1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 James Pintar and Tricia Pintar, Case No. 2:21-cv-00652-CDS-EJY
5 Plaintiffs Order Finding Diversity Jurisdiction and Issuing Separate Judgment Pursuant to Fed. 6 v. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
7 CSAA General Insurance Company,
8 Defendant
9 10 On April 27, 2026, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded this action for the 11 limited purpose of resolving appellate jurisdictional issues. See Order, ECF No. 68. The remand 12 was issued after the court requested supplemental briefing on the jurisdiction question and held 13 oral argument on the appeal. See generally James Pintar & Tricia Pintar v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co. et al., No. 14 25-3634 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026). In its supplemental brief, defendant CSAA General Insurance 15 argued, for the first time, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to 16 properly assert diversity jurisdiction, and that the Ninth Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction 17 because this court did not enter final judgment. See id. at Dkt. No. 27. The plaintiffs argued the 18 opposite, asserting that diversity jurisdiction was properly alleged because the only error was 19 the name of the defendant, and further, while recognizing that partial summary judgment orders 20 are generally not appealable, this case warrants issuance of final judgment pursuant to Rule 21 54(b). See id. at Dkt. No. 24. 22 The remand order directed this court to grant, in my discretion: (1) leave to amend the 23 pleadings in accordance with Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 152 F.4th 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2025), 24 to resolve the potential subject matter jurisdiction issue given how the plaintiffs’ pleaded 25 diversity of citizenship, and (2) to enter final judgment to resolve any question about appellate 26 jurisdiction. See id. at 2. This court set a hearing to discuss the order with the parties, during 1 which the court heard arguments from both sides. During the May 7, 2026 hearing, the plaintiffs 2 argued that this court should resolve the jurisdictional issue by entering a separate judgment 3 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). CSAA opposed that request, maintaining there was no 4 appellate jurisdiction, despite acknowledging that the spirit of the stipulation to dismiss was to 5 permit the plaintiffs to appeal the order granting partial summary judgment. At the conclusion 6 of the hearing, I took the matter under advisement. 7 I find that the plaintiffs properly bring this action under diversity jurisdiction. Though 8 the complaint erroneously names the defendant, the record is devoid of any legitimate challenge 9 to diversity citizenship. I also grant the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to correct the 10 name of the defendant. Finally, I also issue a separate judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 11 I. Background 12 On October 16, 2023, I granted in part defendant CSAA General Insurance Company’s 13 motion for partial summary judgment. See Order, ECF No. 42. Specifically, I granted summary 14 judgment on the plaintiffs’ breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and prayer for 15 punitive damages but denied the motion on plaintiffs’ unfair claims practices act claim.1 See id. 16 The parties were directed to a settlement conference; however, settlement efforts were 17 unsuccessful, so this action returned to the litigation track. See Mins., ECF No. 44 (noting no 18 settlement was reached). The case was set for trial on May 19, 2025. See Mins., ECF No. 60. 19 However, a week before trial was set to commence, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss. 20 Stip., ECF No. 62. Therein, the parties jointly agreed to: (1) dismiss with prejudice the plaintiffs’ 21 second claim for breach of contract, and (2) permit the plaintiffs to preserve the right to appeal 22 this court’s order granting partial summary judgment. See id. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of 23 appeal. Not., ECF No. 64. After briefing was complete, the Ninth Circuit requested the 24 1 This claim was dismissed without prejudice because the plaintiffs’ conceded that Nevada Revised 25 Statute gives exclusive jurisdiction to the commissioner of the Nevada Department of Insurance (NDOI) for any claims arising under 686A.310, and there was no evidence before the court that the Pintars 26 exhausted their administrative remedies before bringing their UCPA claim. See ECF No. 42 at 6–7. 1 supplemental briefing discussed above. After oral argument before the panel, the case was 2 remanded to resolve the issues addressed herein. See Order, ECF No. 68. 3 II. Legal standard 4 A. Diversity of citizenship 5 A federal court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter 6 jurisdiction exists,” and may raise the issue “on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation.” 7 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506, 514 (2006). A district court has subject matter 8 jurisdiction only where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete 9 diversity among the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Parties are completely diverse when no plaintiff 10 shares a domicile with any defendant in the case. GranCare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th 11 Cir. 2018). For diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its 12 principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1332(c)(1); see also Rosenwald, 152 F.4th at 13 1175. A corporation’s “principal place of business” is where its officers “direct, control, and 14 coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). 15 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) allows the court to “direct the entry of a final 17 judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties” when there is “no just 18 reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). To enter a separate judgment under Rule 54(b), the 19 judgment must be a “final judgment.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1980). 20 Further, the district court must make express findings that there is no “just reason for delay.” 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 Specifically, these findings must show: (1) that the “interrelationship of the claims” will not lead 23 to “piecemeal appeals”; and (2) the equities—such as “efficient judicial administration,” 24 prejudice, and delay—warrant a separate judgment. S.E.C. v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 25 1072, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2010). “[I]n the interest of judicial economy Rule 54(b) should be used 26 1 sparingly.” Gausvik v.
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1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 James Pintar and Tricia Pintar, Case No. 2:21-cv-00652-CDS-EJY
5 Plaintiffs Order Finding Diversity Jurisdiction and Issuing Separate Judgment Pursuant to Fed. 6 v. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
7 CSAA General Insurance Company,
8 Defendant
9 10 On April 27, 2026, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded this action for the 11 limited purpose of resolving appellate jurisdictional issues. See Order, ECF No. 68. The remand 12 was issued after the court requested supplemental briefing on the jurisdiction question and held 13 oral argument on the appeal. See generally James Pintar & Tricia Pintar v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co. et al., No. 14 25-3634 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026). In its supplemental brief, defendant CSAA General Insurance 15 argued, for the first time, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to 16 properly assert diversity jurisdiction, and that the Ninth Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction 17 because this court did not enter final judgment. See id. at Dkt. No. 27. The plaintiffs argued the 18 opposite, asserting that diversity jurisdiction was properly alleged because the only error was 19 the name of the defendant, and further, while recognizing that partial summary judgment orders 20 are generally not appealable, this case warrants issuance of final judgment pursuant to Rule 21 54(b). See id. at Dkt. No. 24. 22 The remand order directed this court to grant, in my discretion: (1) leave to amend the 23 pleadings in accordance with Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 152 F.4th 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2025), 24 to resolve the potential subject matter jurisdiction issue given how the plaintiffs’ pleaded 25 diversity of citizenship, and (2) to enter final judgment to resolve any question about appellate 26 jurisdiction. See id. at 2. This court set a hearing to discuss the order with the parties, during 1 which the court heard arguments from both sides. During the May 7, 2026 hearing, the plaintiffs 2 argued that this court should resolve the jurisdictional issue by entering a separate judgment 3 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). CSAA opposed that request, maintaining there was no 4 appellate jurisdiction, despite acknowledging that the spirit of the stipulation to dismiss was to 5 permit the plaintiffs to appeal the order granting partial summary judgment. At the conclusion 6 of the hearing, I took the matter under advisement. 7 I find that the plaintiffs properly bring this action under diversity jurisdiction. Though 8 the complaint erroneously names the defendant, the record is devoid of any legitimate challenge 9 to diversity citizenship. I also grant the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to correct the 10 name of the defendant. Finally, I also issue a separate judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 11 I. Background 12 On October 16, 2023, I granted in part defendant CSAA General Insurance Company’s 13 motion for partial summary judgment. See Order, ECF No. 42. Specifically, I granted summary 14 judgment on the plaintiffs’ breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and prayer for 15 punitive damages but denied the motion on plaintiffs’ unfair claims practices act claim.1 See id. 16 The parties were directed to a settlement conference; however, settlement efforts were 17 unsuccessful, so this action returned to the litigation track. See Mins., ECF No. 44 (noting no 18 settlement was reached). The case was set for trial on May 19, 2025. See Mins., ECF No. 60. 19 However, a week before trial was set to commence, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss. 20 Stip., ECF No. 62. Therein, the parties jointly agreed to: (1) dismiss with prejudice the plaintiffs’ 21 second claim for breach of contract, and (2) permit the plaintiffs to preserve the right to appeal 22 this court’s order granting partial summary judgment. See id. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of 23 appeal. Not., ECF No. 64. After briefing was complete, the Ninth Circuit requested the 24 1 This claim was dismissed without prejudice because the plaintiffs’ conceded that Nevada Revised 25 Statute gives exclusive jurisdiction to the commissioner of the Nevada Department of Insurance (NDOI) for any claims arising under 686A.310, and there was no evidence before the court that the Pintars 26 exhausted their administrative remedies before bringing their UCPA claim. See ECF No. 42 at 6–7. 1 supplemental briefing discussed above. After oral argument before the panel, the case was 2 remanded to resolve the issues addressed herein. See Order, ECF No. 68. 3 II. Legal standard 4 A. Diversity of citizenship 5 A federal court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter 6 jurisdiction exists,” and may raise the issue “on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation.” 7 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506, 514 (2006). A district court has subject matter 8 jurisdiction only where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete 9 diversity among the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Parties are completely diverse when no plaintiff 10 shares a domicile with any defendant in the case. GranCare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th 11 Cir. 2018). For diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its 12 principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1332(c)(1); see also Rosenwald, 152 F.4th at 13 1175. A corporation’s “principal place of business” is where its officers “direct, control, and 14 coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). 15 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) allows the court to “direct the entry of a final 17 judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties” when there is “no just 18 reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). To enter a separate judgment under Rule 54(b), the 19 judgment must be a “final judgment.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1980). 20 Further, the district court must make express findings that there is no “just reason for delay.” 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 Specifically, these findings must show: (1) that the “interrelationship of the claims” will not lead 23 to “piecemeal appeals”; and (2) the equities—such as “efficient judicial administration,” 24 prejudice, and delay—warrant a separate judgment. S.E.C. v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 25 1072, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2010). “[I]n the interest of judicial economy Rule 54(b) should be used 26 1 sparingly.” Gausvik v. Perez, 392 F.3d 1006, 1009 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004). Rule 54(b) judgments are 2 reserved “for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of 3 proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the 4 litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.” Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. 5 Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). 6 C. Leave to amend 7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), courts should “freely” grant leave to amend 8 a complaint “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Several factors govern the propriety 9 of a motion to amend: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice to the opponent, and (4) 10 futility of amendment.” Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1986) 11 (citation omitted). “Leave to amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would 12 be subject to dismissal.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018). A 13 “proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the 14 pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 15 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 16 1988)). 17 III. Discussion 18 On remand, this court is to determine two issues: (1) if the plaintiffs properly allege 19 diversity of citizenship, and (2) if this court should, in its discretion, enter separate and final 20 judgment as it relates to the order granting CSAA’s motion for partial summary judgment. I 21 address each in turn. 22 A. Diversity of citizenship is met. 23 In sum, CSAA argues that the plaintiffs failed to properly allege diversity of citizenship 24 because they improperly named the wrong party and never amended the pleadings. See James 25 Pintar and Tricia Pintar v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co. et al., No. 25-3634 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026), Dkt. No. 27. 26 1 CSAA is correct in that the plaintiffs incorrectly named the wrong party. In the complaint, the 2 plaintiffs alleged the following: 3 Both jurisdiction and venue are appropriate because the Defendants are, jointly, foreign corporations that are licensed to operate in Nevada; the acts complained of 4 herein occurred in Clark County, Nevada, and, further, the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court for purposes of diversity 5 jurisdiction; 6 and 7 Federal jurisdiction based on diversity of the parties pursuant to 28 USC Section 8 1332 is invoked herein as the Plaintiffs, and each of them, are citizens of the State of Nevada and the Defendants AAA Nevada Fire & Casualty Insurance Company and AAA 9 Insurance have their principal place of business in the State of California; therefore, there is complete diversity of citizenship for purposes of federal jurisdiction, and, 10 further, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as alleged herein. 11 12 Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 5–6 (emphasis added). In their notice regarding diversity of citizenship, 13 the plaintiffs alleged the following: 14 “According to the policy of homeowners insurance between Plaintiffs and Defendant AAA Nevada Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, the principal place of business for 15 the Defendant is AAA Insurance, 3055 Oak Road, Walnut Creek, CA 94597,” 16 and 17 “Plaintiffs allege and contend that Defendant AAA Nevada Fire & Casualty Insurance Company has its principal place of business in the State of California 18 and it is believed to be incorporated in the State of California.”
19 20 See ECF No. 10 (emphasis added). At no time, did CSAA challenge diversity of citizenship in any 21 meaningful way. Rather, in its motion for partial summary judgment, CSAA merely noted that 22 they were named incorrectly, not that the address or citizenship was erroneous which would 23 call diversity jurisdiction into question. See ECF No. 6 at 1 n.1 (noting that the defendant was 24 “Improperly Named, Properly Named, “CSAA General Insurance Company.”) and ECF No. 32 at 25 1 n.1 (same). Certainly, the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving 26 1 jurisdiction exists, Me. Cmty. Health Options v. Albertsons Cos., 993 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 2021), so 2 this court is not burden shifting. However, because the record is devoid of any meaningful 3 challenge to the plaintiffs’ notice of diversity jurisdiction, I find the defendant-acknowledged 4 scrivener’s error in naming “AAA Nevada Fire & Casualty Insurance” instead of “CSAA General 5 Insurance Company” to be an insufficient basis to find plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. 6 Thus, based on the information in the record, the plaintiffs properly pleaded diversity 7 jurisdiction: the parties were diverse because the plaintiffs are residents of Nevada, the 8 defendant is domiciled in California,2 and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. See 28 9 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 10 In an abundance of caution, however, I grant the plaintiffs limited leave to amend the 11 complaint to correct the name of the defendant only. Further instructions are provided in the 12 conclusion of this order. 13 B. Issuance of a separate judgment under Rule 54(b) is appropriate here. 14 Having resolved the jurisdictional question, I must decide if issuing separate judgment 15 pursuant to Rule 54(b) is appropriate. To do so, I must first determine if I am dealing with a 16 “final judgment,” meaning it must be “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in 17 the course of a multiple claims action.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956). 18 Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, including the fact that the parties 19 stipulated to the plaintiffs’ appeal, it is appropriate to consider the order resolving CSAA’s 20 partial summary judgment motion a final judgment. 21 22 23
24 2 Although judicial notice cannot suffice to establish diversity of citizenship, the court does note that a simple internet search reveals that the prior headquarters for CSAA Insurance Group Headquarters is the 25 same address as that included in the plaintiffs’ notice of diversity of citizenship. Compare ECF No. 10 at ¶ 1, with https://csaa-insurance.com/content/aaa-ie/b2c/en/primary-nav/contact-us.html/ (last visited May 26 26, 2026). 1 Because I find the element of finality is met here, I then evaluate “whether there is any 2}| just reason for delay.” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. Here, taking “into account judicial 3|| administrative interests as well as the equities involved,” id., there is no just reason for delay. 4|| Given the parties’ stipulation permitting appeal on one claim, entering final judgment will not result in piecemeal litigation, and final judgment will allow for resolution of the pending appeal. 6 Accordingly, the plaintiffs have met their burden showing entering final judgment under 7|| Rule 54(b) is warranted. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Williamsburg Nat. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 650578, at *2 8|| (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (explaining that the party seeking Rule 54(b) certification bears the 9] burden to show that certification is warranted. ). Conclusion IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the order [ECF No. 42] granting in part CSAA’s 12|| motion for partial summary judgment is hereby considered a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). Nothing in this order disturbs the other findings set forth in that order, nor the parties’ stipulation to dismiss the breach of contract claim [ECF No. 62]. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs must file an amended complaint correctly 16]| identifying the defendant and their address by June 4, 2026. 17 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment in favor of CSAA General 18|| Insurance Company on claim one: breach of the ren shod faith and fair dealing. 19 Dated: May 27, 2026 / / 20 . / LZ 21 Cri kf U □□□ States District Judge 23 ‘
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