Jane Doe v. Georgia Department of Corrections

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: December 23, 2024
• Docket: 24-11382
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 1 of 8

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11382 ____________________

JANE DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORREC- TIONS, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF HEALTH SER- VICES, SHARON LEWIS, Statewide Medical Director, in her official and individual capacities, DESHAWN JONES, Phillips State Prison Warden, in his official and individual capacities, et al., USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 2 of 8

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Defendants-Appellants,

MHM CORRECTIONAL SERVICES LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-05578-MLB ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and MARCUS, Cir- cuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-Appellee, Jane Doe, is a transgender woman cur- rently in the custody of the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”) serving a sentence of life imprisonment. On December 6, 2023, she sued the GDOC and others (collectively, the “GDOC”), claiming that they were violating her Eighth Amend- ment constitutional rights by refusing to provide her medically nec- essary care to treat her gender dysphoria. The same day Doe filed suit in the district court, she filed accompanying motions, one seek- ing leave to proceed in the case anonymously and another seeking preliminary injunctive relief. In resolving these motions, the USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 3 of 8

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district court issued a Pseudonym Order, granting Doe the right to proceed under a pseudonym, and a Preliminary Injunction Order, granting in part and denying in part her request for preliminary in- junctive relief. The GDOC has filed an interlocutory appeal in this Court challenging both orders. The GDOC seeks to vacate both the district court’s preliminary injunction and its pseudonym or- der. We will address that appeal in a separate opinion at a later date. In the meantime, the GDOC has moved us to unseal the ap- pellate record. While the parties hotly dispute whether we have jurisdiction now to review the district court’s Pseudonym Order, there is no dispute that we have the power to decide a motion to unseal our own docket. “When presented with an appeal, [courts of appeals] routinely unseal documents that were sealed in the dis- trict court when those documents are used on appeal and there is no legal basis for sealing.” June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512, 518 n.3 (5th Cir. 2022); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (noting the inherent powers “necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expe- ditious disposition of cases” (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962))). The GDOC’s cross-motion to unseal only addresses the appellate record accompanying this interlocutory ap- peal. We consider this to be a matter of considerable immediacy and find it appropriate to address it now, separate from our consid- eration of the merits of GDOC’s interlocutory appeal. USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 4 of 8

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As we’ve long recognized, “[l]awsuits are public events.” Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992). We view “‘[t]he oper- ations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges” as “matters of utmost public concern’” because “‘[t]he common-law right of access to judicial proceedings, an essential component of our sys- tem of justice, is instrumental in securing the integrity of the pro- cess.’” Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007) (first quoting Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978); and then quoting Chicago Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001)). This is especially the case in criminal trials where the public’s right of access “plays a particu- larly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606, 610-11 (1982) (holding that a Massachusetts statute providing for the exclusion of the general public from criminal tri- als of specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18 violated the First Amendment). Public scrutiny “enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process,” and “permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process.” Id. at 606. Moreover, “open proceedings may be imperative if the public is to learn about the crucial legal issues that help shape modern society.” Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983). It is undeniable that “[i]nformed public opinion is critical to effective self-governance.” Id. For these reasons, the Su- preme Court has held that “a right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly afforded protection by the First Amend- ment.” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605 (emphasis omitted). USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 5 of 8

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In civil cases, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure similarly provide that “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Just as in the criminal context, this require- ment is more than some procedural formality; it reflects the First Amendment’s “guarantees [that] are implicated when a court de- cides to restrict public scrutiny of judicial proceedings.” Doe v. Ste- gall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981). 1 So, whenever we con- sider whether to close some aspect of a judicial proceeding, we can- not do so lightly. See id. This is especially true when we are tasked with reviewing “civil trials” that “pertain to the release or incarcer- ation of prisoners and the conditions of their confinement,” which “are presumptively open to the press and public.” Newman, 696 F.2d at 801. “If it is beneficial to have public scrutiny of criminal proceedings that may result in conviction and punishment,” then it is surely beneficial to allow public access to civil proceedings that affect that punishment. Id. Nevertheless, we’ve acknowledged that there may be com- pelling circumstances where it is appropriate to allow a party to proceed anonymously. After all, “[t]he public right to scrutinize governmental functioning . . . is not so completely impaired by a grant of anonymity to a party as it is by closure of the trial itself.” Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185. This is because at least sometimes party anonymity may not “obstruct the public’s view of the issues joined

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we

adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981. USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 6 of 8

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or the court’s performance in resolving them.” Id. Thus, the pub- lic’s interest in a party’s name, the who, sometimes may be far less significant than disclosing the how and the why surrounding the decisional process. We’ve said, for example, that “[a] party may proceed anonymously in federal court by establishing a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally- embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” In re: Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2020) (cita- tion omitted). A party seeking anonymity, however, bears the heavy burden of establishing that her privacy rights outweigh the powerful presumption of open judicial proceedings. Id. at 1247-48. We have found, on occasion, a substantial privacy interest in cases involving mental illness, homosexuality, and transsexual- ity. See Frank, 951 F.2d at 324 (collecting cases). “[W]here the is- sues involved are matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature, such as . . . homosexuality . . . , the normal practice of disclosing the parties’ identities yields to a policy of protecting privacy in a very private matter.” S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women L. Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Sometimes “the social stigma attached to the plaintiff’s disclosure was found to be enough to overcome the presumption of openness in court proceedings.” Frank, 951 F.2d at 324. The case before us -- which arises out of Doe’s transgender status and her gender dysphoria treatment -- deals with infor- mation of the utmost intimacy. The facts, which are now part of this appellate record, describe Doe’s struggles with gender USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 7 of 8

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dysphoria, her LGBTQ+ status, her mental illness, her attempts at self-mutilation including self-castration, and multiple suicide at- tempts. In fact, the GDOC does not contest that this case deals with highly sensitive and personal information. Instead, it argues that Doe has forfeited any privacy right in this information by filing previous lawsuits that publicly revealed much of the same infor- mation at stake here. We have studied this interlocutory record closely and are convinced that there remain sufficiently compelling reasons to al- low Doe to proceed anonymously in this proceeding, and at this time. As everyone seems to agree, revealing Doe’s identity in this interlocutory proceeding would compel the disclosure of deeply personal and private information associated with a high degree of social stigma. Moreover, the danger of physical harm appears to be real. We are particularly reluctant to unseal Doe’s identity now because this cross-motion comes to us on appeal from a prelimi- nary injunction order, on a preliminary record, and the district court is still hearing the bulk of the underlying case. The totality of the circumstances counsels that Doe should be allowed to pro- ceed under a pseudonym in these interlocutory proceedings. That being said, the public’s right of access to judicial pro- ceedings “includes the right to inspect and copy public records and documents.” Chicago Trib. Co., 263 F.3d at 1311. We recognize that this is a case pertaining to conditions of prisoner confinement and it is undeniable that the public has a powerful interest in the non- identifying information involved in these proceedings. Most USCA11 Case: 24-11382 Document: 70 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Page: 8 of 8

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pertinently, the public has a strong interest in access to the tran- script of the preliminary injunction hearing which, like much of the interlocutory record, has been filed in our docket under seal. In- deed, if the right to inspect judicial records is to mean anything, it must mean that the public has a right to review the evidence that led the district court to its preliminary conclusions, and that will undoubtedly inform this Court in addressing the matters now be- fore us. Unsealing the materials on file in our Court but redacting the Plaintiff’s name is consistent with the district court’s Pseudo- nym Order and will not disturb the ability of the district court to conduct the ongoing proceedings as it sees fit. Accordingly, while we conclude that it remains wise now to keep Doe’s identity sealed, we can discern no sound reason to keep the full interlocutory record on file in our Court under seal. We, therefore, direct the parties to counsel with each other, review the materials that have been filed under seal in our Court, and file with us in an unsealed form the appellate record, after redacting from those materials Doe’s name and such other information in the rec- ord that would reasonably identify her. In short, the GDOC’s motion to unseal the appellate record is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The parties shall file an appropriately redacted version of the currently sealed record evidence within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.