RENDERED: MAY 27, 2022; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1396-DG
JAMES MEREDITH APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE KAREN CONRAD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-XX-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JONES, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: James Meredith has been granted discretionary review
from the opinion and order of the Oldham Circuit Court affirming the Oldham
District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained at a roadblock
set up and operated by the Oldham County Police Department (OCPD). We affirm because Meredith was not improperly seized through the use of this particular
roadblock.
At approximately 12:05 a.m. on July 19, 2015, Meredith was stopped
at a roadblock operated by the OCPD on northbound exit ramp 22 of I-71 at its
intersection with Highway 53 in Oldham County, Kentucky. As a result of the
stop, Meredith was arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI).
Meredith filed a motion to suppress the evidence before the district
court, arguing that the roadblock violated his Fourth Amendment rights and was
unconstitutional because it did not comply with the factors set forth in
Commonwealth v. Cox, 491 S.W.3d 167 (Ky. 2015), and Commonwealth v.
Buchanon, 122 S.W.3d 565 (Ky. 2003).
Following a hearing, the district court denied Meredith’s motion.
Meredith ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09 to DUI, first offense. On direct appeal, the
circuit court affirmed. Meredith sought discretionary review, which we granted.
“Our standard of review of the trial court’s denial of a suppression
motion is twofold. First, the trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence; and second, the trial court’s legal conclusions
are reviewed de novo.” Brumley v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 280, 283-84 (Ky.
2013). “Substantial evidence means evidence that when taken alone or in light of
-2- all the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable men.” Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Ky.
2013) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted). “[A] reviewing
court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error
and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and
local law enforcement officers.” Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634,
637 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct.
1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). If a trial court’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence the next question addressed by the reviewing
court is “whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated.” Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) (quoting
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697, 116 S.Ct. at 1662).
A highway stop of motorists at a government-operated roadblock
constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). “A
seizure is generally unreasonable in the absence of a warrant or individualized
suspicion.” Cox, 491 S.W.3d at 169-70. To pass constitutional muster, roadblocks
“must have a ‘primary purpose,’ such as keeping the roads safe from impaired
drivers or maintaining border security.” Id. at 170. Moreover, the seizure caused
by the roadblock must be reasonable. Buchanon, 122 S.W.3d at 568. The
-3- Kentucky Supreme Court has enumerated non-exclusive factors for determining
the reasonableness of any roadblock:
First, it is important that decisions regarding the location, time, and procedures governing a particular roadblock should be determined by those law enforcement officials in a supervisory position, rather than by the officers who are out in the field. Any lower ranking officer who wishes to establish a roadblock should seek permission from supervisory officials. Locations should be chosen so as not to affect the public’s safety and should bear some reasonable relation to the conduct law enforcement is trying to curtail.
Second, the law enforcement officials who work the roadblock should comply with the procedures established by their superior officers so that each motorist is dealt with in exactly the same manner. Officers in the field should not have unfettered discretion in deciding which vehicles to stop or how each stop is handled.
Third, the nature of the roadblock should be readily apparent to approaching motorists. At least some of the law enforcement officers present at the scene should be in uniform and patrol cars should be marked in some manner. Signs warning of a checkpoint ahead are also advisable.
Fourth, the length of a stop is an important factor in determining the intrusiveness of the roadblock. Motorists should not be detained any longer than necessary in order to perform a cursory examination of the vehicle to look for signs of intoxication or check for license and registration. If during the initial stop, an officer has a reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the law, the motorist should be asked to pull to the side so that other motorists can proceed.
Id. at 571.
-4- A violation of one factor may not create “a violation of constitutional
proportions.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he guidelines are to be applied on a case-by-case
basis in order to determine the reasonableness of each roadblock.” Id.
On appeal, Meredith asserts OCPD failed to substantially comply with
most1 of the constitutional guidelines set forth above. He argues: (1) the primary
purpose of the roadblock was to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing and that was
improper; (2) the only consideration with respect to the location of the roadblock
was that it had been used in the past; (3) there were no written protocols in place
and thus no restraints imposed on the officers while conducting stops at the
roadblock; and (4) notice of the roadblock was inadequate.
We are not writing on a blank slate when it comes to the roadblock at
issue as it is similar in some respects to a seizure at a prior roadblock conducted at
this same location in Oldham County. When judicially reviewed, the district court
deemed that prior roadblock to be an unconstitutional seizure under Buchanon and
Cox, with the circuit court denying the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ of
prohibition, which a panel of our Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 558
S.W.3d 475, 482 (Ky.App. 2018). In Wheeler, the district court determined the
roadblock was inadequate because it violated the third Buchanon factor, lacking
1 The district court found there had been no evidence presented calling the length or intrusiveness of the stop into question, and that the fourth Buchanon factor was therefore not at issue. Meredith offers no argument to the contrary.
-5- “visibility” which was the same problem in Cox because testimony by the trooper
was that “there were no road signs or cones set up to notify the public that a
checkpoint was taking place[,]” there was no proof that any media notice was
issued, and the only indication of the checkpoint was that both the officers working
the checkpoint “had activated the emergency lights on their vehicles and were . . .
wearing traffic safety vests.” Wheeler, 558 S.W.3d at 481.
Regarding the primary purpose of the roadblock, Meredith asserts that
after he was arrested, Officer (Ofc.) Steve Jenkins (the arresting officer) asked him
for permission to search his car “for drugs,” and Meredith argues this is evidence
that the primary purpose of the roadblock was therefore “drug interdiction,” which
was improper. However, the district court had more than just Meredith’s
testimony to consider on this issue. Two of the four officers who testified at the
suppression hearing participated in the roadblock that stopped Meredith: Sergeant
(Sgt.) James Brown (the supervising officer) and Ofc. Jenkins. Both officers
explained their directive during the administration of the roadblock was limited to
looking for traffic violations, checking driver’s licenses, insurance, and
registration, and looking for notable indications of intoxication.
Considering all the evidence, the district court concluded that the
primary purpose of the roadblock was for “public visibility and noted drug and
-6- alcohol enforcement.” It deemed this a focused and permissible purpose, unlike
the detection of “ordinary criminal wrongdoing” or “drug interdiction.”
We interpret the district court to be saying that the purpose of the
roadblock was to detect drivers impaired by drugs and alcohol and to show drivers
that officers enforce prohibitions about driving while intoxicated. This is certainly
an approved purpose for a roadblock. Compare Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-55, 110 S.Ct.
at 2487-88 (upholding a roadblock which consisted of a “brief stop at the sobriety
checkpoint” as consistent with the Fourth Amendment because “the balance of the
State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can
reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon
individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state
program.”) with City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447,
457, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), (determining that a primary purpose of general crime
control; i.e., “interdicting illegal narcotics,” did not justify a checkpoint program
that stopped motorists without some indicia of individualized suspicion.).
Substantial evidence supports the determination that detecting drivers impaired by
drugs or alcohol was the primary purpose of the roadblock, thereby comporting
with Cox.
Regarding Meredith’s second argument, we disagree with him that the
only consideration with respect to the location of the roadblock was that it had
-7- been used in the past. The district court credited Sgt. Brown’s testimony that the
location was determined several days in advance based on a list of previously
approved locations chosen due to crash volume and visibility on the highway. The
district court also took notice that in a prior ruling (later affirmed by the circuit
court), it had found that the location of the checkpoint had been preapproved by
OCPD. Indeed, the roadblock at issue in this case was in the same location as the
roadblock at issue in Wheeler, where the district court made the same finding that
the location of the roadblock had been preapproved. Substantial evidence supports
that the location of the roadblock bore a reasonable relation to the conduct law
enforcement was trying to curtail.
Regarding his third argument, Meredith is correct that there were no
written OCPD protocols in place regarding roadblocks when he was stopped.
Having such protocols in place provides greater assurance that a roadblock is being
conducted within permissible constitutional contours. However, written protocols
are not a constitutional requirement of a roadblock. Rather, the primary focus is
upon whether the law enforcement officials who worked the roadblock complied
with the procedures established by their superior officers so that each motorist was
dealt with in exactly the same manner. Buchanon, 122 S.W.3d at 571.
Here, decisions regarding the location, time, and procedures
governing the roadblock were made by OCPD Sgt. Brown, who acted in a dual
-8- role as both supervisor and as one of the four officers who conducted the
roadblock. Sgt. Brown testified he was authorized by OCPD to do so. His signed
preapproval memorandum was also introduced as evidence, indicating he
authorized the roadblock on July 13, 2015, and specified it would operate from 11
p.m. through 2 a.m.2 from July 18-19, 2015. He also testified he notified his
superior officer regarding the roadblock, although he offered no documentation to
that effect.
Sgt. Brown acknowledged OCPD had no written roadblock policy in
force at the time of the roadblock, which he attributed to a mistake that occurred
when OCPD revised its overall procedures sometime before that date. However,
he testified he generally followed the department’s prior roadblock policy. A copy
of that three-page policy (entitled “general order OM-E-4” relating to “traffic
safety checkpoints”) is of record. Sgt. Brown, as well as Ofc. Jenkins, testified
Sgt. Brown met with the other officers who conducted the roadblock hours before
it was initiated on July 18, 2015, to review the necessary guidelines and that the
roadblock was conducted pursuant to a systematic plan. Sgt. Brown testified that
he and his accompanying officers stopped each vehicle approaching the checkpoint
and treated each motorist in the same manner; they asked for driver’s licenses,
2 During the suppression hearing, Brown testified OCPD operated the roadblock for an additional hour on July 19, 2015, so it ended at 3 a.m. rather that 2 a.m.
-9- proof of insurance and registration, and looked for traffic violations and notable
indications of intoxication. If further investigation was necessary, motorists were
told to move off the traveled portion of the highway and out of the stream of
traffic. The district court found this testimony to be credible and that the
checkpoint was conducted in this manner.
However, the district court was troubled by Sgt. Brown’s dual
capacities as both supervisor and officer in the field. Determining this fact
weighed against the Commonwealth relative to the second Buchanon factor, the
district court explained in its order that “[a]s a practical matter, it cannot be said
that the supervisory officers took discretion from the officers in the field[.]” But,
balanced against the other evidence set forth above regarding the checkpoint and
the conduct of the four officers operating it, the district court determined the first
two Buchanon factors had been substantially complied with. Upon review, we
cannot say the district court’s determination lacked the support of substantial
evidence in this respect or was otherwise erroneous.
Lastly, we consider Meredith’s argument that notice of the roadblock
was inadequate. The thrust of his contention is that it was impossible for any
motorist to notice the roadblock until reaching a “point of no return” on exit 22 of
northbound I-71 because by the time the roadblock could be observed, a service
road had terminated and the exit ramp was separated from I-71 by a grassy
-10- peninsula dotted with bushes and trees. At that point, motorists had to proceed
toward the Highway 53 intersection or violate the law by backing up or reversing
course on the one-way ramp. Exit 22 then curves slightly to the right, where it
meets with a stoplight at its intersection with Highway 53.
The roadblock at issue in this matter was set up at the stoplight where
exit 22 meets Highway 53. Sgt. Brown testified that from his vantage point at the
roadblock, he could easily see vehicles on exit 22 when they reached the “point-of-
no-return,” which was several hundred feet away from the roadblock but he did not
know if those vehicles could see the roadblock before reaching that point.
Meredith, for his part, did not testify regarding the visibility of the roadblock.
Leonard Adcock, another driver who used exit 22 when the roadblock
was in operation in the same location and at roughly the same time the prior day,
testified he did not notice the roadblock until he was “about a hundred feet or so”
onto exit 22, shortly past the “point-of-no-return.” Adcock testified that upon
seeing the roadblock, he tried, unsuccessfully, to avoid it by turning off his
headlights, backing up a few feet, and using the service road on the left to re-enter
the interstate.
Adcock testified that the roadblock was not visible until after the point
-of-no-return because it was set up beyond the curve on the exit ramp, on a part of
the road that, from a vantage point further back, was obstructed by the trees and
-11- bushes on the cut in the hill. But, he testified that he immediately recognized the
roadblock for what it was upon seeing it, and he sought to avoid it because he did
not have proof of insurance.
With that said, we pause here. While the third Buchanon guideline
indicates that warning signs are “advisable,” neither Cox nor Buchanon specify
that law enforcement must provide warnings sufficient to enable motorists to avoid
roadblocks. Rather, the purpose of providing “adequate notice” of a roadblock to
motorists relates to the potential of any roadblock to generate fear and surprise,
“not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being
stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in
law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop.” Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452, 110 S.Ct. at
2486. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the potential for this
fear and surprise is lessened when motorists approaching a roadblock can see
visible signs of the officers’ authority, and that every vehicle is being stopped. Id.
at 453, 110 S.Ct. at 2486-87 (relying on United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)).
In United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 560 (6th Cir. 1998), the
Court explained:
In reviewing the degree of intrusion at the Martinez– Fuerte checkpoints, the Supreme Court emphasized the lack of discretion allocated to the operating officers, the brief duration of the stop in which just a few questions
-12- were asked and perhaps a document reviewed, and the numerous physical and visual indicators apparent to approaching motorists. 428 U.S. at 558-59, 96 S.Ct. 3074. The challenged checkpoints were permanent structures with flashing lights and signs saying “STOP HERE – U.S. OFFICERS,” cones funneling cars into appropriate lanes, uniformed border patrol officers directing traffic, and parked marked border patrol cars with activated lights. Id. at 546, 96 S.Ct. 3074. The Supreme Court emphasized that these indicators would inform approaching motorists that the stop was authorized and non-random, thereby lessening the potential for fear and surprise. Id. at 559, 96 S.Ct. 3074.
As for the appearance of the roadblock in this matter, it was in the
same location as the one described in Wheeler, and like that roadblock which the
district court deemed constitutionally insufficient, the officers conducting the
roadblock were wearing reflective yellow safety vests; the flashing blue emergency
lights of their vehicles were engaged; each vehicle that approached the roadblock
was stopped; and each vehicle was only briefly detained. Likewise, the officers
used no warning signs or cones.
However, unlike Wheeler, there were four officers operating this
roadblock, not two; there were four different police vehicles at the roadblock with
emergency lights engaged, not two; and, according to Sgt. Brown, the officers used
“flashlights with orange cones on them” to guide oncoming vehicles. As
discussed, Adcock testified that when he saw the roadblock, he recognized it for
what it was.
-13- Moreover, unlike Wheeler, there was also some evidence that OCPD
notified media outlets, prior to the date of Meredith’s arrest, of its intention to
conduct roadblocks throughout the county. The press release Sgt. Brown created
regarding roadblocks in Oldham County is of record, dated May 28, 2015. The
officer in charge of sending out press releases, Major (Maj.) Jim Latham, testified
he forwarded the press release to a list – included of record – of approximately
fifty email recipients including reporters and news outlets on that date.
To be sure, Maj. Latham had no documentary evidence demonstrating
he sent the notice; nor did he have knowledge of or control over whether any
media outlets made use of the press release. Furthermore, the press release itself
did not name any date, time, or location of any specific roadblock. It stated, in
pertinent part:
The Oldham County Police will be conducting traffic safety checkpoints throughout the county during the period of May, June, and July. During the checkpoints officers will be enforcing laws related to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, licensing of motor vehicles and operators, registration and insurance violations, seat belt and child restraint violations, and motor vehicle equipment violations.
However, the Buchanon and Cox Courts did not predicate the
constitutionality of any given roadblock upon any media release, much less a
media release identifying the roadblock’s date, time, or location, and it was up to
-14- the district court to evaluate the evidence and make credibility findings.
Considering the evidence, we cannot say the district court committed clear error in
determining that OCPD provided adequate notice of its roadblock or that any
deficiency in its notice, taken in conjunction with the totality of what is otherwise
set forth above, created “a violation of constitutional proportions.” Buchanon, 122
S.W.3d at 571.
The district court considered all factors enunciated in Buchanon and
Cox before denying Meredith’s motion to suppress. We conclude the record
supports the denial of the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the decision
of the Oldham Circuit Court, affirming the Oldham District Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward Malone Bourne Daniel Cameron Owenton, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Walter Matthew Hudson Special Assistant Attorney General La Grange, Kentucky
-15-