JAMES MIDDLETON HUGER * NO. 2022-CA-0410
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL STEPHANIE GOLIWAS * HUGER FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2018-07554, DIVISION “K” Honorable Bernadette D'Souza, Judge ****** Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase)
Mark J. Mansfield Amy C. Cowley Chandler D. McCoy TRANCHINA & MANSFIELD, LLC 321 E. Kirkland Street Covington, LA 70433
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Marc D. Winsberg Jonathan D. Gamble WINSBERG & HEIDINGSFELDER & GAMBLE, LLC 650 Poydras Street, Suite 2050 New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
DECEMBER 14, 2022 This is a domestic case. Plaintiff/appellant, James Middleton Huger JCL (“Husband”), appeals the January 5, 2022 judgment of the district court, which TFL
TGC adopted the Special Master’s recommendation classifying certain payments as an
extension of interim spousal support. Pursuant to a June 2, 2020 consent judgment,
Husband made a $300,000 lump sum payment to defendant/appellee, Stephanie
Goliwas Huger (“Wife”), along with Husband’s payment of particular expenses.
The parties reserved to the Special Master the issue of whether these payments
would be classified either as an extension of interim spousal support or as an
advance on Wife’s share of the community. The Special Master recommended that
said payments were an extension of interim spousal support, and in the judgment
on appeal, the district court adopted that recommendation. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following facts and procedural timeline are pertinent to our
determination. Husband and Wife were married on April 16, 1994. Four children
1 were born of the marriage, who have all reached the age of majority. The parties
have a community property regime, and no premarital agreement was established
before the marriage. On July 30, 2018, Husband filed a Petition for Divorce
Pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Article 102. On February 12, 2019, the parties
entered into a consent judgment to appoint a Special Master. The parties agreed, in
pertinent part, that Steven J. Lane (the “Special Master”) be appointed as Special
Master to make findings and recommendations regarding the determination,
valuation, and allocation of the parties’ community assets, liabilities, and
reimbursement claims.1
On July 26, 2019, the parties entered into another consent judgment in which
Husband agreed to pay the following relevant amounts:
• $24,000 per month in interim spousal support; and
• Certain “direct expenses” including:
o 100% of Wife’s health insurance premiums and uncovered medical expenses;
o 80% of the mortgage, property taxes, flood insurance, homeowners insurance, utilities, cable, internet, housekeeper, handyman, lawn and garden maintenance, pest control, pool maintenance, home security and maintenance/repairs for the former family home; and 1 Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4165 governs the appointment, duties, and powers of special
masters in particular civil cases. “Pursuant to the inherent judicial power of the court and upon its own motion and with the consent of all parties litigant, the court may enter an order appointing a special master in any civil action wherein complicated legal or factual issues are presented or wherein exceptional circumstances of the case warrant such appointment…” La. R.S. 13:4165(A). “The court may order the master to prepare a report upon the matters submitted to him and, if in the course of his duties he is required to make findings of facts or conclusions of law, the order may further require that the master include in his report information with respect to such findings or conclusions.” La. R.S. 13:4165(C)(1). “Within ten days after being served with notice of the filing of the report, any party may file a written objection thereto. After a contradictory hearing, the court may adopt the report, modify it, reject it in whole or in part, receive further evidence, or recommit it with instructions. If no timely objection is filed, the court shall adopt the report as submitted, unless clearly erroneous.” La. R.S. 13:4165(C)(3).
2 o 80% of the umbrella and art/jewelry insurance policy premiums and Wife’s automobile insurance premiums.
On September 6, 2019, a judgment of divorce was granted. Pursuant to La.
C.C. art. 113, interim spousal support was scheduled to end on March 4, 2020,
which was 180 days from the September 6, 2019 judgment of divorce. Thus, on
January 16, 2020, Wife filed a motion to extend interim spousal support or, in the
alternative, for an advance of community funds.
On June 2, 2020, the parties entered into an additional consent judgment. For
the period of March 4, 2020 to May 31, 2020, Husband agreed to pay Wife
$24,000 per month along the direct expenses memorialized in the July 26, 2019
consent judgment, all of which would be classified as an advance on Wife’s share
of community property.
In addition, in the June 2, 2020 consent judgment, Husband agreed to certain
payments, which are the subject of this appeal. In particular, Husband agreed to
pay Wife a lump sum of $300,000 on June 1, 2020, as well as the direct expenses
listed in the July 26, 2019 consent judgment for the limited period of June 1, 2020
through August 18, 2020. The parties stipulated that these payments would be
classified as either an extension of interim spousal support or an advance on Wife’s
share of the community property, and that classification would be deferred to the
Special Master at a later date, with both parties reserving all rights regarding the
classification.
On August 10, 2020, Wife filed a second motion to extend interim spousal
support or, in the alternative, for an advance of community funds. Meanwhile, a
3 bifurcated traversal trial took place on August 19, 20, and 21, 2020, and September
21, 2020, during which the Special Master received evidence and heard oral
argument and testimony regarding the classification of certain assets as community
property or separate property. On September 21, 2020, the Special Master also held
a hearing on the second motion for extended interim support and/or advance. On
October 2, 2020, the Special Master entered a recommendation to deny Wife any
extension of interim support after September 21, 2020; instead, he recommended
an advance from the community in the amount of $775,000, net of taxes. Neither
party objected to this recommendation.
The Special Master held no further hearing regarding classification of the
$300,000 lump sum payment and direct expenses. On January 12, 2021, following
supplemental briefing by the parties, the Special Master issued a recommendation
that the $300,000 lump sum and payments of direct expenses for the period of June
1 to September 21, 2020 should be classified as an extension of interim spousal
support. On March 10, 2021, Husband filed an objection to the Special Master’s
January 12, 2021 recommendation, and on August 17, 2021, the district court held
a hearing on Husband’s objection. On January 5, 2022, the district court rendered
judgment overruling Husband’s objection and adopting the Special Master’s
recommendation in its entirety. This appeal followed.
4 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Husband asserts three assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in classifying the $300,000 lump sum payment and direct expenses paid by [Husband] as an extension of interim spousal support when the Special Master previously ruled that [Wife] was not entitled to an extension of spousal support and did not meet her burden.
2. The trial court erred in determining a $300,000 lump sum payment and direct expenses paid from June 1, 2020 to September 21, 2020 were to be considered an extension of interim spousal support, whereby such payments exceed the $10,000/month finding made by the Special Master to be [Wife’s] actual “need” in calculating interim spousal support.
3. The trial court erred in determining a $300,000 lump sum payment and direct expenses paid from June 1, 2020 to September 21, 2020 were to be considered an extension of spousal support and wholly disregarding the law of the case established by a prior final judgment.
DISCUSSION
As Husband points out, the significance of whether the lump sum payment
and direct expenses are classified as interim spousal support or an advance on
Wife’s share of the community is whether Husband will be entitled to
reimbursement for one half of these amounts. Husband argues that if the lump sum
payment and direct expenses are an advance from community property, then he
will be entitled to reimbursement for one-half at partition.2 However, if they are
2 “If community property has been used during the existence of the community property regime
or former community property has been used thereafter to satisfy a separate obligation of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.” La. C.C. art. 2364.
5 extended interim spousal support, Husband would not be entitled to such
reimbursement.3
Standard for Extension of Interim Spousal Support
The classification of the disputed payments as interim spousal support
depends on whether Wife has shown good cause for an extension of interim
spousal support beyond 180 days. The Civil Code provides for an award of interim
spousal support and extension of the award for good cause under La. C.C. art.
113(A), which states:
Upon motion of a party, the court may award a party interim spousal support based on the needs of that party, the ability of the other party to pay, any interim or final child support obligation, and the standard of living of the parties during the marriage. An award of interim spousal support shall terminate one hundred eighty days from the rendition of a judgment of divorce, except that the award may extend beyond one hundred eighty days but only for good cause shown.
This Court recently discussed the relevant standard for an extension of
interim spousal support as follows:
“The purpose behind interim spousal support is to ensure that the parties maintain the status quo enjoyed during the marriage while the divorce is pending.” Hight v. Hight, 2017-0566, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/13/17), 234 So.3d 1143, 1147 (citing Evans v. Evans, 49,160, p.3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/25/14), 145 So.3d 1093, 1094-95). “The spouse seeking interim spousal support bears the burden of proving his or her entitlement to such support.” Id. (citing Loftice v. Loftice, 2007-1741, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/08), 985 So.2d 204, 207). “In order to establish that need, it must be shown that the requesting spouse lacks sufficient income to preserve the standard of living they previously enjoyed while married.” Id. (citing Brown v.
3 “An alimentary obligation imposed by law on a spouse is deemed to be a community
obligation.” La. C.C. art. 2362.
6 Brown, 44,989, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/27/10), 31 So.3d 532, 536). “Once that spouse has demonstrated their need, then the court will look to the ability of the other spouse to pay interim support.” Id., 2017-0566, pp. 5-6, 234 So.3d at 1147.
A trial court’s determinations on interim spousal support [are] reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Molony v. Harris, 2009-1529, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/14/10), 51 So.3d 752, 756. Accordingly, “[i]f the trial court record supports the trial court’s reasoning and conclusions regarding the means of the payor spouse and his or her ability to pay, no abuse of discretion will be found.” Hight, 2017-0566, p. 5, 234 So.3d at 1147 (citing Molony, 2009-1529, p. 2, 51 So.3d at 756). The trial court’s factual findings will not be set aside unless there is manifest error. Id.
As La. C.C. art. 113 makes clear, an award of interim spousal support expires by operation of law 180 days after the judgment of divorce is rendered. The award can be extended “for good cause shown,” however.
“Whether ‘good cause’ exists for the extension of interim support must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Hogan v. Hogan, 49,979, p. 23 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 178 So.3d 1013, 1026 (citing Guillory v. Guillory, 2008-1375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 4/1/09), 7 So.3d 144). “It must constitute, if not a compelling reason, certainly a reason of such significance and gravity that ‘it would be inequitable to deny an extension of such support.’ ” Id., 49,979, pp. 23-24, 178 So.3d at 1026 (quoting Roan v. Roan, 38,383, p. 21 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 626, 639). Roan clarified that “good cause” pursuant to La. C.C. art. 113 “requires an affirmative showing by the party seeking an extension of interim support that the extension is really and genuinely needed, and the purpose for which it is sought is legitimate, not calculated to cause hardship or to obtain as much spousal support as possible for as long as possible.” Roan, 38,383, p. 22, 870 So.2d at 639.
Bernstein v. Bernstein, 19-1106, pp. 14-16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/10/21), 313 So.3d
413, 424, writ denied, 21-00390 (La. 5/4/21), 315 So.3d 220, and writ denied, 21-
00380 (La. 5/4/21), 315 So.3d 222.
7 Husband’s appeal sets forth two main arguments. First, the Special Master’s
earlier October 2, 2020 recommendation imputed to Wife a monthly need for
$10,000 in personal living expenses; Husband argues this is the law of the case and
that classifying the disputed payments as extended interim spousal support is
inconsistent with Wife’s need. Second, he argues that no good cause was shown
for an extension of spousal support. We disagree on both counts.
Law of the Case
We find no support for the proposition that the Special Master’s reasoning as
to Wife’s need, corresponding to a different period than the one in question,
constitutes law of the case by which this Court must be bound.
“The ‘law of the case’ doctrine generally refers to the binding effect of trial
court and/or appellate court rulings during later stages of the same case, including
the principle that an appellate court ordinarily will not reconsider its own rulings of
law in a subsequent appeal in the same case.” Myers v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Louisiana, 11-0751, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/4/12), 90 So.3d 522, 526. The
Louisiana Supreme Court described the policy reasons behind this doctrine,
including: “(1) avoiding relitigation of the same issue; (2) promoting consistency
of result in the same action; and (3) promoting efficiency and fairness to the parties
by affording a single opportunity for the argument and decision of the matter at
issue.” Id., 11-0751, pp. 6-7, 90 So.3d at 526 (citing Day v. Campbell–Grosjean
Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., 260 La. 325, 256 So.2d 105, 107 (1971)). Even so,
“[u]nlike the statutory doctrine of res judicata, the jurisprudential doctrine of law
8 of the case is a discretionary guide that will not be applied inflexibly.” Daigre v.
International Truck and Engine Corp., 10-1379, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/5/11), 67
So.3d 504, 513-14. Further, “it will not be applied when the underlying, operative
facts upon which the court’s prior decision was based have changed.” Id., 10-1379,
p. 15, 67 So.3d at 514. “[J]urisprudence provides that the law of the case doctrine
‘does not apply when the issues are not identical, when there is more than a mere
doubt as to the correctness of the earlier decision, or when there is intervening case
law.’” KeyClick Outsourcing, Inc. v. Ochsner Health Plan, Inc., 11-0598, p. 8 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 3/14/12), 89 So.3d 1207, 1212 (quotation omitted).
The Special Master’s October 2, 2020 recommendation was rendered
following trial on Wife’s second motion to extend interim spousal support or, in
the alternative, for an advance of community funds, which was filed on August 10,
2020. This recommendation explicitly refers to the period after September 21,
2020. Husband contended at that particular time that he did not have the ability to
pay interim spousal support going forward in light of his businesses suffering due
to the government restrictions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence
was also presented as to a recent employment offer made to Wife, which Wife
rejected. In contrast, the January 12, 2021 recommendation classifying the lump
sum and direct expense payments served to resolve the remaining issue on Wife’s
first motion to extend interim spousal support or, in the alternative, for an advance
of community funds, which was filed on January 16, 2020. The single issue
reserved to the Special Master therein was classification of payments, which had
9 already made to or on Wife’s behalf. The Special Master’s January 12, 2021
recommendation refers to a different limited period, June 1, 2020 to September 21,
2020. We cannot say that the issues before the Special Master were identical, and
we decline to apply the law of the case doctrine.
Classification of Payments
We likewise do not find that the Special Master’s classification of the
payments as spousal support is inconsistent with his statements as to Wife’s need
as of October 2, 2020. In both of his October 2, 2020 and January 12, 2021
recommendations, the Special Master issued detailed reasons, which corresponded
to specific periods of monthly support.
When interim support terminated by operation of law on March 4, 2020, the
parties agreed by consent judgment that Husband’s payments over the next three
months of $24,000 plus direct expenses were an advance against Wife’s share of
community property, not interim spousal support.
The disputed lump sum and direct expenses, characterized by the Special
Master as extended interim support, were limited to a specific window of time,
June 1, 2020 to September 21, 2020. The parties agreed by consent judgment to the
quantity of the $300,000 lump sum and direct expenses. Husband already paid
these amounts in June 2020, and Husband’s ability to pay these amounts as of that
time was not disputed. The parties deferred the classification of these payments to
the Special Master, but not the quantity of the payments themselves. The Special
Master found that good cause existed to provide Wife with financial support and
10 that a more viable basis existed to characterize payments before September 21,
2020 as extended interim support than those payments made after. As to Wife’s
need for financial support during this time, the Special Master looked to Wife’s
age, work history, absence from the work force during the marriage, and education,
similar to the factors identified in LaRocca v. LaRocca, 14-255, p. 11 (La. App. 5
Cir. 10/29/14), 164 So.3d 207, 214. Specifically, Wife was 52 years old at the time,
and while she had attained an undergraduate degree in fine arts, she had not
worked full time at any point during the 24-year marriage; rather, she sporadically
performed substitute teaching work and was primarily a homemaker through the
time the parties’ youngest children graduated from high school in May 2020. No
vocational rehabilitation expert testified on behalf of either party as to Wife’s
capacity to work or available employment, and neither party introduced any other
evidence regarding Wife’s ability to obtain full time employment prior to Fall
2020. The Special Master found it compelling that Wife used “essentially all, if not
all of the $300,000 payment that she received in June 2020 to pay for her day to
day living expenses and legal fees,” which the Special Master found “confirms that
[Wife] needed extended interim support during that time.” The Special Master
indicated that both parties spent approximately $200,000 per year on attorney’s
and expert’s fees. As to Husband’s ability to pay, the Special Master noted
Husband had a greater ability to pay from June to September 2020 than he would
have had after September 21, 2020. In particular, Husband “spent a considerable
amount of time at the island in Maine and/or on his yacht in Turks and Caicos.
11 Moreover, according to [Wife], responses to discovery revealed that, from March
1, 2020 through August 18, 2020 [Husband] had deposits in his accounts in excess
of a million dollars and was netting a monthly income in excess of $100,000
through August 2020.”
Importantly, all interim support terminated after September 21, 2020, at
which point only an advance from the community was recommended. In the
October 2, 2020 recommendation, the Special Master calculated an amount that he
suggested would cover Wife’s financial need for at least one year, from September
21, 2020 to September 21, 2021.4 The Special Master’s denial of extended interim
spousal support as of October 2020 was based in part on evidence that Wife was
employable and was offered employment for the school year beginning Fall 2020
paying an annual salary of $20,000 as a ceramics teacher, an offer which Wife
rejected. The Special Master recommended that termination of interim support as
of this period weighed in favor of classifying the previously paid disputed sums,
corresponding to June to September 2020, as extended interim support for that
limited period. The Special Master also noted that Husband’s business enterprises
had suffered pandemic-related financial losses, which were more severe after
September 21, 2020 than in the previous period in dispute, such that Husband’s
ability to pay the support was considerably different in June 2020 than it was on a
prospective basis after September 2020.
4 The October 2020 $775,000 advance calculated by the Special Master was intended to pay for:
(1) $215,000 in Wife’s outstanding attorney’s and expert’s fees; (2) $200,000 in Wife’s attorney’s and expert’s fees for the following year; (3) $240,000 for 1 year of expenses at $20,000 per month to maintain the former family home; and (4) $120,000 for one year of Wife’s personal expenses at $10,000 per month.
12 Considering the Special Master’s detailed reasoning and looking to the
totality of the circumstances involved, we cannot say that the district court abused
its discretion in finding good cause to extend interim support based on its finding
that the amount awarded was reasonable based upon Wife’s need for support, the
prior lifestyle enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, and Husband’s ability to
pay said support.
Finding no compelling reason to disturb the classification of payments as a
limited extension of interim spousal support, we affirm the district court’s adoption
of the Special Master’s January 12, 2021 recommendation.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.