JAMIE JACKSON v. ARTHUR L. WALKER

Court of Appeals of Georgia

JAMIE JACKSON v. ARTHUR L. WALKER

DecidedAugust 22, 2017

DocketA17A1959

StatusPublished

This text of JAMIE JACKSON v. ARTHUR L. WALKER (JAMIE JACKSON v. ARTHUR L. WALKER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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JAMIE JACKSON v. ARTHUR L. WALKER, (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________ August 03, 2017

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A1959. JAMIE JACKSON v. ARTHUR L. WALKER, et al.

Inmate Jamie Jackson filed a pro se civil action alleging, generally, that he has been deprived of his interest in his father’s estate. In his complaint, as amended, Jackson named Bernice Easterling, attorney Arthur L. Walker, and Arthur L. Walker and Associates, LLC, as defendants. Walker and his firm filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Jackson then filed this direct appeal. For the following reasons, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. First, the trial court’s order is interlocutory. “In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not a final judgment.” Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 192 Ga. App. 628, 629 (385 SE2d 731) (1989) (punctuation omitted). Here, although the trial court dismissed Jackson’s claims against attorney Walker and his firm, Jackson’s claims against Easterling remain pending. Therefore, the challenged order is not a final order, and it is appealable only through the interlocutory appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See id. Second, because Jackson is incarcerated, his appeal is controlled by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, OCGA § 42-12-1 et seq. Pursuant to OCGA § 42-12- 8, an appeal of a civil action filed by a prisoner “shall be as provided in Code Section 5-6-35.” And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal in this case. See Jones v. Townsend, 267 Ga. 489 (480 SE2d 24) (1997). For these reasons, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 08/03/2017 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

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Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________ August 03, 2017

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A1959. JAMIE JACKSON v. ARTHUR L. WALKER, et al.

Inmate Jamie Jackson filed a pro se civil action alleging, generally, that he has been deprived of his interest in his father’s estate. In his complaint, as amended, Jackson named Bernice Easterling, attorney Arthur L. Walker, and Arthur L. Walker and Associates, LLC, as defendants. Walker and his firm filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Jackson then filed this direct appeal. For the following reasons, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. First, the trial court’s order is interlocutory. “In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not a final judgment.” Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 192 Ga. App. 628, 629 (385 SE2d 731) (1989) (punctuation omitted). Here, although the trial court dismissed Jackson’s claims against attorney Walker and his firm, Jackson’s claims against Easterling remain pending. Therefore, the challenged order is not a final order, and it is appealable only through the interlocutory appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See id. Second, because Jackson is incarcerated, his appeal is controlled by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, OCGA § 42-12-1 et seq. Pursuant to OCGA § 42-12- 8, an appeal of a civil action filed by a prisoner “shall be as provided in Code Section 5-6-35.” And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal in this case. See Jones v. Townsend, 267 Ga. 489 (480 SE2d 24) (1997). For these reasons, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 08/03/2017 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

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