JAMSHIDBEK RAVSHAN UGLI UROLBOEV v. WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY DETENTION CENTER, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-02158
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 JAMSHIDBEK RAVSHAN UGLI Case No. 1:26-cv-02158-JLT-SAB-HC UROLBOEV, 11 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO Petitioner, GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 12 HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT v. RESPONDENTS TO IMMEDIATELY 13 RELEASE PETITIONER WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY 14 DETENTION CENTER, et al.,

15 Respondents.

16 17 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff is a twenty-two year old citizen of Uzbekistan who entered the United States on 22 or about December 31, 2023 when he was nineteen years old.1 (ECF No. 1 at 3.2) Petitioner was 23 apprehended by Respondents soon upon his arrival and paroled into the United States on 24 conditions of supervision by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), including 25 regular check-ins. Petitioner has no criminal or prior immigration record. (Id. at 5–6.) 26 1 The petition also states that Petitioner “entered the United States when he was a minor.” (ECF 1 at 5.) However, 27 given that the petition consistently states that Petitioner is currently twenty-two years old, he could not have been a minor on December 31, 2023, two years and four months ago. 1 On January 2, 2024, Respondents filed the notice to appear (“NTA”) charging Petitioner 2 as a noncitizen “present in the United States without having been inspected or paroled” and as 3 inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (ECF 4 No. 1 at 6, 27.) Petitioner appeared as ordered for his court hearings and filed an application for 5 asylum before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). (ECF No. 1 at 6.) 6 On January 13, 2025, a New York state court appointed a guardian for Petitioner,3 7 finding that Petitioner had been abandoned and/or neglected by his father, granted the Special 8 Juvenile Petition/Motion, and determined that it is not in the best interests of Petitioner to be 9 removed to Uzbekistan. (ECF No. 4 at 18–23.) Petitioner filed an I-360 Petition and an I-485 10 Application for Adjustment of Status with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 11 (“USCIS”) to adjust his status to Legal Permanent Resident that remain pending. (ECF No. 1 at 12 6.) 13 On January 16, 2026, Petitioner appeared at his regularly scheduled check-in with 14 Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) New York City. At the appointment Petitioner 15 was arrested without explanation or notice of revocation of his parole or release on supervision, 16 without an opportunity to rebut or be heard by a neutral adjudicator, and without an opportunity 17 to receive the assistance of his retained immigration counsel. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) 18 On March 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for 19 temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 4.) The district judge denied the motion for 20 TRO as untimely. (ECF No. 5.) On April 9, 2026, Respondents filed an answer, and Petitioner 21 filed a traverse on April 21, 2026. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) 22 II. 23 DISCUSSION 24 Petitioner asserts that his detention violates substantive due process, procedural due 25 process, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), bond regulations, and the Accardi doctrine (ECF No. 1 at 17–22.) 26

27 3 At the time, Petitioner was over eighteen years of age and agreed to a guardship until he turned twenty-one years old. (ECF No. 4 at 18.) “Petitioner is now 22 years old, and the guardianship has dissolved by operation of the Court 1 “Respondents maintain that Petitioner is an ‘applicant for admission’ who is subject to 2 mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).” (ECF No. 7 at 1.) 3 A. Statutory Framework 4 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal 5 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory 6 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of 7 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto- 8 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 9 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been 10 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection 11 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 12 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in 13 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’”4 14 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under 15 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Avilez, 16 69 F.4th at 529. “When a person is apprehended under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial 17 custody determination,” and the noncitizen “will be released if he ‘demonstrate[s] to the 18 satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and 19 that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.’” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 20 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). 21 “[A]n alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not 22 been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 23 287 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). “Applicants for admission must ‘be inspected by 24 immigration officers’ to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. 25 immigration law.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3)). “[A]pplicants for 26

27 4 Subsection C, which is not at issue here, “provides for the detention of ‘criminal aliens’ and states that ‘[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who’ is deportable or inadmissible based on a qualifying, 1 admission fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by 2 § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. “Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize the 3 detention of certain aliens.” Id. 4 “Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, 5 misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain 6 other aliens designated by the Attorney General in his discretion.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 7 (citations omitted). “Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed ‘without 8 further hearing or review’ pursuant to an expedited removal process.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. 9 § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). “But if a § 1225(b)(1) alien ‘indicates either an intention to apply for asylum 10 ... or a fear of persecution,’ then that alien is referred for an asylum interview.” Jennings, 583 11 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)). “If an immigration officer determines after 12 that interview that the alien has a credible fear of persecution, ‘the alien shall be detained for 13 further consideration of the application for asylum.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 14 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)). 15 Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for 16 admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is 17 not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a 18 proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus, “[a]ll applicants 19 for admission who are not processed for expedited removal [pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)] are placed 20 in regular removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(2)(A). That process generally entails a hearing 21 before an immigration judge pursuant to § 1229a.” Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 22 503, 507 (9th Cir. 2019). 23 “Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their detention, applicants for 24 admission may be temporarily released on parole ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 25 public benefit.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)) (citing 8 C.F.R. 26 §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017)). “Such parole, however, ‘shall not be regarded as an admission of the 27 alien.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). “Instead, when the 1 custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the 2 same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.’” Jennings, 583 3 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 4 B. Due Process 5 In Count Two of the petition, Petitioner asserts a procedural due process claim. (ECF No. 6 1 at 18–20.) “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 7 including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” 8 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Even when the government has discretion to 9 detain an individual, its subsequent decision to release the individual creates ‘an implicit 10 promise’ that she will be re-detained only if she violates the conditions of her release.” Garro 11 Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-CV-05632-PCP, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 2025 WL 3691938, at *30 (N.D. 12 Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Other courts, 13 including this Court, have held similarly.” J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT-SKO, 14 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (citing Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647- 15 DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025)). “Accordingly, a noncitizen 16 released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining 17 out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, 18 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). 19 Here, Respondents fail to contend with the liberty interest created by the fact that the 20 Petitioner in this case was paroled into the United States. “Respondents recognize that the 21 majority of judges in the Eastern District of California have accepted Petitioner’s arguments.” 22 (ECF No. 7 at 1.) As Respondents have not identified any factual or legal issues in this case that 23 would distinguish it from the Court’s prior decisions that have granted habeas relief in similar 24 circumstances, the Court recommends finding that Petitioner’s re-detention without a pre- 25 deprivation hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for the reasons set 26 forth in Garcia v. Chesnut, No. 1:25-CV-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3771348 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27 31, 2025), J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3523108 (E.D. Cal. 1 Oct. 16, 2025), and Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01228 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, 2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025).5 3 The Court now turns to whether a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing is 4 appropriate in this case. 5 The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” See Zinermon v. 6 Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). However, the Court also recognized that there may be situations that urgently require arrest, in which a 7 prompt post-deprivation hearing is appropriate. Id. at 128 (noting there may be “special case[s]” where a pre-deprivation hearing is impracticable); Guillermo M. 8 R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (“absent evidence of urgent concerns, a pre-deprivation hearing is 9 required to satisfy due process, particularly where an individual has been released on bond by an IJ”). The rapidly developing caselaw on this subject gives limited 10 guidance as to where this line should be drawn. Some courts that have addressed detention-related habeas petitions brought by persons released with enhanced 11 supervision conditions have required pre-deprivation process, but in somewhat different circumstances. In E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, No. C25-1192-KKE, 2025 WL 12 2402130, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025), the district court ordered the release of a petitioner arrested by ICE immediately after appearing in immigration court. 13 That court agreed with the petitioner that ICE’s post hoc explanation that violations warranted his detention was pretextual, given that ICE first became 14 aware of petitioner’s alleged violations a few hours before his immigration hearing, DHS did not raise those violations at the hearing or argue the petitioner 15 should be detained for any reason, and the petitioner was then provided multiple, inconsistent justifications for his arrest. Id. In Arzate v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV- 16 00942-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2230521, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2025), converted to preliminary injunction sub nom, 2025 WL 2411010, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 17 Aug. 20, 2025), the court ordered immediate release of in immigration detainee who had been in compliance with his conditions of release, even though he had 18 incurred a misdemeanor arrest while on parole, in part because no charges were ever filed. 19 In contrast, this Court ordered a parole revocation hearing in Martinez Hernandez 20 v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025), where the petitioner’s records indicated numerous violations. Though 21 Martinez Hernandez offered explanations for the violations and there was a dispute of fact as to whether the violations occurred, ICE’s reliance upon those 22 violations was “not obviously pretexual.” Id. at * 12 (“If Respondent’s view of the facts is correct, it is at least arguable that providing Petitioner with notice and 23 a pre-deprivation hearing would have been impracticable and/or would have motivated his flight.”). As this Court noted in Martinez Hernandez: 24 In similar circumstances, courts have refused to release the petitioners but 25 have ordered timely bond hearings. Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV- 00978-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 26 2025), citing Perera v. Jennings, et. al, No. 21-CV-04136-BLF, 2021 WL 2400981, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2021); Pham v. Becerra, No. 23-CV- 27 1 01288-CRB, 2023 WL 2744397, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023). “[A]llowing a neutral arbiter to review the facts would significantly reduce 2 the risk of erroneous deprivation.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV- 05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025). Thus, the 3 Court concludes that prompt, post-deprivation process is required here.

4 Id. 5 J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108, at *11–12. 6 Here, Respondents do not argue that Petitioner’s re-detention was based on any violations 7 or that Petitioner is now considered a flight risk or danger to the community. Accordingly, the 8 Court recommends that a pre-deprivation hearing is appropriate based on the facts of this case, 9 and that “the burden at any such hearing [be placed] on the government to demonstrate to a 10 neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that re-detention is necessary to prevent 11 danger to the community or flight.” J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108, at *14 (citing Pinchi v. Noem, 12 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 2025 WL 2084921, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2025)). See J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 13 3523108, at *14 (“[T]he immigrant’s initial release reflected a determination by the government 14 that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. Since it is the government 15 that initiated re-detention, it follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of 16 providing a justification for the re-detention.”). 17 III. 18 RECOMMENDATION 19 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 20 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED on Count Two; 21 2. Respondents be directed to immediately release Petitioner on the conditions of his prior 22 release from custody until DHS proves to a neutral adjudicator by clear and convincing 23 evidence that re-detention is necessary to prevent danger to the community or flight. 24 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 25 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 26 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 27 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any 1 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 2 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days 3 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate 4 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 5 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 6 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 7 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 8 , | IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ae 10 | Dated: _ May 15, 2026 STANLEY A. BOONE 1] United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28