Jamilah McCray v. Southern New Hampshire University

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00546
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION JAMILAH MCCRAY, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:26-cv-546-N-BN § SOUTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE § UNIVERSITY, § § Defendant. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Jamilah McCray filed a pro se complaint alleging claims under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“HEA”) and its implementing regulations and “federal consumer protection standards.” See Dkt. No. 3 at 3. Senior United States District Judge David C. Godbey referred the lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice. Legal Standards A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on

its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F. App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019). A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted). “[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court

may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)). And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted). A district court’s authority to dismiss an action that “fails to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face’” extends to dismissal of “claims that are ‘clearly

baseless,’ including ‘claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” Starrett, 763 F. App’x at 383-84 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, then Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them”)). Analysis

McCray seeks actual and punitive damages relating to Southern New Hampshire University’s alleged failure to disburse HEA student aid funds within the time period set by 34 C.F.R. § 668.164(e). See Dkt. No. 3-1. But there is no private right of action for violations of the HEA. See, e.g., Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he HEA expressly empowers only the Secretary of Education—not debtors—with the authority to enforce the HEA and

rectify HEA violations” and “does not expressly provide debtors with a private right of action.”); Wescott v. Eastern Univ., No. 25-cv-2088, 2025 WL 1770820, at *2 (E.D. Penn. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases); Brown v. La. Off. of Student Fin. Assistance, No. 3:06-cv-950-R, 2007 WL 2325514, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2007) (same). And McCray does not specifically identify a particular law with respect to her claim that the failure to disburse the HEA funds violates “federal consumer protection standards.” But the Court is not aware of any federal law that would give rise to a private right of action for claims for failure to timely disburse HEA student aid funds. See, e.g., Wescott, 2025 WL 1770820, at *2 (dismissing claim for failure to

disburse financial aid credit balance within 14 days and noting Court could not “discern any other plausible claim within its jurisdiction”). Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint before dismissal, but leave is not required when she has already pled her “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). McCray’s claims do not give rise to a private right of action, and she has failed to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be inferred. Based on the most

deferential review of her complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given the opportunity, McCray could allege viable legal claims. Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay. Recommendation The Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: March 25, 2026

DAVIDL.HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE