal class action against the Board, asserting that the
Board improperly refused to issue final awards on compensation claims until the
claimants reached a state of maximum medical improvement. The Board contended that
a decision on temporary benefit issues would not be a final order subject to judicial
review. The federal court asked our Supreme Court to address several certified
questions, including: “without disposing of all of the issues that may exist or arise
between the parties . . . [m]ay the Board make an enforceable and appealable
determination that temporary total disability benefits have been properly terminated?” Id.
at 1055.
Our Supreme Court reviewed the governing statutes and determined that the Board
was authorized to issue an order addressing temporary total disability benefits, and that
such an order would be enforceable in court. Next, the Court turned to whether such an
order would be appealable. The Court noted that by statute, a party to a proceeding
before the Board may seek review of an award at the Court of Appeals. See id. at 1056-
57 (citing Ind. Code § 22-3-4-8). Giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meaning, and noting that the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act is intended to remove
obstacles and provide a more certain, expeditious remedy for injured employees, our
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FOR PUBLICATION ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
RONALD L. WILSON PAUL L. FIELDS Badell & Wilson, P.C. The Law Offices of the Liberty Rushville, Indiana Mutual Group Carmel, Indiana
FILED Mar 28 2012, 9:20 am IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court
JANET STEWART, ) ) Appellant-Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) No. 93A02-1108-EX-793 ) RICHMOND COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, ) ) Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION BOARD OF INDIANA Linda P. Hamilton, Chairman Cause No. C-178177
March 28, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
SHARPNACK, Senior Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Janet Stewart appeals the final judgment of the Worker’s Compensation Board of
Indiana (“the Board”) affirming a Single Hearing Member’s (“the Member”)
determination of permanent partial impairment. The Board had previously reversed the
Member’s determination that Stewart was permanently and totally disabled and had
remanded the determination to the Member to establish Stewart’s degree of permanent
partial impairment. We affirm.
ISSUE
Stewart raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the Board’s determination
that she is not permanently and totally disabled is supported by sufficient evidence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stewart worked for the Richmond Community School Corporation (“the School”)
as a physical education teacher. On December 5, 2003, Stewart was spotting a student as
he attempted a gymnastic maneuver. The student fell onto Stewart, causing her to break
her right leg. The injury required surgery and other treatment. Stewart applied for, and
received, worker’s compensation benefits for the surgery and other treatment.
After surgery, Stewart continued to experience pain and difficulty putting weight
on the leg. On December 5, 2004, she fell at home and broke her right hip. Stewart
contended that the fall was caused by continuing problems with her right leg. She did not
return to work at the School after the hip injury.
Stewart applied for worker’s compensation benefits related to her hip injury.
After a hearing, the Member determined that the hip injury was related to Stewart’s
2 work-related leg injury and that Stewart was permanently and totally disabled. The
School appealed the decision to the full Board. The Board affirmed the Member’s
conclusion that Stewart’s hip injury was a compensable claim. However, the Board
reversed the Member’s determination that Stewart was permanently and totally disabled
and remanded for a calculation of her permanent partial impairment. Neither party
appealed the Board’s decision.
On remand, the parties filed factual stipulations and statements of contentions. In
Stewart’s statement of contentions she argued, as she had at the prior hearing, that she
was permanently and totally disabled. In the alternative, she asserted that she “has 39%
impairment.” Appellant’s App. p. 33. The Member concluded that Stewart had sustained
a “39% permanent partial impairment in the amount of $60,100.00.” Id. at 31. Stewart
sought review from the full Board, which affirmed the Member’s determination. This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
In reviewing a worker’s compensation decision, an appellate court is bound by the
factual determinations of the Board and may not disturb them unless the evidence is
undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion. Christopher R. Brown,
D.D.S., Inc. v. Decatur Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 892 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ind. 2008). We
examine the record only to determine whether there is substantial evidence and
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom to support the Board’s findings and
conclusions. Id. As to the Board’s interpretation of the law, an appellate court employs a
deferential standard of review to the interpretation of a statute by an administrative
3 agency charged with its enforcement in light of its expertise in the given area. Id. The
Board will only be reversed if it incorrectly interpreted the Worker’s Compensation Act.
Id.
Stewart argues that the evidence establishes that she is permanently and totally
disabled and the Board’s decision must be reversed. The School contends that Stewart
has waived her claim of permanent and total disability because she did not appeal the
Board’s determination that she was not permanently and totally disabled.
Stewart has not filed a Reply Brief or otherwise responded to the School’s claim
of waiver. When an appellee fails to file a brief responding to the appellant’s arguments,
we may apply a less stringent standard of review, reversing the judgment below if the
appellant establishes prima facie error. Ferguson v. Stevens, 851 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006). In this case, Stewart’s failure to respond to the School’s claim of waiver
is substantially like an appellee’s failure to file a brief. The School’s claim, if
meritorious, is dispositive of Stewart’s appeal. Therefore, we determine that the School
need only establish a prima facie case in support of its claim. Prima facie is defined as at
first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id.
To address the School’s claim of waiver, we must determine whether the Board’s
decision that Stewart was not permanently and totally disabled was a final, appealable
judgment. The School cites no cases in support of its argument and relies solely on
Indiana Code section 22-3-4-8(b) (1986), which governs appeals of the Board’s
decisions. We have found more direct guidance on this subject in our Supreme Court’s
decision in Cox v. Worker’s Comp. Bd., 675 N.E.2d 1053 (Ind. 1996). In that case, a
4 group of injured workers filed a federal class action against the Board, asserting that the
Board improperly refused to issue final awards on compensation claims until the
claimants reached a state of maximum medical improvement. The Board contended that
a decision on temporary benefit issues would not be a final order subject to judicial
review. The federal court asked our Supreme Court to address several certified
questions, including: “without disposing of all of the issues that may exist or arise
between the parties . . . [m]ay the Board make an enforceable and appealable
determination that temporary total disability benefits have been properly terminated?” Id.
at 1055.
Our Supreme Court reviewed the governing statutes and determined that the Board
was authorized to issue an order addressing temporary total disability benefits, and that
such an order would be enforceable in court. Next, the Court turned to whether such an
order would be appealable. The Court noted that by statute, a party to a proceeding
before the Board may seek review of an award at the Court of Appeals. See id. at 1056-
57 (citing Ind. Code § 22-3-4-8). Giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meaning, and noting that the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act is intended to remove
obstacles and provide a more certain, expeditious remedy for injured employees, our
Supreme Court concluded that an order regarding temporary total disability benefits is a
final decision subject to appellate review, even though the parties’ dispute is not yet fully
resolved as to all issues.
Here, the Board’s reversal of the Member’s determination that Stewart was
permanently and totally disabled is analogous to a ruling on temporary total disability as
5 discussed in Cox. The parties fully argued the question of permanent and total disability,
and nothing remained to be addressed after the Board issued its ruling. In fact, the
Board’s determination that Stewart was not permanently and totally disabled is more
definite than a determination of temporary total disability, because the status of
temporary total disability is subject to further evidentiary developments. Furthermore,
appellate review of the Board’s decision that Stewart was not permanently and totally
disabled would have promoted judicial efficiency, because a reversal of the Board’s
decision would have eliminated the need for further proceedings before the Member.
Consequently, based on the holding in Cox, we conclude that the Board’s determination
that Stewart was not permanently and totally disabled was a final award subject to
appellate review. Stewart failed to seek appellate review of the Board’s determination.
As a result, Stewart has waived any claim of error related to the Board’s decision that she
is not permanently and totally disabled. The School has presented a prima facie case in
support of its claim of waiver and we therefore find no reversible error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the Board.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.