Jane Doe v. Rosenberg

Second Circuit

Jane Doe v. Rosenberg

166 F.3d 507, 1999 WL 38387

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJanuary 29, 1999

Docket1065, Docket 98-7803

StatusPublished

Cited by35 cases

This text of 166 F.3d 507 (Jane Doe v. Rosenberg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jane Doe v. Rosenberg, 166 F.3d 507, 1999 WL 38387 (2d Cir. 1999).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

On May 5,1996, [ Jane ] [ Doe ] was involuntarily committed to the psychiatric ward at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center. After successfully challenging her confinement pursuant to § 9.31 of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law, she was released on May 16, 1996. She then brought suit alleging, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , that her physician, as well as Columbia Presbyterian and several of Columbia Presbyterian’s employees — all private individuals or entities — had violated rights secured to her by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. [ Doe ]s complaint also contained several state law causes of action.

The district court, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed [ Doe ]s § 1983 claim on the ground that the defendants are not state actors and that they therefore did not act under color of state law. See [ Doe ] v. Rosenberg, 996 F.Supp. 343 , 348-58 (S.D.N.Y.1998). The court dismissed [ Doe ]s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3) (1994). See id. at 358 . On appeal, [ Doe ] challenges the district court’s conclusion that the defendants are not state actors. She also challenges certain of the district court’s discovery rulings.

On the question of whether the defendants acted under color of state law, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s comprehensive and scholarly opinion. We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying [ Doe ] the discovery she sought.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

On May 5,1996, [ Jane ] [ Doe ] was involuntarily committed to the psychiatric ward at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center. After successfully challenging her confinement pursuant to § 9.31 of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law, she was released on May 16, 1996. She then brought suit alleging, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , that her physician, as well as Columbia Presbyterian and several of Columbia Presbyterian’s employees — all private individuals or entities — had violated rights secured to her by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. [ Doe ]s complaint also contained several state law causes of action.

The district court, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed [ Doe ]s § 1983 claim on the ground that the defendants are not state actors and that they therefore did not act under color of state law. See [ Doe ] v. Rosenberg, 996 F.Supp. 343 , 348-58 (S.D.N.Y.1998). The court dismissed [ Doe ]s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3) (1994). See id. at 358 . On appeal, [ Doe ] challenges the district court’s conclusion that the defendants are not state actors. She also challenges certain of the district court’s discovery rulings.

On the question of whether the defendants acted under color of state law, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s comprehensive and scholarly opinion. We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying [ Doe ] the discovery she sought.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

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166 F.3d 507, 1999 WL 38387, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jane-doe-v-rosenberg-ca2-1999.

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