James Pintar and Tricia Pintar v. CSAA General Insurance Company

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided May 27, 2026·No. 2:21-cv-00652·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 James Pintar and Tricia Pintar, Case No. 2:21-cv-00652-CDS-EJY

5 Plaintiffs Order Finding Diversity Jurisdiction and Issuing Separate Judgment Pursuant to Fed. 6 v. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

7 CSAA General Insurance Company,

8 Defendant

9 10 On April 27, 2026, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded this action for the 11 limited purpose of resolving appellate jurisdictional issues. See Order, ECF No. 68. The remand 12 was issued after the court requested supplemental briefing on the jurisdiction question and held 13 oral argument on the appeal. See generally James Pintar & Tricia Pintar v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co. et al., No. 14 25-3634 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026). In its supplemental brief, defendant CSAA General Insurance 15 argued, for the first time, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to 16 properly assert diversity jurisdiction, and that the Ninth Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction 17 because this court did not enter final judgment. See id. at Dkt. No. 27. The plaintiffs argued the 18 opposite, asserting that diversity jurisdiction was properly alleged because the only error was 19 the name of the defendant, and further, while recognizing that partial summary judgment orders 20 are generally not appealable, this case warrants issuance of final judgment pursuant to Rule 21 54(b). See id. at Dkt. No. 24. 22 The remand order directed this court to grant, in my discretion: (1) leave to amend the 23 pleadings in accordance with Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 152 F.4th 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2025), 24 to resolve the potential subject matter jurisdiction issue given how the plaintiffs’ pleaded 25 diversity of citizenship, and (2) to enter final judgment to resolve any question about appellate 26 jurisdiction. See id. at 2. This court set a hearing to discuss the order with the parties, during 1 which the court heard arguments from both sides. During the May 7, 2026 hearing, the plaintiffs 2 argued that this court should resolve the jurisdictional issue by entering a separate judgment 3 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). CSAA opposed that request, maintaining there was no 4 appellate jurisdiction, despite acknowledging that the spirit of the stipulation to dismiss was to 5 permit the plaintiffs to appeal the order granting partial summary judgment. At the conclusion 6 of the hearing, I took the matter under advisement. 7 I find that the plaintiffs properly bring this action under diversity jurisdiction. Though 8 the complaint erroneously names the defendant, the record is devoid of any legitimate challenge 9 to diversity citizenship. I also grant the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to correct the 10 name of the defendant. Finally, I also issue a separate judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 11 I. Background 12 On October 16, 2023, I granted in part defendant CSAA General Insurance Company’s 13 motion for partial summary judgment. See Order, ECF No. 42. Specifically, I granted summary 14 judgment on the plaintiffs’ breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and prayer for 15 punitive damages but denied the motion on plaintiffs’ unfair claims practices act claim.1 See id. 16 The parties were directed to a settlement conference; however, settlement efforts were 17 unsuccessful, so this action returned to the litigation track. See Mins., ECF No. 44 (noting no 18 settlement was reached). The case was set for trial on May 19, 2025. See Mins., ECF No. 60. 19 However, a week before trial was set to commence, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss. 20 Stip., ECF No. 62. Therein, the parties jointly agreed to: (1) dismiss with prejudice the plaintiffs’ 21 second claim for breach of contract, and (2) permit the plaintiffs to preserve the right to appeal 22 this court’s order granting partial summary judgment. See id. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of 23 appeal. Not., ECF No. 64. After briefing was complete, the Ninth Circuit requested the 24 1 This claim was dismissed without prejudice because the plaintiffs’ conceded that Nevada Revised 25 Statute gives exclusive jurisdiction to the commissioner of the Nevada Department of Insurance (NDOI) for any claims arising under 686A.310, and there was no evidence before the court that the Pintars 26 exhausted their administrative remedies before bringing their UCPA claim. See ECF No. 42 at 6–7. 1 supplemental briefing discussed above. After oral argument before the panel, the case was 2 remanded to resolve the issues addressed herein. See Order, ECF No. 68. 3 II. Legal standard 4 A. Diversity of citizenship 5 A federal court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter 6 jurisdiction exists,” and may raise the issue “on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation.” 7 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506, 514 (2006). A district court has subject matter 8 jurisdiction only where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete 9 diversity among the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Parties are completely diverse when no plaintiff 10 shares a domicile with any defendant in the case. GranCare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th 11 Cir. 2018). For diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its 12 principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1332(c)(1); see also Rosenwald, 152 F.4th at 13 1175. A corporation’s “principal place of business” is where its officers “direct, control, and 14 coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). 15 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) allows the court to “direct the entry of a final 17 judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties” when there is “no just 18 reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). To enter a separate judgment under Rule 54(b), the 19 judgment must be a “final judgment.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1980). 20 Further, the district court must make express findings that there is no “just reason for delay.” 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 Specifically, these findings must show: (1) that the “interrelationship of the claims” will not lead 23 to “piecemeal appeals”; and (2) the equities—such as “efficient judicial administration,” 24 prejudice, and delay—warrant a separate judgment. S.E.C. v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 25 1072, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2010). “[I]n the interest of judicial economy Rule 54(b) should be used 26 1 sparingly.” Gausvik v.

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James Pintar and Tricia Pintar v. CSAA General Insurance Company, (D. Nev. 2026).

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