In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-15-00216-CR
JAMES WILLIAM NOBILE, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013-0698-1, Honorable James W. Anderson, Presiding
November 24, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, James William Nobile, was arrested and charged by complaint and
information with the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI),1 enhanced by one prior
conviction.2 Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that alleged the arresting
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of appellant. The trial court
conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress and denied the motion. Thereafter,
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2014). 2 See id. § 49.09(a) (West Supp. 2014). appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of DWI, and the State waived its
enhancement provision.
Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to nine days’ confinement in the
Randall County Detention Facility and fined $1,000 plus costs of court. Appellant has
perfected his appeal and, through a single issue, contends that the trial court committed
reversible error in denying his motion to suppress. Disagreeing with appellant, we will
affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background3
Appellant was stopped on IH-27 at approximately mile post 111 shortly before
the Canyon Expressway merges into the interstate. The officer who stopped appellant,
James Lee Spicer, a Texas Department of Public Safety trooper, had followed appellant
from FM 1541 to FM 3331 and finally onto IH-27. FM 3331 is a two-lane highway.
While following appellant on FM 3331, Spicer observed appellant cross the center stripe
two or three times. At that time, there was no oncoming traffic, and Spicer decided not
to stop appellant but continued to follow him. After appellant turned north onto IH-27,
Spicer followed and again observed appellant cross the center stripe dividing the two
northbound lanes on three occasions. Spicer testified that, because the appellant was
approaching the Canyon Expressway, the traffic was becoming heavier. It was at that
time that Spicer decided to initiate a stop of appellant.
During cross-examination at the suppression hearing, Spicer testified that he
stopped appellant because he violated section 545.060 of the Texas Transportation
3 Inasmuch as appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence, we will only discuss the evidence regarding the initial stop of appellant.
2 Code (failure to drive in a single-marked lane). See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.060
(West 2011). Spicer indicated that the traffic violation was failing to drive in a single
marked lane while on IH-27. However, on redirect-examination, Spicer further testified
that the traffic violation gave him reason to stop appellant but that, in addition, he was
concerned that appellant was distracted, sleepy, or possibly intoxicated because of his
inability to drive in his lane of traffic.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
Subsequently, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law and amended
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In it findings, the trial court found that Spicer
had followed appellant on FM 3331 and observed appellant drive over the center stripe
two and, possibly, three times; that Spicer continued to follow appellant on IH-27 and
observed appellant drive across the center stripe on three or more occasions; and that
appellant’s driving on IH-27 was corroborated by the in-car DVD. In the conclusions-of-
law portion, the trial court concluded that Spicer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a
vehicular stop on IH-27. The trial court then filed amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In the amended conclusions, the trial court stated that, “[g]iving due
credit to Trooper Spicer’s experience in the field derived from his eleven years of
enforcing traffic laws, his observations made and inferences of possible intoxication
reached regarding the fact of [appellant]’s persistent failure to maintain control of his
vehicle in a single lane of traffic for a span of four miles and his overall credibility, this
Court finds that Trooper Spicer had reasonable suspicion to stop [appellant]’s vehicular
(sic) on Interstate 27 on September 2, 2013[,] for driving while intoxicated.”
3 Appellant’s single issue on appeal contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying appellant’s motion to suppress because the trial court failed to
properly apply the applicable law to the facts presented. We disagree and will affirm.
Standard of Review
A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed under a bifurcated
review process. See Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court’s
application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Id.
In our case, we will review the trial court’s rulings on the questions of reasonable
suspicion to detain appellant under the bifurcated standard of review. See id. We give
almost total deference to the trial court on questions of credibility and historical fact.
See Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trial court is
the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony. See id. When, as here, the trial court makes explicit findings of
fact, we are to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling, supports the fact findings. State v. Priddy, 321 S.W.3d 82, 86
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818–19
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9,
of the Texas Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.
State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Article 1.06 of the Code of
4 Criminal Procedure provides that the people shall be secure from all unreasonable
seizures or searches. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.06 (West 2005).4 Thus,
under Texas law, searches and seizures must be reasonable.
“[A] law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be
involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and
take additional steps to investigate further.” State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S.
177, 185, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004)). “An officer must have reasonable
suspicion that some crime was, or is about to be, committed before he may make a
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-15-00216-CR
JAMES WILLIAM NOBILE, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013-0698-1, Honorable James W. Anderson, Presiding
November 24, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, James William Nobile, was arrested and charged by complaint and
information with the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI),1 enhanced by one prior
conviction.2 Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that alleged the arresting
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of appellant. The trial court
conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress and denied the motion. Thereafter,
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2014). 2 See id. § 49.09(a) (West Supp. 2014). appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of DWI, and the State waived its
enhancement provision.
Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to nine days’ confinement in the
Randall County Detention Facility and fined $1,000 plus costs of court. Appellant has
perfected his appeal and, through a single issue, contends that the trial court committed
reversible error in denying his motion to suppress. Disagreeing with appellant, we will
affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background3
Appellant was stopped on IH-27 at approximately mile post 111 shortly before
the Canyon Expressway merges into the interstate. The officer who stopped appellant,
James Lee Spicer, a Texas Department of Public Safety trooper, had followed appellant
from FM 1541 to FM 3331 and finally onto IH-27. FM 3331 is a two-lane highway.
While following appellant on FM 3331, Spicer observed appellant cross the center stripe
two or three times. At that time, there was no oncoming traffic, and Spicer decided not
to stop appellant but continued to follow him. After appellant turned north onto IH-27,
Spicer followed and again observed appellant cross the center stripe dividing the two
northbound lanes on three occasions. Spicer testified that, because the appellant was
approaching the Canyon Expressway, the traffic was becoming heavier. It was at that
time that Spicer decided to initiate a stop of appellant.
During cross-examination at the suppression hearing, Spicer testified that he
stopped appellant because he violated section 545.060 of the Texas Transportation
3 Inasmuch as appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence, we will only discuss the evidence regarding the initial stop of appellant.
2 Code (failure to drive in a single-marked lane). See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.060
(West 2011). Spicer indicated that the traffic violation was failing to drive in a single
marked lane while on IH-27. However, on redirect-examination, Spicer further testified
that the traffic violation gave him reason to stop appellant but that, in addition, he was
concerned that appellant was distracted, sleepy, or possibly intoxicated because of his
inability to drive in his lane of traffic.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
Subsequently, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law and amended
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In it findings, the trial court found that Spicer
had followed appellant on FM 3331 and observed appellant drive over the center stripe
two and, possibly, three times; that Spicer continued to follow appellant on IH-27 and
observed appellant drive across the center stripe on three or more occasions; and that
appellant’s driving on IH-27 was corroborated by the in-car DVD. In the conclusions-of-
law portion, the trial court concluded that Spicer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a
vehicular stop on IH-27. The trial court then filed amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In the amended conclusions, the trial court stated that, “[g]iving due
credit to Trooper Spicer’s experience in the field derived from his eleven years of
enforcing traffic laws, his observations made and inferences of possible intoxication
reached regarding the fact of [appellant]’s persistent failure to maintain control of his
vehicle in a single lane of traffic for a span of four miles and his overall credibility, this
Court finds that Trooper Spicer had reasonable suspicion to stop [appellant]’s vehicular
(sic) on Interstate 27 on September 2, 2013[,] for driving while intoxicated.”
3 Appellant’s single issue on appeal contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying appellant’s motion to suppress because the trial court failed to
properly apply the applicable law to the facts presented. We disagree and will affirm.
Standard of Review
A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed under a bifurcated
review process. See Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court’s
application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Id.
In our case, we will review the trial court’s rulings on the questions of reasonable
suspicion to detain appellant under the bifurcated standard of review. See id. We give
almost total deference to the trial court on questions of credibility and historical fact.
See Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trial court is
the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony. See id. When, as here, the trial court makes explicit findings of
fact, we are to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling, supports the fact findings. State v. Priddy, 321 S.W.3d 82, 86
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818–19
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9,
of the Texas Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.
State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Article 1.06 of the Code of
4 Criminal Procedure provides that the people shall be secure from all unreasonable
seizures or searches. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.06 (West 2005).4 Thus,
under Texas law, searches and seizures must be reasonable.
“[A] law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be
involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and
take additional steps to investigate further.” State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S.
177, 185, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004)). “An officer must have reasonable
suspicion that some crime was, or is about to be, committed before he may make a
traffic stop.” State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Thus, a traffic
stop based upon a reasonable suspicion that some crime was, or is about to be,
committed does not violate Texas law. See id. An officer’s determination about
reasonable suspicion must be supported by “specific and articulable facts.” See id. at
568–69 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).
In determining whether the officer had specific and articulable facts, a reviewing court
uses an objective standard. See id. at 569. That is, considering only the information
actually available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search, would a man of
reasonable caution be warranted to believe that the action taken was appropriate? See
id. A reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of
circumstances. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
4 Further reference to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure will be by reference to “art. ___” or “article ____.”
5 Analysis
The record before the Court supports the proposition that Spicer observed erratic
driving by appellant. The driving observed was the inability of appellant to drive within
his lane of travel. As the trial court found in its findings of fact, the officer observed at
least five or six incidents where appellant’s vehicle crossed over either the center stripe
or his lane’s dividing stripes. The fact that there was no collision or near-miss is not the
touchstone of the reasonableness of the stop by Spicer. Erratic and unsafe driving may
furnish sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion. See Halford v. State, No. 07-08-
00338-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4918, at *10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 25, 2010,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing James v. State, 102 S.W.3d
162, 171-72 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d)). When the totality of the
circumstances of appellant’s driving are viewed, see Ford, 158 S.W.3d 492, we are
confident in saying that Spicer had specific and articulable facts upon which to base his
decision to stop appellant. See Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 568–69. Thus, the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by the record. See Priddy, 321
S.W.3d at 86. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant’s motion to suppress. See Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 150.
Appellant seems to place a great deal of emphasis on the fact that Spicer’s
testimony shows that there was no near-accident, which according to his theory, means
that there was no traffic violation. We again point out that the trial court had all of
Spicer’s testimony before him that included testimony about five or six instances of
failure to drive within appellant’s lane of travel. As such, there was, at the minimum, a
6 pattern of erratic driving that provided the reasonable suspicion necessary for Spicer to
initiate a stop of appellant.
Next, appellant complains that, when Spicer testified, he said he was relying only
on the driving of appellant on IH-27 to provide the basis for the initial stop. Such a
statement is true, if one does not consider Spicer’s testimony on redirect examination.
There, Spicer testified that he was relying on the totality of the driving he observed,
which is the proper measure for determination of reasonable suspicion to stop. See
Ford, 158 S.W.3d 492.
Finally, appellant indicates that, since Spicer testified on cross-examination that
he was stopping appellant for the traffic offense of failure to drive in a single marked
lane and because there was no testimony that the failure of appellant to stay totally
within his lane was unsafe, the stop cannot be justified. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §
545.060. Such position ignores the reality that the officer’s subjective reason for making
a stop is not the controlling factor; rather, the totality of the facts are viewed from the
viewpoint of an objective standard, which is controlling on the issue of reasonable
suspicion to stop. See Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 568. As we have previously determined,
the totality of the facts, when viewed in an objective manner, support the legitimacy of
Spicer’s stop of appellant. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d 492. Appellant’s issue to the contrary
is overruled.
7 Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Mackey K. Hancock Justice
Do not publish.