James Parker v. Daniel Driscoll

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 19, 2025
• Docket: 23-35510
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES PARKER, No. 23-35510

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01451-IM

v. MEMORANDUM* DANIEL DRISCOLL, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Army,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BENNETT, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

James Parker appeals the district court’s order dismissing his pro se

complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”),

29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 791, and judicially noticing certain documents

from Parker’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the

district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Benavidez v. Cnty. of

San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2021). The district court’s decision to

judicially notice documents from Parker’s EEOC proceeding is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th

Cir. 2018). We affirm the district court’s decision to judicially notice the

documents in question, but reverse and remand the district court’s dismissal of

Parker’s complaint.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in judicially noticing the

records from Parker’s EEOC case. Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d

1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a “court may take judicial notice of

‘records and reports of administrative bodies’” without converting the motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment) (citation omitted), abrogated on

other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104

(1991). In doing so, the court did not impermissibly notice any fact that was

“subject to reasonable dispute.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

201(b)).

2. By requiring Parker to have pled a prima facie case of discrimination for

his claims under the ADEA and Rehabilitation Act, the district court contravened

well-established precedent. The Supreme Court held in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

2 N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), that plaintiffs in discrimination cases need not plead a

prima facie case of discrimination, and no subsequent decision of the court has

abrogated that holding. “[A]n employment discrimination complaint . . . must

contain only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.’” Id. at 508 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Sheppard v.

David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff alleging

discrimination under the ADEA “is not required to plead a prima facie case of

discrimination in order to survive a motion to dismiss”).

Parker’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act “satisfies the requirements of

Rule 8(a).” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514. He provided the Secretary “fair notice

of the basis for” his claim, including by referencing his diabetes diagnosis; the

hiring officials’ awareness of that diagnosis prior to his non-selection; his

qualifications for the position; the other applicants’ non-disability status; and a

citation to the Rehabilitation Act. Id. (discrimination pleading sufficient where

plaintiff “detailed the events leading to his termination, provided relevant

dates, . . . included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant

persons involved with his termination,” and stated claims upon which relief could

be granted). Parker’s ADEA claim likewise meets the pleading standard because it

identified his age relative to the other applicants, qualifications for the position,

3 and non-selection.1 Sheppard, 694 F.3d at 1049–50 (holding that a 2.5-page

complaint met the pleading standard for an ADEA claim where it alleged that

plaintiff was of a certain age; performed job satisfactorily; was discharged; and her

five younger comparators kept their jobs).

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.2

1 Any qualms the district court had regarding whether any age differences between Parker and other candidates are sufficiently substantial are properly resolved after the pleading stage. See France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that, on summary judgment for an ADEA claim, plaintiff can rebut a “presumptively insubstantial” age difference of less than ten years with additional evidence that “the employer considered his . . . age to be significant”). 2 The Secretary shall bear the costs associated with this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).