1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMILAH ABDUL-HAQQ, Case No. 2:25-cv-2525-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SAN JOAQUIN GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al., 15 Defendants. 16
17 18 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 12(b)(6). ECF No. 7. Because the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8, defendants’ motion is 20 granted, and the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 21 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 22 I. Factual Allegations 23 Plaintiff alleges that defendants, San Joaquin General Hospital, and three of its employees, 24 Belva Snyder, Debbie Cocola, and Paul Zeller, violated her constitutional rights while she was 25 employed as a nurse. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff claims that she was hired with pre-existing PTSD 26 and anxiety disorder and worked in the Post-Anesthesia Care Unit (“PACU”) at defendant 27 hospital. Id. Plaintiff alleges that in July 2021, she experienced a “hostile incident” at work that 28 exacerbated her PTSD. Id. Plaintiff alleges that “Nursing Administration” failed to intervene, 1 offer any form of reassurance, or take any meaningful steps to investigate. Id. at 10. After this 2 incident, plaintiff alleges that she accepted a leadership role in the PACU. Id. at 11. Six weeks 3 after this promotion, in November 2022, she was demoted after reporting two incidents of 4 workplace violence and harassment. Id. She made an EEOC complaint and was reinstated to the 5 leadership position shortly thereafter, but, at some point, she was again demoted. Id. Plaintiff 6 alleges that “[d]efendants acted to remove her” after she filed a workers’ compensation injury 7 complaint in December 2023. Id. at 12. Plaintiff filed a formal harassment complaint and then 8 was removed from the PACU in January 2024. Id. She alleges that she was “medically cleared 9 to return in May 2024” but was “excluded from continued employment.” Id. 10 Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated her procedural due process property and “liberty 11 interests.” ECF No. 1 at 13-14 (counts I and X). She also claims disability discrimination, failure 12 to accommodate, and retaliation claims under the ADA (counts II, VII, and X), California 13 employment law claims (counts III, VIII, and XII), claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation 14 Act of 1973 (counts IV and XIII), and claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (counts V, IX, 15 and XIII).1 She also alleges that defendants violated her right to have them engage in a good faith 16 interactive process. Id. at 23 (count VI). Plaintiff finally alleges that defendants engaged in racial 17 discrimination in violation of California and federal law. Id. at 38 (count XIIII). 18 II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard 19 “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable 20 legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. 21 Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 22 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 23 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 24 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 25 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 26 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads 27
28 1 Plaintiff has titled two of her causes of action “Count XIII.” 1 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 2 for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in its 4 entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions 5 to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of 6 which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 7 308, 322 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 8 construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media Grp., 9 Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “the tenet that a court 10 must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 11 conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can 13 provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 14 Those facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 15 Id. at 683. Ultimately, the allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim 16 is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and 17 citation omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). However, a liberal interpretation of a complaint “may not 20 supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 21 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 22 III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 23 The complaint, as pled, fails to conform with Rule 8. Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading 24 shall contain: 25 (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has 26 jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 27 the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. 28 1 The court may dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 8, 2 either upon a motion by the opposing party, or sua sponte. Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 3 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969); Kittay Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 542 (2d Cir. 2000). The district 4 court has the discretion to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 5 8(a). Gillibeau, 417 F.2d at 431; Atkins v Northwest Airlines, Inc, 967 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 6 1992) (“A dismissal without prejudice under Rule 8 is within the sound discretion of the trial 7 court.”). Such dismissals may be based on the length, content, and organization of the complaint 8 See Connell v Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMILAH ABDUL-HAQQ, Case No. 2:25-cv-2525-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SAN JOAQUIN GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al., 15 Defendants. 16
17 18 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 12(b)(6). ECF No. 7. Because the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8, defendants’ motion is 20 granted, and the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 21 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 22 I. Factual Allegations 23 Plaintiff alleges that defendants, San Joaquin General Hospital, and three of its employees, 24 Belva Snyder, Debbie Cocola, and Paul Zeller, violated her constitutional rights while she was 25 employed as a nurse. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff claims that she was hired with pre-existing PTSD 26 and anxiety disorder and worked in the Post-Anesthesia Care Unit (“PACU”) at defendant 27 hospital. Id. Plaintiff alleges that in July 2021, she experienced a “hostile incident” at work that 28 exacerbated her PTSD. Id. Plaintiff alleges that “Nursing Administration” failed to intervene, 1 offer any form of reassurance, or take any meaningful steps to investigate. Id. at 10. After this 2 incident, plaintiff alleges that she accepted a leadership role in the PACU. Id. at 11. Six weeks 3 after this promotion, in November 2022, she was demoted after reporting two incidents of 4 workplace violence and harassment. Id. She made an EEOC complaint and was reinstated to the 5 leadership position shortly thereafter, but, at some point, she was again demoted. Id. Plaintiff 6 alleges that “[d]efendants acted to remove her” after she filed a workers’ compensation injury 7 complaint in December 2023. Id. at 12. Plaintiff filed a formal harassment complaint and then 8 was removed from the PACU in January 2024. Id. She alleges that she was “medically cleared 9 to return in May 2024” but was “excluded from continued employment.” Id. 10 Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated her procedural due process property and “liberty 11 interests.” ECF No. 1 at 13-14 (counts I and X). She also claims disability discrimination, failure 12 to accommodate, and retaliation claims under the ADA (counts II, VII, and X), California 13 employment law claims (counts III, VIII, and XII), claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation 14 Act of 1973 (counts IV and XIII), and claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (counts V, IX, 15 and XIII).1 She also alleges that defendants violated her right to have them engage in a good faith 16 interactive process. Id. at 23 (count VI). Plaintiff finally alleges that defendants engaged in racial 17 discrimination in violation of California and federal law. Id. at 38 (count XIIII). 18 II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard 19 “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable 20 legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. 21 Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 22 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 23 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 24 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 25 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 26 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads 27
28 1 Plaintiff has titled two of her causes of action “Count XIII.” 1 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 2 for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in its 4 entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions 5 to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of 6 which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 7 308, 322 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 8 construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media Grp., 9 Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “the tenet that a court 10 must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 11 conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can 13 provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 14 Those facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 15 Id. at 683. Ultimately, the allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim 16 is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and 17 citation omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). However, a liberal interpretation of a complaint “may not 20 supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 21 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 22 III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 23 The complaint, as pled, fails to conform with Rule 8. Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading 24 shall contain: 25 (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has 26 jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 27 the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. 28 1 The court may dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 8, 2 either upon a motion by the opposing party, or sua sponte. Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 3 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969); Kittay Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 542 (2d Cir. 2000). The district 4 court has the discretion to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 5 8(a). Gillibeau, 417 F.2d at 431; Atkins v Northwest Airlines, Inc, 967 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 6 1992) (“A dismissal without prejudice under Rule 8 is within the sound discretion of the trial 7 court.”). Such dismissals may be based on the length, content, and organization of the complaint 8 See Connell v Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir 1998) (“The 89-page pleading is an omnium 9 gatherum, obsessively repetitious, overwrought in tone, and organized like a front hall closet.”). 10 The policy behind Rule 8’s pleading requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of 11 what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County 12 Narcotics Intelligence and Coord Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (citations and quotations 13 omitted), see also Salahuddin v Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41 (2d Cir 1988) (“The statement should be 14 short because unnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and 15 the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a 16 mass of verbiage.”). 17 Here, the complaint is unnecessarily long, even given that it contains fifteen legal claims. 18 For instance, plaintiff fails to differentiate between the various defendant parties in her factual 19 allegations.2 These “naked assertions” of wrongdoing are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 20 This issue especially undermines her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which require that each 21 alleged violation be committed by a “person” acting under color of state law. Long v. Cty. of Los 22 Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). To properly allege these causes of action, plaintiff 23 must offer individualized allegations that each of the named defendants personally participated in 24 or caused a deprivation of her rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); Leer 25 26 27 2 Regarding defendant’s arguments that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her claims, plaintiff 28 has sufficient pled her exhaustion with administrative remedies. ECF No. 1 at 9. 1 v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Actions that plaintiff imputes to “Nursing 2 Administration” are insufficient to meet this standard. See ECF 1 at 5, 10, 11, 12. 3 Plaintiff has not complied with the “short and plain statement” requirement of Rule 8(a), 4 because of the length and unnecessary detail of the factual section of the complaint. The court 5 will, therefore, exercise its discretion and will grant without prejudice defendants’ motion to 6 dismiss. Since plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court will provide “some notice of [the 7 complaint’s] deficiencies” to guide amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 8 Cir. 1995). 9 Plaintiff’s complaint must set forth a “claim”—a set of “allegations that give rise to an 10 enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 11 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). Plaintiff is cautioned that any amended complaint must 12 specifically identify actions by individual defendants who personally and substantially 13 participated in depriving her of her constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duff, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 14 Cir. 1978). Each count must include sufficient facts to support that count, and those facts should 15 be alleged under each cause of action. Jones v. Cnty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 16 1984) (“The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 17 defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claim.”). Any amended complaint should be as 18 concise as possible in fulfilling the above requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 19 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See 20 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Any amended complaint must be complete 21 in itself without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. An amended 22 complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 23 earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 24 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[The] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 25 being treated thereafter as non-existent.”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 26 1967)). 27 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 28 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, is GRANTED. 1 2. Plaintiffs complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 2 3. Within fourteen days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an 3 | amended complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 4 4. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may 5 | result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of 6 | Civil Procedure 41(b). 7 g IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ June 24, 2026 q———_ 10 JEREMY D. PETERSON 1 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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