James Edward Jones v. State

Opinion

                                                                                    NO. 12-04-00046-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

JAMES EDWARD JONES,                               §                 APPEAL FROM THE 241ST

APPELLANT

V.                                                                         §                 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE                                                        §                 SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            James Edward Jones (“Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s cumulation of sentences order. In one issue, he contends that the order violates the United States Constitution’s protections against cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

Background

            On March 20, 2003, Appellant was indicted for the offense of aggravated assault on a public servant with a deadly weapon. On November 12, the State filed a motion to cumulate the sentence in that case with a life sentence a jury previously imposed on Appellant in another aggravated assault on a public servant case that arose out of the same criminal episode. On December 20, Appellant pleaded guilty to this offense, along with six other offenses. On January 16, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s punishment, and after arguments by both parties, sentenced Appellant to forty years of imprisonment and assessed a $5,000.00 fine. The trial court also granted the State’s motion to cumulate sentences, thereby ordering that Appellant’s forty-year sentence and previous life sentence be served consecutively. On February 16, Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal.

Analysis

            In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the trial court’s cumulation-of-sentences order constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Texas and United States Constitutions. Initially, we note that Appellant made no objection to the trial court raising the issue of cruel and unusual punishment and has, therefore, waived such an issue with respect to any alleged violation of his rights under the Texas Constitution. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. However, even absent waiver, we conclude that Appellant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

            The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons v. State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. In this case, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on a public servant. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Such an offense is a first degree felony, which carries a punishment range of between 15 and 99 years, or life. Id.; see also Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.32(a), 12.42(c)(1) (Vernon 2003). Here, the punishment assessed by the trial court falls well within the range set forth by the legislature. Id. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual or excessive per se.             Furthermore, the legislature has conferred upon the trial courts the discretion, in second and subsequent cases, to order that the sentences imposed run consecutively or concurrently. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08 (Vernon 2003). The act of stacking sentences so that they run consecutively has been held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Stevens v. State, 667 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Baird v. State, 455 S.W.2d 259, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Quintana v. State, 777 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. App.– Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d).             Nonetheless, Appellant urges the court to perform the three-part test originally set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin, to require a threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316; see also Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, no pet.).

            In determining whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate, we are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estell, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court addressed the proportionality claim of an appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas habitual offender statute for a conviction for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. The life sentence was imposed because the appellant also had two prior felony convictions - one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods or services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1134-35. After both recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as felonies and considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 445 U.S. at 285, 100 S. Ct. at 1145.

            In the case at hand, the offenses committed by Appellant - two aggravated assaults on a public servant with a deadly weapon - were far more serious than the offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel. However, Appellant’s 40-year sentence stacked onto a life sentence is no more severe, considering the serious nature of Appellant’s two offenses, than the life sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rummel. Thus, it follows that if the sentence in Rummel was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither is the sentence assessed against Appellant in the case at hand. Therefore, since we do not find the threshold test to be satisfied, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                                    SAM GRIFFITH

                                                                                                               Justice

Opinion delivered August 25, 2004.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., and Griffith, J.

DeVasto, J., not participating

(DO NOT PUBLISH)