James Fraser v. Pennsylvania State University

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: August 22, 2024
• Docket: 23-2413
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 23-2413 _______________

JAMES FRASER, Appellant

v.

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, a Pennsylvania educational institution; DR. ROBERT PAULSON, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; DR. MELISSA ROLLS, an individual, in her official and individual capacities; DR. ANDREW READ, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; KEYSTONE NANO, INC., a Pennsylvania Business Corporation; DR. MARK KESTER, an individual, in his official and individual capacities

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 4-22-cv-00726) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on May 7, 2024

Before: PORTER, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 22, 2024)

OPINION _______________

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PORTER, Circuit Judge.

James Fraser appeals the order of the District Court dismissing his amended

complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 Our

review of the District Court’s dismissal is plenary. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d

184, 188 (3d Cir. 2002).

Fraser asserted claims against Pennsylvania State University and various members

of its faculty and against Keystone Nano, Inc., alleging that while he was a graduate

student he was forced to complete work outside the scope of his thesis. He alleged

violations of his free speech rights under the First Amendment and his substantive and

procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He also alleged

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. After reviewing the

appellate briefs of the parties and the record, we conclude that the District Court’s

opinion was sound in dismissing each of Fraser’s federal claims. We see no need to

expand upon its opinion in this regard.

Because it dismissed all of Fraser’s federal claims, the District Court declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see

also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). We review such decisions

for abuse of discretion. Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir.

1999). The District Court did not abuse its discretion here. So, to keep his state law

claims in federal court, Fraser needs diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; 28 U.S.C.

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This court has jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2 § 1367(a). We have held that the party invoking diversity jurisdiction “bears the burden

to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricc Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 2016)

(citation omitted). However, “that burden is not especially onerous.” Id. Dismissal is only

warranted if it “appear[s] to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the

jurisdictional amount[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Puzzlingly, Fraser only pled diversity

jurisdiction “insofar as the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” App. 350. The

District Court’s opinion did not consider whether Fraser pleaded an amount in

controversy. We will therefore vacate and remand for the District Court to consider

whether Fraser’s pleadings were sufficient to confer diversity jurisdiction.

* * *

Accordingly, we will affirm the portion of the District Court’s order dismissing

Fraser’s federal claims and vacate and remand the portion of the order dismissing his state

law claims.