Jameson v. State of Oklahoma

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 12, 2024
Docket6:24-cv-00405
StatusUnknown

This text of Jameson v. State of Oklahoma (Jameson v. State of Oklahoma) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jameson v. State of Oklahoma, (E.D. Okla. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA FLOYD JAMESON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. CIV 24-405-RAW-DES ) STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al, ) ) Defendants. ) OPINION AND ORDER On October 23, 2024, Plaintiff Floyd Jameson filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking monetary and injunctive relief. (Dkt. 1 at 12). He is a state prisoner who is incarcerated at the McIntosh County Jail in Eufaula, Oklahoma. The defendants are the State of Oklahoma (District Attorney’s Office), the McIntosh County Board of County Commissioners, McIntosh County Sheriff Kevin Ledbetter, and Jail Administrator Monica Smith. After review of the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff must file an amended civil rights complaint on the Court’s form, as set forth below. Plaintiff’s Claims Plaintiff alleges in Claim One of the complaint that on multiple occasions, he has received split sentences and illegal revocations. He also was sentenced to an unnecessary and unlawful drug rehabilitation program that financially crippled his family so badly that he had to leave the program. (Dkt. 1 at 6). In Claim Two, Plaintiff claims that since May 24, 2024, he has been asking Defendant Monica Smith for permission to use the law library to correct his illegal sentence, however, his requests were denied. Plaintiff also asserts Defendant Sheriff Ledbetter allowed Smith to harm him in this manner. Id. at 7. Screening/Dismissal Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that § 1915A dismissals are reviewed under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard for stating a claim for relief). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement 2 to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Defendant State of Oklahoma (District Attorney’s Office) Plaintiff has named the State of Oklahoma (District Attorney’s Office) as a defendant. The Eleventh Amendment, however, prevents Plaintiff from suing the State of Oklahoma without its unequivocal consent. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1110 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Although a state may waive the sovereign immunity granted to it under the Eleventh Amendment, we require a showing of unequivocal intent to do so.”). “Oklahoma has not waived sovereign immunity against § 1983 claims in federal district court.” Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). See also Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 152.1. Therefore, the State of Oklahoma is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). See Wauford v. Richardson, 450 F. App’x 698, 699 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that claims dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment “should [be] dismissed without prejudice.”). To the extent Plaintiff has named the Office of the District Attorney of McIntosh County as a defendant, Plaintiff’s claims also are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Callahan v. Poppell
471 F.3d 1155 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Wauford v. Richardson
450 F. App'x 698 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
Guttman v. Khalsa
669 F.3d 1101 (Tenth Circuit, 2012)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Gilles v. United States
906 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Jameson v. State of Oklahoma, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jameson-v-state-of-oklahoma-oked-2024.