Jamie R. Howell v. Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 10, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-0268
• Status: Published

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0268-MR

JAMIE R. HOWELL1 APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE COLE ADAMS MAIER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-CI-00056

BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC.2 APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND A. JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, A., JUDGE: Jamie Howell appeals from the Madison Circuit Court’s

summary judgment dismissing her claims against Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc.,

1 At some point during the proceedings below, Appellant changed her surname from Howell to Johnson. Consistent with the notice of appeal and the case caption, we refer to her as Howell throughout this Opinion. 2 Appellee was incorrectly identified in portions of the record as “Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc.” The proper corporate name is Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. d/b/a Baptist Health Richmond (“Baptist”), arising from an alleged sexual assault

committed by Baptist employee Alvin Buckmaster while Howell was a patient in

Baptist’s emergency department.

On appeal, Howell challenges the dismissal of her claims for

negligence, negligent training, gross negligence, respondeat superior, and negligent

supervision. We conclude that Howell’s appeal from the circuit court’s August 3,

2022 order dismissing her negligence, negligent training, gross negligence, and

respondeat superior claims is untimely. As to her remaining negligent-supervision

claim, we agree with the circuit court that Howell failed to present affirmative

evidence that Baptist knew or had reason to know that Buckmaster possessed

harmful propensities or otherwise posed an unreasonable risk of harm to patients.

Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 3, 2018, Howell arrived at Baptist’s Richmond, Kentucky,

emergency department complaining of a migraine and possible seizure. She was

transported by ambulance from Liberty Place Recovery Center, where she was

participating in a court-ordered drug rehabilitation program. Multiple hospital

employees participated in Howell’s care, including Nurse Alvin Buckmaster and

Nurse Jessica Dollins. Dollins was assigned to Howell’s room, but Buckmaster

-2- assisted with portions of Howell’s intake and treatment, including obtaining blood

work, starting an intravenous line, and collecting a urine sample.

Buckmaster had been a registered nurse since 2007 and had been

employed by Baptist since approximately 2015. Before joining Baptist, he worked

as a flight nurse and paramedic. The record reflects that he had no disciplinary

history and no prior complaints or allegations of inappropriate conduct by patients

or coworkers.

During her visit, Howell and Buckmaster were alone together on

several occasions. The following day, Howell reported to Liberty Place personnel

that Buckmaster had sexually abused her while she was receiving treatment.

Among other allegations, Howell asserted that Buckmaster watched her disrobe,

remained in the restroom while she produced a urine sample, engaged in

nonconsensual sexual contact, including kissing and touching intimate areas of her

body, and exposed himself to her. She further alleged that Buckmaster gave her his

telephone number as she was being discharged from the hospital. Buckmaster

denied Howell’s allegations of sexual abuse but acknowledged giving her his

telephone number and engaging in flirtatious conversation with her. He further

acknowledged that after completing his assigned nursing tasks, he returned to

Howell’s room to continue their discussions.

-3- At the time of the incident, Howell’s room was located directly across

from the nurses’ station. Other nurses, technicians, assistants, clerks, and a

physician assistant participated in Howell’s care throughout her visit. Hospital

employees who testified during discovery stated that they neither observed nor

heard anything inappropriate between Howell and Buckmaster. Howell likewise

did not report any misconduct to hospital personnel during her hospitalization.

After Howell reported the alleged misconduct to Liberty Place

personnel, the director contacted law enforcement and a criminal investigation

followed. Buckmaster was subsequently charged with three counts of First-Degree

Sexual Abuse. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to one

misdemeanor count of Attempted Sexual Abuse in the First Degree in Madison

Circuit Court Action No. 19-CR-00646, and the remaining charges were dismissed.

Howell and Buckmaster later entered into a settlement agreement resolving any

civil claims Howell might have against him. Accordingly, Buckmaster is not a

party to this action.

On January 24, 2020, Howell filed suit against Baptist asserting

claims for negligence, negligent supervision, negligent training, gross negligence,

and respondeat superior liability. The circuit court entered partial summary

judgment on August 3, 2022, dismissing all claims except negligent supervision.

Following additional discovery and motion practice, the circuit court entered

-4- summary judgment in favor of Baptist on the remaining negligent-supervision

claim on January 30, 2025. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review the Circuit Court’s August 3, 2022 Summary Judgment Order.

Baptist argues that we do not have jurisdiction to review the circuit

court’s summary judgment in its favor on Count 1 (negligence), Count 3 (negligent

training), Count 4 (gross negligence), and Count 5 (respondeat superior). It notes

that the circuit court entered summary judgment on those claims in its August 3,

2022 order. That order concludes: “There being no reason[] for delay, this is a

final and appealable Order.”

Questions concerning appellate jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.

Louisville Historical League, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Government,

709 S.W.3d 213, 221 (Ky. 2025); Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. D.W., 680

S.W.3d 856, 860 (Ky. 2023).

Howell did not file a reply brief, and her Appellant’s Brief does not

address this issue. However, Howell’s notice of appeal states:

Notice is hereby given that the above-named Plaintiff, Jamie Howell, by counsel, appeals to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, from the Final Judgment entered on January 30, 2025, which is a final judgment clarifying the Judgment granting partial summary judgment.

(Emphasis added.) -5- The circuit court’s January 30, 2025 order was not a mere clarification

of its prior ruling. Both the opening and closing paragraphs of that order make

clear that it was intended to address only Count 2, negligent supervision, which the

circuit court had previously determined was not ripe for summary judgment. The

determinative question before us is whether Howell timely appealed the August 3,

2022 order. The answer depends on CR3 54.02, which provides in relevant part:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . the court may grant a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon a determination that there is no just reason for delay. The judgment shall recite such determination and shall recite that the judgment is final. In the absence of such recital, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is interlocutory and subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

CR 54.02(1).

Admittedly, the circuit court deviated slightly from the language of

CR 54.02(1). Instead of stating that there was “no just reason for delay,” the circuit

court stated that there was “no reason[] for delay.” Kentucky precedent has long

required strict compliance with CR 54.02 before an otherwise interlocutory order

3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -6- adjudicating fewer than all claims becomes final and appealable. See, e.g., Peters

v. Board of Ed. of Hardin Cnty., 378 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Ky. 1964); Vorherr v.

Coldiron, 525 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Ky. App. 2017); Turner Constr. Co. v. Smith Bros.,

Inc., 295 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1956).

Those cases, however, involved somewhat different circumstances. In

each case, one or both of the required certifications were entirely absent. Here, by

contrast, the circuit court’s order addressed both the delay and finality elements.

Although the circuit court omitted the word “just” and employed slightly different

grammar than that found in CR 54.02, it expressly stated that there was no reason

for delay and unequivocally declared the August 2022 order to be final and

appealable.

Having reviewed the relevant precedent, however, we are convinced

that strict compliance in the context of CR 54.02 requires that the order address

both delay and finality and be worded in a manner that leaves no doubt that the

trial court intended to “release for appeal final decisions upon one or more, but less

than all, claims in [a] multiple claims action[].” Watson v. Best Financial Services,

Inc., 245 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Ky. 2008). That is the case here. While the better

practice would be for trial courts to use the precise language of CR 54.02(1) so as

to avoid even the hint of uncertainty, we are confident that the trial court’s slight

deviations did not prevent the August 3, 2022 order from achieving finality.

-7- Because the August 3, 2022 order was final and appealable, Howell

was required to file a notice of appeal within thirty days. RAP4 3(A). She did not

do so. Instead, she waited until after entry of the circuit court’s January 30, 2025

judgment resolving the remaining negligent-supervision claim. By that point, the

time for appealing the August 3, 2022 order had long since expired. “Filing a

notice of appeal within the prescribed time frame is still mandatory and failure to

do so is fatal to an appeal.” Fox v. House, 912 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Ky. App. 1995)

(citations omitted). “[A] party failing to appeal from a final judgment containing

the requisite recitals—as occurred here—does so to its peril.” Watson, 245 S.W.3d

at 727.

Additionally, Howell neither referenced the August 3, 2022 order in

her notice of appeal nor attached a copy of that order to the notice of appeal. RAP

2(B)(1)(b) requires an appellant to identify the judgment or order appealed from,

and RAP 2(B)(2) requires a copy of the judgment or order appealed from to be

attached to the notice of appeal. Likewise, RAP 32(A)(7) and (E) require an

appellant to include in the appendix to her brief the judgment, opinion, or order

under review. Howell did not include the August 3, 2022 order in the appendix to

her brief.

4 Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure. -8- These omissions further cloud the question of whether Howell

intended to appeal the August 3, 2022 order at all. In any event, to the extent she

seeks review of that order, her appeal is untimely. RAP 10(A). Accordingly, we

lack jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s dismissal of Howell’s claims for

negligence, negligent training, gross negligence, and respondeat superior liability.

Therefore, the only claim properly before us is Howell’s appeal from

the circuit court’s summary judgment dismissing her negligent-supervision claim.

B. The Circuit Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Howell’s Negligent-Supervision Claim.

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56.03. The

movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of

material fact in dispute. The party opposing the motion then has the burden to

present “at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476,

482 (Ky. 1991); Watson v. Landmark Urology, P.S.C., 642 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Ky.

2022).

“A party responding to a properly supported summary judgment

motion cannot merely rest on the allegations in its pleadings.” Versailles Farm -9- Home and Garden, LLC v. Haynes, 647 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Ky. 2022). Likewise,

“speculation and supposition are insufficient to justify a submission of a case to the

jury[.]” O’Bryan v. Cave, 202 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006). We review a grant of

summary judgment de novo. Isaacs v. Sentinel Ins. Co. LTD., 607 S.W.3d 678, 681

(Ky. 2020).

Kentucky recognizes a cause of action for negligent supervision.

McDonald’s Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274, 291 (Ky. App. 2009). To prevail, a

plaintiff must establish that “[(1)] the defendant knew or had reason to know of the

employee’s harmful propensities; [(2)] the employee injured the plaintiff; and [(3)]

the hiring, supervision, or retention of an employee proximately caused the

plaintiff’s injuries.” Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169

S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ky. 2005). Howell acknowledges that the first element, whether

the employer knew or had reason to know, is equivalent to the duty inquiry, which

presents a question of law for the court. See Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Ins.

Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Ky. 1992).

Howell argues that Baptist knew Buckmaster, acting as the triage

nurse, performed sensitive examinations of Howell without another employee

present and knew that he repeatedly reentered her room after his nursing tasks were

complete. She further contends that these facts should have alerted Baptist to the

risk of misconduct.

-10- The problem with Howell’s argument is that the knowledge upon

which she relies was allegedly acquired contemporaneously with the events in

question. At best, Baptist learned these facts while Buckmaster was treating

Howell. At worst, the facts became known only after Howell reported the alleged

assault. Neither circumstance satisfies the knowledge element required for a

negligent-supervision claim.

As our courts have repeatedly recognized, duty is inseparable from

foreseeability. Schneider Electric USA, Inc. v. Williams, 733 S.W.3d 180, 192 (Ky.

2026) (“The existence of a duty is a question of law informed by whether the

defendant’s conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm.”). Foreseeability, in turn,

requires information that would have allowed the defendant to appreciate and

guard against the risk before the injury occurred. Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113

S.W.3d 85, 90 (Ky. 2003). “Foreseeability is not a hindsight determination[.]”

Lhotsky as Next Friend for Lhotsky v. Sutcliffe, 723 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Ky. App.

2025).

In almost every negligence action, one can look back with perfect

20/20 vision and identify actions that might have prevented the injury. The law,

however, requires more than hindsight. The defendant must have been on notice of

facts that would have allowed it to appreciate the risk and to act before the conduct

took place.

-11- Ogborn illustrates the point. There, for more than a decade,

McDonald’s was aware that an unknown individual was placing hoax telephone

calls to McDonald’s restaurants and other fast-food establishments while

impersonating a police officer. During that time, managers, employees, and third

parties were persuaded to conduct strip searches and other degrading acts at the

caller’s direction. Prior to the incident at issue, the scheme had been perpetrated at

numerous McDonald’s locations. Given McDonald’s longstanding knowledge of

the hoax and its repeated success, this Court concluded that McDonald’s had a duty

to train, supervise, or warn its employees regarding the scheme. Ogborn, 309

S.W.3d at 292.

No comparable evidence exists here. Howell produced no evidence

that Buckmaster had ever been accused of inappropriate conduct by a patient,

coworker, supervisor, or former employer. There is no evidence of prior

disciplinary action, prior complaints, prior criminal conduct, prior reports to the

Kentucky Board of Nursing, or any other information that would have placed

Baptist on notice that Buckmaster posed a risk of sexually abusing patients. To the

contrary, the undisputed evidence established that Buckmaster had worked as a

nurse since 2007, had been employed by Baptist since approximately 2015, and

had no known history of misconduct.

-12- Nor are we persuaded by Howell’s reliance on Buckmaster’s

testimony that he had a naturally flirtatious personality. Even accepting that

characterization, Howell produced no evidence that Buckmaster’s disposition had

previously manifested itself in the workplace in a manner that generated

complaints, disciplinary action, or other concerns that would have placed Baptist

on notice that he posed a risk to patients.

Howell relied primarily on the testimony of her expert, Dr. Jonathan

Thomas. Dr. Thomas offered opinions regarding Baptist’s policies and practices

regarding staffing assignments, patient observation, and the collection of urine

samples in an emergency department setting. However, much of Dr. Thomas’s

testimony concerns whether Baptist’s policies and procedures could have been

improved. Dr. Thomas criticized aspects of Baptist’s practices regarding staffing

assignments, patient observation, and urine-sample collection. Yet, he was unable

to identify evidence that Baptist knew or had reason to know Buckmaster

possessed harmful propensities before the events at issue. And Howell did not

identify any prior incidents demonstrating that Baptist’s policies had resulted in

similar misconduct and that Baptist nevertheless failed to alter its training or

supervisory practices.

This distinction is significant because Howell’s general-negligence

claim is not before us. The only claim remaining in this appeal is negligent

-13- supervision. To survive summary judgment on that claim, Howell was required to

present affirmative evidence that Baptist knew or had reason to know Buckmaster

posed a risk of harm or that prior experience had demonstrated a need for different

training or supervision. Evidence that a policy might have been “better” does not

satisfy that burden. And, even in the general negligence context, the fact that a

policy could have been better does not establish liability unless it can be shown

that the policy in place fell below the applicable standard of care. Dr. Thomas was

unable to say that Baptist actually deviated from the standard of care.

In sum, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Howell, we

agree with the circuit court that Howell failed to present affirmative evidence

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the knowledge

element of her negligent-supervision claim. Because Howell cannot establish an

essential element of that claim, summary judgment was properly granted.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to

review the circuit court’s August 3, 2022 summary judgment dismissing Howell’s

claims for negligence, negligent training, gross negligence, and respondeat

superior liability. We further conclude that the circuit court properly granted

summary judgment on Howell’s negligent-supervision claim because she failed to

present affirmative evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding

-14- Baptist’s knowledge of any harmful propensities on Buckmaster’s part.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Madison Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Dan Thompson Ryan D. Nafziger Somerset, Kentucky Tera M. Rehmel Hayley A. Abbott Louisville, Kentucky

-15-