James Melvin Hal v. Justin Glenn

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-26-00028-CV

JAMES MELVIN HAL, Appellant V.

JUSTIN GLENN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 76th District Court Titus County, Texas

Trial Court No. 41800

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin

MEMORANDUM OPINION

We lack jurisdiction over this appeal and therefore dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

The case in the trial court was composed of a suit to quiet title filed by Justin Glenn against James Melvin Hal, to which was added, via consolidation, a suit by Hal for partition of the property at issue in Glenn’s suit. In other words, following consolidation, Hal was both defendant (quiet title) and counter-plaintiff (partition).

On May 27, 2025, Hal’s counsel filed a suggestion of death representing that Hal had died, and that, on August 14, 2024, a Dallas County probate court appointed Hal’s daughter, La Wanda E. Kelly, as the Independent Executor of the Estate of James Melvin Hal.1 Per the record before us, scire facias never issued, and following the suggestion of death, the pleadings in the consolidated matter were never amended to substitute Kelly, as independent executor of Hal’s estate, as defendant and counter-plaintiff. On February 10, 2026, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the consolidated case with prejudice, finding “that all causes of action pending [t]herein have been rendered moot.”

“Courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” In re Lazy W Dist.

No. 1, 493 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Houston Mun. Emp. Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. 2007)). “[W]e must consider our jurisdiction, even if that consideration is sua sponte.” Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam); see TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a) (“[O]n any party’s motion—or on its own initiative,” this Court may dismiss an appeal “for want of jurisdiction.”).

1 The suggestion of death did not provide Hal’s date of death, only the date of the independent executor’s appointment.

3

“Standing is about who can sue. It concerns the nature and sufficiency of the plaintiff’s connection with the litigation’s subject matter, so that courts are not tempted to resolve legal issues at the request of someone lacking the requisite interest in the outcome.” Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Sky Mktg. Corp., 733 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tex. 2026). “Standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.” In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)).

“‘[A]ppellate standing is typically afforded ‘only to parties of record.’” State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965)). “Consequently, an appeal filed by an improper party must be dismissed.” Id. “Once a defendant dies, the defendant is, for purposes of the law, a non-entity due to death.” In re Coats, 580 S.W.3d 431, 438 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, orig. proceeding) (citing Hegwer v. Edwards, 527 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.)).

Rule 7.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure addresses what to do with an appeal if a party dies after the trial court enters judgment.2 But that rule does not apply when the death occurred while the case was pending in the trial court. Klose v. N-Tex Sand & Gravel, LLC, No. 06-24-00017-CV, 2024 WL 4116885, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Here, [the appellant] died while the trial court proceedings were ongoing.

2 “If a party to a civil case dies after the trial court renders judgment but before the case has been finally disposed of on appeal, the appeal may be perfected, and the appellate court will proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if all parties were alive.” TEX. R. APP. P. 7.1(a)(1); see Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 679 (Tex. 2018) (“[W]e issue our judgment as if [decedent] were still alive, as Rule 7.1 requires.”).

4

Consequently, Rule 7.1(a)(1) does not apply . . . .”). “Because [the appellant] was deceased before the trial court rendered judgment and there is no provision allowing for this appeal to continue under his name, we do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal, and we must dismiss it.” Id.

Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

Date Submitted: July 6, 2026 Date Decided: August 14, 2026