NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1675-19T3
JANAK SARKARIA, M.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUMMIT ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, P.A.,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
OVERLOOK MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant. _________________________
Submitted January 4, 2021 – Decided January 22, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-6481-16.
Jean-Marc Zimmerman, attorney for appellant. Bressler Amery & Ross, P.C., attorneys for respondent (Lauren Fenton-Valdivia and Michael T. Hensley, of counsel and on the brief; Justin E. Condit, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from two orders: one granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant and dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract and punitive
damages claims for alleged age discrimination under the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination (LAD); and another granting a directed verdict in favor
of defendant on plaintiff's remaining LAD claim. Plaintiff claims that her
employer, defendant Summit Anesthesia Associates (SAA), forced her
termination based on her age and high salary when Mednax acquired the practice
and that defendant used unfounded and unproven allegations that she deviated
from the applicable professional standard of care to oust her from the practice.
Plaintiff produced no evidence in support of her discrimination case and failed
to show that defendant's business reason for termination was pretextual. We
therefore affirm.
Plaintiff is a sixty-nine-year-old anesthesiologist who began working at
SAA in 1977. SAA employed plaintiff as an attending physician to provide
anesthesia services at both Overlook Hospital (Overlook) and other outpatient
centers. Plaintiff executed an employment agreement with SAA (the
A-1675-19T3 2 employment agreement) with an effective date of December 31, 2013, and a term
of three years, ending December 31, 2016. Pertinent to this appeal, the
employment agreement provided that SAA could terminate plaintiff "in the
event [plaintiff] shall have a [d]isability for ninety-one . . . days or more in any
one hundred twenty . . . consecutive day period." In January 2014, Mednax, a
large national company that acquires medical practices, acquired SAA. Around
this time, co-workers began asking plaintiff when she was going to retire, slow
down, or take fewer calls.
On October 2, 2015, plaintiff participated in a caesarian section at
Overlook and rendered care to a patient after an attending physician found the
patient was exhibiting signs of post-partum hemorrhage. Doctors and nurses not
affiliated with SAA filed complaints about plaintiff's handling of the patient,
characterizing plaintiff's care as "chaotic" and "threatening." Thereafter,
Overlook made a request that plaintiff be temporarily removed from the
obstetrics (OB) call schedule until an investigation could be completed. SAA
kept plaintiff on the regular anesthesiology schedule as a full-time employee.
Plaintiff worked her regular daytime shifts from October 5, 2015 to
October 8, 2015. On October 8, 2015, SAA scheduled plaintiff for an OB call
shift, which she worked under the supervision of another attending physician
A-1675-19T3 3 because she was not allowed to take calls without supervision. On October 9,
2015, plaintiff met with Dr. Paris, then-director of SAA, who reiterated that
plaintiff was not to take OB calls temporarily. Plaintiff believed this decision
was permanent, that she was effectively terminated between October 13 and
October 28, 2015, and was therefore only working per diem. Plaintiff's pay and
benefits did not change during the time frame that she was temporarily removed
from the OB call schedule.
On October 9, 2015, plaintiff left on a pre-planned vacation and returned
to Overlook on October 26, 2015 for her scheduled shift. Plaintiff was "nervous
and so shaky," "didn't feel comfortable" administering anesthesia, was unable to
perform her job, and asked to be relieved from her shift. Plaintiff reported
becoming anxious after her removal from the OB call schedule, having panic
attacks, and having difficulty sleeping. She began treatment in October 2015
with a psychiatrist, Dr. Syeda Hasan, M.D., who diagnosed her with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
On October 28, 2015, after completion of all investigations, SAA decided
plaintiff would not be terminated and could return to the OB call schedule upon
completion of an obstetrics training simulation. Plaintiff said she "was not in
any shape [or] form" to participate in the simulation and never did.
A-1675-19T3 4 Plaintiff did not return to work at SAA after her October 26, 2015 shift.
For approximately one year following this date, plaintiff was on short -term
disability, long-term disability, and received leave under the Family Medical
Leave Act. Plaintiff continued to be a full-time employee of SAA during the
time she was on a medical leave of absence from October 26, 2015 until
November 7, 2016. SAA contacted plaintiff multiple times to determine when
she would be able to rejoin the practice, complete the simulation, and return to
the regular anesthesia call schedule. On November 7, 2016, SAA served
plaintiff with a letter terminating her employment pursuant to the long-term
disability provision of her employment agreement.
On November 4, 2016, plaintiff filed her complaint alleging age
discrimination and breach of contract related to her removal from the OB call
schedule and the termination of her employment agreement. On April 12, 2019,
defendant moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice. On May 10, 2019, after hearing oral argument, the
motion judge granted defendant's motion with respect to plaintiff's breach of
contract and punitive damages claims. The motion judge allowed part of
plaintiff's age discrimination claim under the LAD to proceed because he found
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the termination of
A-1675-19T3 5 plaintiff's employment in November 2016 violated the LAD. Although he found
that part of the age discrimination claim survived summary judgment, he ruled
that plaintiff's removal from the OB call schedule did not constitute an adverse
employment action.
Trial began on December 2, 2019 before Judge Lisa M. Vignuolo. After
plaintiff presented her case-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict,
which the trial judge granted. The trial judge held that plaintiff had failed to
prove a prima facie claim of discrimination because the evidence established
that she was not able to perform her job towards the end of October 2015, the
record was devoid of any evidence of age discrimination, and there was no
evidence of a causal connection between plaintiff's damages and some adverse
employment action by defendant. In granting defendant's motion, the trial judge
recognized the motion judge's prior ruling on summary judgment that
defendant's conduct in October 2015 did not constitute adverse employment
action as the law of the case.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the following points for this court's
consideration:
POINT I
THE [MOTION JUDGE] COMMITED ERROR IN FINDING THAT [DEFENDANT'S] ACTION IN
A-1675-19T3 6 OCTOBER 2015 DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION[.]
A. [Plaintiff] Established A Prima Facie LAD Case[.]
B. [Plaintiff] Demonstrated That [Defendant's] Business Reason Was Pretext[.]
POINT II
THE [MOTION JUDGE] ERRED IN DISMISSING [PLAINTIFF'S] CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE LAD[.]
POINT III
THE TRIAL [JUDGE] ERRED IN GRANTING [A] DIRECTED VERDICT[.]
We disagree and affirm.
I.
We reject plaintiff's argument that the motion judge erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant because SAA's actions in October 2015
constituted an adverse employment action, plaintiff established a prima facie
LAD case, and plaintiff established that defendant's business reason for the
termination was pretext.
We review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard that
governs the motion judge's decision. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).
A-1675-19T3 7 Under that standard, summary judgment will be granted when "the competent
evidential materials submitted by the parties," viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, show that there are no "genuine issues of material fact"
and that "the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."
Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat, 217
N.J. at 38); accord R. 4:46-2(c). "An issue of material fact is 'genuine only if,
considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the
parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring
the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'"
Grande, 230 N.J. at 24 (quoting Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38). We owe no special
deference to the motion judge's legal analysis. RSI Bank, 234 N.J. at 472 (citing
Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199
(2016)).
The LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, prohibits employment discrimination based
on an employee's age. In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination . . . [f]or an employer, because of the . . . age . . . of any individual . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge or require to retire, unless justified by lawful considerations other than age, from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in
A-1675-19T3 8 compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment[.]
[See also N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.]
"All LAD claims are evaluated in accordance with the United States
Supreme Court's burden-shifting mechanism" established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 546 (2013). A plaintiff claiming age discrimination must
first present evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing age played a determinative role in the adverse employment action.
Bergen Commer. Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 212-13 (1999). Upon plaintiff's
demonstration of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Id. at 210-11.
"[T]o successfully assert a prima facie claim of age discrimination under
the LAD, plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected group;
(2) her job performance met the 'employer's legitimate expectations'; (3) she was
terminated; and (4) the employer replaced, or sought to replace, her." Nini v.
Mercer Cty. Cmty. Coll., 406 N.J. Super. 547, 554 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 450 (2005)), aff'd, 202 N.J. 98,
(2010). Satisfaction of the fourth element "require[s] a showing that the plaintiff
A-1675-19T3 9 was replaced with 'a candidate sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age
discrimination.'" Bergen Commer. Bank, 157 N.J. at 213 (quoting Kelly v.
Bally's Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422, 429 (App. Div. 1995)), or that
otherwise creates an inference of age discrimination, Reynolds v. Palnut Co.,
330 N.J. Super. 162, 168-69 (App. Div. 2000). A plaintiff must "show that the
prohibited consideration[, age,] played a role in the decision[-]making process
and that it had a determinative influence on the outcome of that process." Garnes
v. Passaic Cty., 437 N.J. Super. 520, 530 (App. Div. 2014) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Bergen Commer. Bank, 157 N.J. at 207). "Although the
discrimination must be intentional, an employee may attempt to prove
employment discrimination by using either direct or circumstantial evidence."
Ibid. (quoting Bergen Commer. Bank, 157 N.J. at 208).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, creating an inference of
discrimination, the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to
"articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action."
Zive, 182 N.J. at 449 (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 596
(1988)). Where the defendant does so, "the burden of production shifts back to
the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason
articulated by the employer was merely a pretext for discrimination and not the
A-1675-19T3 10 true reason for the employment decision." Ibid. "To prove pretext, a plaintiff
may not simply show that the employer's reason was false but must also
demonstrate that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent." Ibid.
(citing Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002)). At all times,
however, the burden of proof that the employer engaged in intentional
discrimination remains with the employee. Clowes, 109 N.J. at 596.
The employer is entitled to summary judgment if, after proffering a
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, plaintiff cannot "point to some
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably
either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe
that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of the employer's action." Zive, 182 N.J. at 455-56 (quoting
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Defendant moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice and arguing that plaintiff failed to set forth evidence
to support her claim for breach of contract; plaintiff's temporary removal from
the OB call schedule in October 2015 was not an adverse employment action;
plaintiff failed to show that defendant's legitimate business decision was a
pretext for age discrimination; and plaintiff failed to set forth any evidence to
A-1675-19T3 11 support a claim for punitive damages. In opposition, plaintiff contended that
her temporary removal from the OB call schedule was effectively termination
and that a genuine issue of disputed material fact existed as to whether that
removal constituted an adverse employment action under the LAD.
On May 10, 2019, after hearing oral argument, the motion judge granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims for
breach of contract and punitive damages. 1 In dismissing these claims, the
motion judge held:
There is no question that defendant did company with . . . the employment agreement and I find that there is no basis, no factual basis upon which a reasonable finder of fact could determine that there was a breach of the agreement itself . . . . I didn't hear really any objection to the punitive damages claims being dismissed because there really is no evidence of an intentional decision on the part of [SAA], Dr. Paris or anyone else to terminate her employment for alleged deficiencies. So therefore, the breach of contract claims and the punitive damage claims are dismissed.
The motion judge allowed part of plaintiff's age discrimination claim to
proceed because he found a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the termination of plaintiff's employment in November 2016 violated the LAD.
1 Plaintiff does not contest the dismissal of her breach of contract claim on appeal. A-1675-19T3 12 Although part of plaintiff's age discrimination claim survived summary
judgment, the motion judge ruled that plaintiff's temporary removal from the
call schedule did not constitute an adverse employment action. Applying our
standard of review, we conclude that the motion judge's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant was proper because plaintiff failed to show she
suffered an adverse employment action or that age played a role in her
termination.
Plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered an adverse employment action
as a matter of law. She was not discharged, suspended, or demoted in October
2015. There is no dispute that she did not suffer any reduction in rank,
compensation, or title. The record makes clear that plaintiff was temporarily
removed from the overnight OB call schedule after well-grounded complaints
were filed by both physicians and nurses not affiliated with SAA after she
rendered substandard treatment to a patient, which necessitated an involuntary
hysterectomy. Plaintiff admitted that she continued to work her regular
scheduled shifts and that her pay and benefits did not change. Three weeks later,
following investigations into plaintiff's care, she was permitted to be restored to
the OB call schedule provided she complete simulation training. At this point,
A-1675-19T3 13 plaintiff was medically unable to perform the simulation. Plaintiff said she "was
not in any shape [or] form" to take the simulation and never did.
To the extent that plaintiff claims that her subjective feelings of
embarrassment or ridicule due to either being supervised, removed from the
schedule, or required to complete a simulation are sufficient to constitute an
adverse employment action, this claim also fails as a matter of law. See Heyert
v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 413-14 (App. Div. 2013) (noting that self-
serving statements are insufficient to preclude summary judgment); Horizon
Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 32 (App. Div.), certif.
denied and appeal dismissed, 211 N.J. 608 (2012) (finding that summary
judgment will not be precluded by "[b]are conclusory assertions[] without
factual support in the record"). We therefore agree with the motion judge's
finding that the October 2015 events did not amount to an adverse employment
action.
Taking away the temporary removal of plaintiff from the OB call schedule
in October 2015, the only other event left was plaintiff's termination under the
employee agreement in November 2016. On November 7, 2016, SAA served
plaintiff with a letter terminating her employment with SAA pursuant to the
provision that "[SAA] may terminate [plaintiff's] employment under [the]
A-1675-19T3 14 Agreement upon written notice to [plaintiff] in the event [plaintiff] shall have a
[d]isability for ninety-one days . . . or more in any one hundred twenty . . .
consecutive day period." After October 2015, when plaintiff began treatment
with Dr. Hasan for her PTSD, she was not able to continue working as an
anesthesiologist. She turned down other offers because she was medicated and
felt her mental health status precluded her ability to perform the work required.
Plaintiff did not present any evidence showing that her age played a role
in defendant's actions. Although plaintiff claims that a few of her colleagues
had asked her when she was going to retire, she testified during her deposition
that such discussion "was just a general talk . . . in the anesthesia lounge" and
such remarks were made six to twelve months prior to the incident and her last
shift on October 26, 2015. In contrast, defendant presented evidence showing
that plaintiff was unable to return work in the capacity required as of October
2015. Without the ability to perform work, her LAD claim fails. See Zive, 182
N.J. at 455-56. We therefore conclude that the motion judge properly granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant.
II.
Next, plaintiff argues that the motion judge erred by dismissing her claim
for punitive damages. Plaintiff maintains that the motion judge's dismissal of
A-1675-19T3 15 punitive damages on summary judgment while allowing part of her LAD claim
to survive was "logically inconsistent."
"In exceptional cases punitive damages are awarded as a punishment of
the defendant and as a deterrent to others from following his [or her] example."
Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 55 N.J. 188, 190 (1970); Catalane v. Gilian Instrument
Corp., 271 N.J. Super. 476, 500 (1994). Punitive damages under the LAD are
governed by N.J.S.A. 10:5-3, which authorizes the award of punitive damages
for an LAD violation, and New Jersey's Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-
5.9 to -5.17. There are two essential prerequisites to an award of punitive
damages under the LAD: proof of actual participation of upper management or
willful indifference; and proof that the conduct was especially egregious.
Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 204 N.J. 239, 274 (2010) (citing Rendine v.
Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 313-14 (1995)).
The Court in Rendine, 141 N.J. at 314, described the conduct that is
sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages as follows:
[T]he defendant's conduct must have been wantonly reckless or malicious. There must be an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an "evil-minded act" or an act accompanied by a wanton and wil[l]ful disregard of the rights of another . . . . The key to the right to punitive damages is the wrongfulness of the intentional act.
A-1675-19T3 16 [(quoting Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 49-50 (1984)).]
In dismissing plaintiff's claim, the motion judge held:
I didn't hear really any objection to the punitive damages claims being dismissed because there really is no evidence of an intentional decision on the part of [SAA], Dr. Paris or anyone else to terminate her employment for alleged deficiencies. So therefore, the breach of contract claims and the punitive damage claims are dismissed.
The dismissal was warranted here where plaintiff did not show
participation by management, willful indifference, or especially egregious
conduct. Plaintiff nevertheless contends that because an issue of material fact
existed as to whether SAA violated the LAD, she therefore sustained her burden
of alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff cites
to no authority—and indeed none exists—that a plaintiff is entitled to present a
claim for punitive damages by showing an alleged violation of the LAD. Rather,
case law demonstrates that a deficient claim for punitive damages may be
dismissed, even where a LAD claim survives summary judgment. See Woods-
Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super 252, 273 (App. Div. 1996) (affirming
the grant of summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's punitive damages claim
where defendant's conduct was not "especially egregious" or "willfully
indifferent," despite reversing the dismissal of plaintiff's sexual harassment
A-1675-19T3 17 claim under the LAD). The motion judge's dismissal was therefore proper where
plaintiff did not show participation by management, willful indifference, or
especially egregious conduct, regardless of whether part of plaintiff's LAD claim
survived summary judgment.
III.
Lastly, we reject plaintiff's argument that the trial judge erred both "in
following as the law of the case the motion [judge's] rulings" and "on that basis
granting SAA a directed verdict."
In deciding a motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence, the
trial judge must "accept as true all evidence presented . . . and the legitimate
inferences drawn therefrom, to determine whether the proofs are sufficient to
sustain a judgment[.]" Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., 434 N.J. Super.
558, 569 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd, 223 N.J. 245 (2015). The trial judge is not
concerned with "the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence,
but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the party opposing the
motion." Ibid. (quoting Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5-6 (1969)).
If reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, the motion must be
denied. Id. at 569-70. However, if the evidence is such that one party must
prevail as a matter of law, then a directed verdict is appropriate. Frugis v.
A-1675-19T3 18 Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 269 (2003). We will apply the same standard that
governed the trial judge when reviewing an order granting or denying a motion
for directed verdict. Ibid.
The law of the case doctrine generally prohibits a second judge, in the
absence of additional developments or proofs, from differing with an earlier
ruling. See Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 (2011). The doctrine is a
"non-binding rule intended to 'prevent re[-]litigation of a previously resolved
issue.'" Id. at 538 (quoting In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 311 (2008)).
"A hallmark of the law of the case doctrine is its discretionary nature, calling
upon the deciding judge to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings
of a coordinate judge against those 'factors that bear on the pursuit of justice
and, particularly, the search for truth.'" Id. at 539 (quoting Hart v. City of Jersey
City, 308 N.J. Super. 487, 498 (App. Div. 1998)). While the law of the case
doctrine is a discretionary, non-binding rule, "[p]rior decisions on legal issues
should be followed unless there is substantially different evidence at a
subsequent trial, new controlling authority, or the prior decision was clearly
erroneous." Sisler v. Gannett Co., 222 N.J. Super. 153, 159 (App. Div. 1987).
After plaintiff presented her case-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed
verdict arguing that plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of age
A-1675-19T3 19 discrimination under the LAD; present any evidence of pretext; and prove that
she suffered any damages as a result of the alleged age based discrimination.
The trial judge granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict and held that
plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination because the
evidence established that she was not able to perform her job at SAA beginning
in the end of October 2015; the record was devoid of any evidence of age
discrimination; and there was no evidence of a causal connection between
plaintiff's damages and some adverse employment action by defendant. In
granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge recognized the
motion judge's prior ruling on summary judgment that defendant's conduct in
October 2015 did not constitute an adverse employment action as the law of the
case. The trial judge expanded upon the issue of plaintiff's removal from the
OB call schedule:
[T]he record is clear that plaintiff never received a reduction in her salary or anything associated with actions that were taken following the [patient] incident that had a disparaging effect upon her ability to collect her salary and to proceed under the terms of the contract, which is what she did.
There was no reason for the trial judge to depart from the motion judge's findings
on summary judgment because there was no new controlling legal authority and
the ruling was not "clearly erroneous" because it was based on the prevailing
A-1675-19T3 20 case law and the evidence in the record. Plaintiff attempts to assert that there
was substantially different evidence presented at trial, which would warrant a
departure from the motion judge's ruling. Specifically, plaintiff asserts for the
first time that SAA testified that it sought to terminate plaintiff before any
formal investigation had concluded. This contention is belied by the record,
which clearly reflects that no adverse employment action occurred in October
2015. Specifically, the record shows that after complaints were made about her
substandard care plaintiff continued to work all of her regular shifts, plaintiff
was only temporarily removed from the OB call schedule for safety reasons,
plaintiff continued to work her October 26, 2015 shift even after she believed
she was terminated, SAA decided not to terminate plaintiff after completing its
investigation, plaintiff's pay and benefits did not change when she was removed
from the OB call schedule, and plaintiff remained an employee of SAA and was
on medical leave until her employment was terminated pursuant to the terms of
the employment agreement in November 2016. We therefore conclude that
judge's grant of defendant's motion for a directed verdict was proper.
Affirmed.
A-1675-19T3 21