James Sungchull Kim v. Jennifer Plummer

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: May 1, 2023
• Docket: 8:23-cv-00652
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 ) 12 JAMES SUNGCHULL KIM, ) Case No.: SACV 23-00652-CJC (ADSx) ) 13 ) ) Plaintiff, 14 ) ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S v. 15 ) EX PARTE MOTION TO REMAND ) [Dkt. 7] AND DENYING PENDING 16 JENNIFER PLUMMER and SUZANNA ) MOTION AS MOOT [Dkt. 3] ) 17 PARRA, ) ) 18 ) Defendants. ) 19 ) ) 20 ) 21

22 23 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 24 25 On April 14, 2023, Defendant Jennifer Plummer removed this unlawful detainer 26 action originally filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Orange by Plaintiff 27 James Sungchull Kim. (Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal].) Defendant asserted that removal 1 U.S.C. § 1331. (Id.) On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to remand the 2 case. (See Dkt. 7 [First Ex Parte Application to Remand Case].) For the following 3 reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. 4 5 II. DISCUSSION 6 7 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 8 if the federal court may exercise original jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1441(b). Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases that (1) involve 10 questions arising under federal law or (2) are between diverse parties and involve an 11 amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Principles of 12 federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously confine their [removal] 13 jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” Shamrock Oil & Gas 14 Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed, “[n]othing is to be more jealously 15 guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 16 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant removing the action to 17 federal court bears the burden of establishing that the district court has subject matter 18 jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal 19 jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal 20 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 21 instance.”). 22 23 Federal courts have a duty to examine their subject matter jurisdiction even if the 24 parties do not raise the issue. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 25 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district court’s duty to establish subject matter 26 jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.”). Whether subject matter 27 jurisdiction exists may be raised at any time, and if it appears that the district court lacks 1 be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the 2 court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 3 dismiss the action.”); GFD, LLC v. Carter, 2012 WL 5830079, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 4 2012) (“The court may—indeed must—remand an action sua sponte if it determines that 5 it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”). 6 7 It is clear that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff’s 8 Complaint states a single claim for unlawful detainer under California law. (See Dkt. 1 at 9 10.) The Complaint does not include any claim “arising under the Constitution, laws, or 10 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. There are no federal claims in 11 Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1748 12 (2019) (explaining that to evaluate whether a court has original jurisdiction, it evaluates 13 whether the plaintiff’s operative complaint could have been brought originally in federal 14 court). 15 16 While in the Notice of Removal mentions that Defendant filed a “Demurrer to the 17 complaint based on a based on a defective notice, i.e., the Notice to Pay or Quit, failed 18 [sic] to comply with The Protecting Tenants Moratorium Act” and asserts that “federal 19 question exists because Defendant’s Answer, a pleading that depends on the 20 determination of Defendant’s rights and Plaintiff’s duties under federal law,” (Dkt. 1 at 21 2), federal question jurisdiction is present only when “a federal question is presented on 22 the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 23 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Accordingly, a defense or answer which raises issues of federal 24 law cannot give rise to federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 10; see also ARCO Envtl. 25 Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dept. of Health and Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 26 2000) (“[T]he existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely on the plaintiff’s claims for 27 relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.”); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 1 || F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not 2 ||confer jurisdiction on a federal court.’’). 3 4 Diversity jurisdiction is also lacking. Diversity jurisdiction exists “where the 5 ||matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 6 costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The amount in controversy requirement has not been met 7 || because the Complaint demands less than $10,000 in damages. (See Dkt. 1 at 7 8 || (“Amount Demanded Does Not Exceed $10,000.00”’].) 9 10 |} TH. CONCLUSION 11 12 For the foregoing reasons, the case is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court 13 || of California, County of Orange. The pending motion (Dkt. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT. 14 15 16 DATED: May 1, 2023 Ko je 17 ff 18 CORMAC J. CARMEY 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28