1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAMES WEST, Case No. 24-cv-01840-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 54 10 SUNNYVALE/SANTA CLARA EL POLLO LOCO, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants 14 Sunnyvale/Santa Clara El Pollo Loco. Dkt. No. 54. The Court finds this matter appropriate for 15 disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For 16 the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Pro se Plaintiff James West initially filed this case against Defendants in March 2024.1 19 See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). In the complaint, Plaintiff contends that he was refused service at two 20 different El Pollo Loco restaurant locations because of his race. See id. Plaintiff alleges that he is 21 African American and gender non-conforming, and participates in the “California Restaurant 22 Meals Program” (“RMP”), commonly referred to as the Electronic Benefits Transfer or “EBT.” 23 See id. at ¶ 1. He states that he attempted to order at El Pollo Loco restaurants in San Jose and 24 Sunnyvale, California as part of this program. Id. at ¶ 2. However, he states that he was not 25 permitted to obtain a discounted meal. Id. at ¶ 3. Despite complaints, Plaintiff alleges that this 26 treatment continued from May 2021 through April 2022, and he received burned or incomplete 27 1 meals and was charged higher prices than he should have been. Id. at ¶¶ 4–6. In March 2024, the 2 store manager at the Sunnyvale location called the police when Plaintiff tried to purchase a meal 3 there. See id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff contends that “white, [A]sian and [L]atino customers were never 4 treated this way.” See id. at ¶ 3. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings claims for race 5 discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the California Unruh Civil Rights 6 Act, negligence, and what he styles as a “ratification claim.”2 See Compl. at 6–7. 7 Defendants, for their part, state that Plaintiff was denied service, and the police were 8 called, because of his erratic behavior, and not because of his race. Defendants have moved for 9 summary judgment. Dkt. No. 54. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 12 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 13 A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson 14 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute is “genuine” if there is evidence 15 in the record sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 16 But in deciding if a dispute is genuine, the court must view the inferences reasonably drawn from 17 the materials in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita, 475 18 U.S. at 587–88, and “may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” Freeman v. 19 Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 20 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that 22 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 23 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the 24 pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 25 admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See 26
27 2 Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that the reference to Title VII in the complaint was an error and 1 id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). The nonmoving party must show more 2 than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 3 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). “In fact, the non-moving party must 4 come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving 5 party’s favor.” Id. (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). If the nonmoving party fails to make 6 this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 7 U.S. at 323. If a court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to only a single 8 claim or defense or as to part of a claim or defense, it may enter partial summary judgment. Fed. 9 R. Civ. P. 56(a). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Defendants raise several arguments, both factual and legal, in support of their motion for 12 summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 54-1. In opposition, Plaintiff does not respond to any of these 13 arguments. Rather, he cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and suggests that further 14 discovery is needed for him to respond. See Dkt. No. 57. 15 As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to obtain 16 discovery from Defendants. Plaintiff filed this case in March 2024, and the Court initially set the 17 close of fact discovery as April 11, 2025. See Dkt. No. 32. On the day that discovery was set to 18 close, Plaintiff asked for a 60-day extension. Dkt. No. 43. He stated that in January 2025 he had 19 treatment for anxiety and a sleep disorder, and that in March 2025 he broke his foot and was still 20 recovering. See id. at 1–3. Plaintiff further suggested that as a pro se party he was limited in his 21 ability to serve and respond to discovery, and thus required additional time. See id. at 3–5. The 22 Court granted this request, and set June 20, 2025, as the close of both fact and expert discovery. 23 Dkt. No. 44. The Court cautioned the parties that it was “disinclined to grant any further 24 extensions of time in this straightforward case, and the parties must complete all discovery as 25 required by the revised schedule . . . .” Id. 26 In May 2025 Plaintiff filed an administrative motion to excuse his untimely discovery 27 responses, Dkt. No. 45, and an administrative motion regarding the number of parties and 1 Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim. See Dkt. Nos. 48, 53. Shortly thereafter, Judge Kim granted 2 Plaintiff additional time to respond to Defendants’ discovery requests, but denied his request 3 regarding the interrogatories he could serve. See Dkt. No. 51. Specifically, Judge Kim held that 4 Plaintiff could only serve 25 interrogatories on the two Defendants that had been served and 5 appeared in this case—W.K.S. Restaurant Corp. and El Pollo Loco Holdings, Inc.—but not on 6 “Sunnyvale/Santa Clara El Pollo Loco,” the specific restaurant locations that had not been served. 7 See id. at 2. Approximately a month after this order, and the day that discovery was set to close, 8 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration with Judge Kim. See Dkt. No. 52. Plaintiff explained 9 that the Sunnyvale and San Jose El Pollo Loco restaurants on which he wanted to serve discovery 10 are now both owned and managed by Defendant W.K.S. Restaurant Corporation, but may have 11 been owned and managed by different companies at the time of the alleged discrimination. See id. 12 Plaintiff did not explain why, under these circumstances, it was insufficient to seek discovery from 13 Defendant W.K.S. Restaurant Corporation.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAMES WEST, Case No. 24-cv-01840-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 54 10 SUNNYVALE/SANTA CLARA EL POLLO LOCO, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants 14 Sunnyvale/Santa Clara El Pollo Loco. Dkt. No. 54. The Court finds this matter appropriate for 15 disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For 16 the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Pro se Plaintiff James West initially filed this case against Defendants in March 2024.1 19 See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). In the complaint, Plaintiff contends that he was refused service at two 20 different El Pollo Loco restaurant locations because of his race. See id. Plaintiff alleges that he is 21 African American and gender non-conforming, and participates in the “California Restaurant 22 Meals Program” (“RMP”), commonly referred to as the Electronic Benefits Transfer or “EBT.” 23 See id. at ¶ 1. He states that he attempted to order at El Pollo Loco restaurants in San Jose and 24 Sunnyvale, California as part of this program. Id. at ¶ 2. However, he states that he was not 25 permitted to obtain a discounted meal. Id. at ¶ 3. Despite complaints, Plaintiff alleges that this 26 treatment continued from May 2021 through April 2022, and he received burned or incomplete 27 1 meals and was charged higher prices than he should have been. Id. at ¶¶ 4–6. In March 2024, the 2 store manager at the Sunnyvale location called the police when Plaintiff tried to purchase a meal 3 there. See id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff contends that “white, [A]sian and [L]atino customers were never 4 treated this way.” See id. at ¶ 3. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings claims for race 5 discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the California Unruh Civil Rights 6 Act, negligence, and what he styles as a “ratification claim.”2 See Compl. at 6–7. 7 Defendants, for their part, state that Plaintiff was denied service, and the police were 8 called, because of his erratic behavior, and not because of his race. Defendants have moved for 9 summary judgment. Dkt. No. 54. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 12 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 13 A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson 14 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute is “genuine” if there is evidence 15 in the record sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 16 But in deciding if a dispute is genuine, the court must view the inferences reasonably drawn from 17 the materials in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita, 475 18 U.S. at 587–88, and “may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” Freeman v. 19 Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 20 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that 22 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 23 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the 24 pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 25 admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See 26
27 2 Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that the reference to Title VII in the complaint was an error and 1 id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). The nonmoving party must show more 2 than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 3 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). “In fact, the non-moving party must 4 come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving 5 party’s favor.” Id. (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). If the nonmoving party fails to make 6 this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 7 U.S. at 323. If a court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to only a single 8 claim or defense or as to part of a claim or defense, it may enter partial summary judgment. Fed. 9 R. Civ. P. 56(a). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Defendants raise several arguments, both factual and legal, in support of their motion for 12 summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 54-1. In opposition, Plaintiff does not respond to any of these 13 arguments. Rather, he cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and suggests that further 14 discovery is needed for him to respond. See Dkt. No. 57. 15 As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to obtain 16 discovery from Defendants. Plaintiff filed this case in March 2024, and the Court initially set the 17 close of fact discovery as April 11, 2025. See Dkt. No. 32. On the day that discovery was set to 18 close, Plaintiff asked for a 60-day extension. Dkt. No. 43. He stated that in January 2025 he had 19 treatment for anxiety and a sleep disorder, and that in March 2025 he broke his foot and was still 20 recovering. See id. at 1–3. Plaintiff further suggested that as a pro se party he was limited in his 21 ability to serve and respond to discovery, and thus required additional time. See id. at 3–5. The 22 Court granted this request, and set June 20, 2025, as the close of both fact and expert discovery. 23 Dkt. No. 44. The Court cautioned the parties that it was “disinclined to grant any further 24 extensions of time in this straightforward case, and the parties must complete all discovery as 25 required by the revised schedule . . . .” Id. 26 In May 2025 Plaintiff filed an administrative motion to excuse his untimely discovery 27 responses, Dkt. No. 45, and an administrative motion regarding the number of parties and 1 Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim. See Dkt. Nos. 48, 53. Shortly thereafter, Judge Kim granted 2 Plaintiff additional time to respond to Defendants’ discovery requests, but denied his request 3 regarding the interrogatories he could serve. See Dkt. No. 51. Specifically, Judge Kim held that 4 Plaintiff could only serve 25 interrogatories on the two Defendants that had been served and 5 appeared in this case—W.K.S. Restaurant Corp. and El Pollo Loco Holdings, Inc.—but not on 6 “Sunnyvale/Santa Clara El Pollo Loco,” the specific restaurant locations that had not been served. 7 See id. at 2. Approximately a month after this order, and the day that discovery was set to close, 8 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration with Judge Kim. See Dkt. No. 52. Plaintiff explained 9 that the Sunnyvale and San Jose El Pollo Loco restaurants on which he wanted to serve discovery 10 are now both owned and managed by Defendant W.K.S. Restaurant Corporation, but may have 11 been owned and managed by different companies at the time of the alleged discrimination. See id. 12 Plaintiff did not explain why, under these circumstances, it was insufficient to seek discovery from 13 Defendant W.K.S. Restaurant Corporation. In any event, Judge Kim denied this motion. Dkt. No. 14 53. Plaintiff did not seek further relief from this Court from either Judge Kim’s orders or the 15 discovery deadlines.3 16 Now, in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff urges that 17 more discovery is needed. See Dkt. No. 57. Plaintiff suggests that “Defendants are withholding 18 key documents and responses needed” to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 6. 19 Specifically, Plaintiff wants Defendants’ RMP applications. See id. at 2–3. He states that the 20 RMP documents that Defendants produced in discovery are deficient because they were generic 21 templates. Id. Plaintiff also has requested, but not yet received, body cam footage from the police 22 officers and the 911 dispatch call for the incident at the Sunnyvale location. See id. at 3. 23 Elsewhere Plaintiff also suggests that Defendants may have other relevant “photographic or video 24 evidence[].” See id. at 7. He does not explain what this is. 25 At summary judgment, where “a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for 26 3 In mid-July 2025, Plaintiff requested an extension of time for file his opposition to the motion 27 for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 57, which the Court granted, Dkt. No. 56. The Court again 1 specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,” a court may “defer 2 considering the motion or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1). A party seeking relief under Rule 3 56(d) must show “(1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to 4 elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are 5 essential to resist the summary judgment motion.” State of Cal., on Behalf of Cal. Dept. of Toxic 6 Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff must have also 7 diligently pursued the requested discovery. See Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1995). 8 Plaintiff has not met these requirements. 9 Most fundamentally, Plaintiff’s claims are all premised on the idea that Defendants 10 discriminated against him because of his race.4 But Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that 11 Defendants acted with discriminatory motive, and the discovery Plaintiff now seeks would not fill 12 in this missing piece in his case or address Defendants’ contrary evidence. The record before the 13 Court indicates that Defendants called the police in response to Plaintiff’s erratic behavior at the 14 restaurants on the days in question. Several employees state that Plaintiff was scaring staff as well 15 as customers, and that he refused to leave the premises when asked. See Dkt. No. 54-3 (“Xiloj 16 Decl.”) at ¶¶ 1–4; Dkt. No. 54-4 (“Chanchavac Decl.”) at ¶¶ 1–4; Dkt. No. 54-5 (“Ramos Decl.”) 17 at ¶¶ 1–4. Moreover, employees state that Plaintiff was not banned from the restaurants as a result 18 of these incidents, and he has since returned and been served. See Xiloj Decl. at ¶ 7; Chanchavac 19 Decl. at ¶ 7; Ramos Decl. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff offers no contrary evidence, nor does he explain how 20 the discovery he now seeks would raise a factual dispute precluding summary judgment. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the evidence he now seeks is “essential to resist the 22 summary judgment motion.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 780. 23 4 See, e.g., Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled 24 on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To state a claim for damages under [Title VI] a plaintiff must allege that (1) the entity involved 25 is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance.”); White v. Square, Inc., 7 Cal. 5th 1019, 1023, 1025 (Cal. 2019) (“[A] person suffers 26 discrimination under the [Unruh Civil Rights Act] when the person presents himself or herself to a business with an intent to use its services but encounters an exclusionary policy or practice that 27 prevents him or her from using those services.”); see also Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp, 220 Cal. 1 Even if Defendants’ RMP application and the audio and video footage from the Sunnyvale 2 police could be considered essential, Plaintiff also has not shown that he has pursued this 3 information diligently. Plaintiff had over a year to obtain the necessary discovery for his case. 4 The Court even granted Plaintiff an extension of time for discovery. See Dkt. No. 44. Throughout 5 his filings, Plaintiff has alluded to the difficulties in litigating this case pro se, especially given his 6 anxiety. In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, for example, he suggests that he 7 was unable to request a further extension of the discovery deadline because he was “experiencing 8 and undergoing treatment for a disabling mental health disorder.” See Dkt. No. 57 at 3. The 9 Court does not minimize the difficulty in litigating any federal case pro se, especially when 10 coupled with health challenges. But as the Court repeatedly explained, Plaintiff is nonetheless 11 required to meet court deadlines and pursue his case diligently. 12 Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff appears willing and able to file documents with the 13 Court when it serves him. For example, since the Court granted Plaintiff’s requested discovery 14 extension he has filed: 15 • Two administrative motions regarding discovery, Dkt. Nos. 45–46; 16 • A motion for reconsideration of Judge Kim’s order, Dkt. No. 52; 17 • An administrative motion for an extension of time to file his opposition to the 18 motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 55; 19 • His opposition brief, Dkt. No. 57; and 20 • His pretrial filings, including witness lists and proposed jury instructions and 21 verdict form, Dkt. No. 65–68, 70–71. 22 23 Plaintiff offers no explanation why he could prepare and file these documents but could not timely 24 pursue the discovery he now seeks. Plaintiff is not free to litigate this case only when convenient 25 to him and his schedule. Nor may he use untimely requests for discovery to forestall final 26 resolution of this case. 27 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) for 1 2 As already noted above, Plaintiff has not offered any substantive response to Defendants’ 3 motion for summary judgment or their proffered evidence. The complaint only contains a high- 4 level allegation that Defendants discriminated against him because of his race. See generally 5 Compl. But Plaintiff has not provided any evidence supporting this assertion or from which a jury 6 || could reasonably render a verdict in his favor as to any of his claims. This is plainly insufficient. 7 The Court finds that summary judgment is thus warranted and GRANTS the motion on this basis. 8 || IV. CONCLUSION 9 The Court therefore GRANTS the motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 54. The Clerk 10 || is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff and to close the case. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 |} Dated: 10/21/205
4 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge
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