Jane Doe v. Grass Lake Community Schools
This text of Jane Doe v. Grass Lake Community Schools (Jane Doe v. Grass Lake Community Schools) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
Jane Doe,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-13766
v. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge Grass Lake Community Schools, Mag. Judge Kimberly G. Altman Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER [4], VACATING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE [3], AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO NOMINATE A REPRESENTATIVE
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for protective order to proceed under a pseudonym (ECF No. 4) and Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s order to show cause (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff Jane Doe, a minor, filed the complaint in this matter on November 24, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint was filed anonymously, with the Plaintiff using the pseudonym “Jane Doe.” (Id.) Plaintiff sues Grass Lake Community Schools, alleging that Defendant violated Jane Doe’s First and Fourteenth Amendments rights. (See id.) I. Ex Parte Motion for Protective Order to Proceed Under a Pseudonym (ECF No. 4) A plaintiff may only proceed under a pseudonym by filing a motion for a protective order. Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004);
Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. Marsh, 123 F. App’x 630, 636 (6th Cir. 2005). “As a general matter, a complaint must state the names of all parties,” but a court “may excuse plaintiffs from identifying themselves in certain
circumstances.” Porter, 370 F.3d at 560. Several considerations determine whether a plaintiff’s privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings. They include: (1) whether the plaintiffs seeking anonymity are suing to challenge governmental activity; (2) whether prosecution of the suit will compel the plaintiffs to disclose information “of the utmost intimacy”; (3) whether the litigation compels plaintiffs to disclose an intention to violate the law, thereby risking criminal prosecution; and (4) whether the plaintiffs are children. Id. (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185–86 (5th Cir. 1981)). The Court finds that all of Porter factors weigh in favor of Plaintiff’s anonymity. Plaintiff easily meets the first and fourth Porter factors. This suit challenges the actions of a public school and its employees, which are government actors. Further, this case concerns a child. Minor Doe is “not even 10 years old.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.26.) Plaintiffs who are children are especially vulnerable and courts routinely grant them “a heightened protection.” See Porter, 370 F.3d at 561 (discussing the “special
vulnerability” of the “very young children” in that case); Doe v. Mechanicsburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1027 (S.D. Ohio
2021) (“Courts frequently grant protective orders to minors who challenge governmental conduct.”). The second and third Porter factor also weigh in favor of Plaintiff’s
anonymity. Plaintiff argues that “religion is perhaps the quintessentially private matter” and that “revelations about their personal beliefs and practices . . . invit[e] an opprobrium analogous to the infamy associated
with criminal behavior.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.26–27 (citing Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186).) According to the complaint, “Defendant, through school board members . . . retaliated against Plaintiff because of her mother[’s]
promotion of her conservative, Christian-based political campaign.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) Anonymity is reasonable considering these circumstances.
Finally, the Court finds that this protective order would not hinder Defendant’s ability to litigate this case. See Porter, 370 F.3d at 561 (discussing the effect of anonymity on the defendant’s ability to conduct discovery and prepare for trial). Based on the allegations in the complaint, it is very likely that Defendant knows the identity of Jane
Doe. The events described in the complaint occurred very recently, and the dates and descriptions of the investigation following the incident and
other contact between the parties are identifying. See Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Loc. Sch. Dist. v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16-CV- 524, 2016 WL 4269080, at *5 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2016) (determining
that “[t]here is no question that the parties in this suit already know Jane’s true identity” based on the circumstances). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for protective order (ECF
No. 4) is GRANTED. II. Order Vacating Order to Show Cause and Ordering Plaintiff to Nominate a Representative On December 4, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff Jane Doe to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of capacity to sue.
(ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff responded on January 5, 2026. (ECF No. 5.) The appropriate action has been taken. Accordingly, the Court’s order to show cause has been satisfied and is VACATED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) and (c) govern a minor’s capacity to sue in federal court. As set forth by Rule 17(c), a general guardian, a committee, a conservator, or a like fiduciary may sue on behalf of a minor when the minor is represented. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1).
The Sixth Circuit has held that the capacity for a representative to sue on behalf of a minor “shall be determined by the law of the state in which
the district court is held,” as set forth by Rule 17(b). Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1964); see also Dwayne B. v. Granholm, No. 06-13548, 2007 WL 1140920, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 17,
2007) (“Defendants correctly construe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 17(b) and 17(c) and observe that the forum state’s capacity rules govern who may bring suit in federal court when acting in a representative
capacity.”). “A minor may sue and be sued as provided by MCR 2.201(E), which lays out the rules of representation and the procedure for appointing
representatives for minors in court proceedings, including for minor plaintiffs.” Olin v. Mercy Health Hackley Campus, 328 Mich. App. 337, 348 (2019). Michigan Court Rule 2.201(E), however, does not waive the
requirement of appointing representation for a minor. “If a minor or incompetent person does not have a conservator to represent the person as plaintiff, the court shall appoint a competent and responsible person to appear as next friend on his or her behalf.” Mich. Ct. R. 2.201(E)(1)(b) (emphasis added).1 If the minor is under 14 years, which is applicable
here (see ECF No. 1, PageID.3), appointment of a representative must be made “on the nomination of the party . . . or . . . if a nomination is not
made or approved within 21 days after service of process, on motion of the court or of a party.” Mich. Ct. R. 2.201(E)(2)(a)(ii)–(iii). While Plaintiff asserts that “it makes no practical difference
whether a minor party obtains an appointment of a next friend before or after the filing of a complaint” (ECF No. 5, PageID.32), the Court still must “appoint a competent and responsible person to appear as next
friend on [the minor’s] behalf.” See Mich. Ct. R. 2.201(E)(1)(b). As a result, the Court orders Plaintiff to nominate, in writing, by February 20, 2026, an appropriate representative to appear on behalf of minor Jane Doe,
accompanied by a written consent of the person to be appointed. Mich. Ct. R. 2.201(E)(1)(b), (2)(a)(ii)–(iii). IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 24, 2026 s/Judith E. Levy Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY
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