James Davis v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 12, 2021
• Docket: 2020CA0988
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2020 CA 0988

JAMES DAVIS

VERSUS

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS

U Judgment Rendered: MAY 12 2021

On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 691, 731

The Honorable Janice Clark, Judge Presiding

James Davis In Proper Person Angie, Louisiana

Deborah A. Rutledge Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee Baton Rouge, Louisiana Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

BEFORE: McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, AND PENZATO, JJ. PENZATO, J.

James Davis, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public

Safety and Corrections ( DPSC), appeals the district court' s judgment that affirmed

DPSC' s final decision in administrative remedy procedure ( ARP) No. RCC -2019-

458 and dismissed his petition with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we

reverse the district court' s judgment and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Davis is housed at Rayburn Correctional Center ( RCC) in Angie, Louisiana.

On February 22, 2019, Davis was issued a rule violation report for violating Rule 11

Aggravated Fighting and Rule 30- V General Prohibited Behaviors— Failing to

Cooperate with an Investigation. Davis pled guilty to these rule violations and was

sanctioned on February 25, 2019, to 90 days Disciplinary Segregation Level 1, Four

Weeks Quarters Confinement, and Restitution in the amount of $10. 00 for the fight

exams. Under DPSC' s Unit Specific For Offender Posted Policy (USOPP) # 35 and

436, offenders housed on Disciplinary Segregation Level 1 are allowed to possess

personal property in certain quantities. On April 24, 2019, an inventory was

conducted of Davis' s personal property. During the inventory, Davis refused to

cooperate with the inventorying officers, refused to sign the inventory forms, and

did not provide an address for the property to be sent home. The property was

initially stored in the mailroom. On May 1, 2019, Form C -02- 009- B,

Incoming/Outgoing General Correspondence, Farm Mail and E -Mail Notice of

Rejection (Notice of Rejection) was sent to Davis from the mailroom officer, stating

the following:

All items from your level 1 inventory were sent to the mailroom. The inventory states that you would like these items sent home, but you also refused to sign. You will need to send me something in writing stating

you want them sent home, and provide me with an address to send them to.

2 On that same date, Davis signed a Legal Mail Receipt Log indicating that he had

received the Notice of Rejection. Davis did not respond to the request for an address

in the Notice of Rejection and the stored property was destroyed.'

Davis filed a complaint under the Louisiana Corrections and Administrative

Remedy Procedure Act, La. R.S. 15: 1171, et seq. ( CARP), claiming that the

destruction of his property was not outlined in any offender policy. RCC denied his

relief at the first step of the administrative remedy procedure, and Davis responded

that no policy dictated that his property be destroyed. The Department denied his

relief at the second step. Thereafter, Davis filed a petition for judicial review in the

Nineteenth Judicial District Court ( 19th JDC), requesting compensation for all items

listed on his inventory forms; the necessary costs to obtain destroyed legal

documents from the courts; an order to DPSC to provide adequate storage space for

Disciplinary Segregation Level 1 offenders; and all other costs.' DPSC answered

the petition stating that RCC does not have sufficient space to store property, that

the procedure has been in place for years, and that Davis was given the option to

mail his property home. The Commissioner' issued a report recommending that

Davis' s petition be dismissed with prejudice, concluding that the record did not

support a finding that DPSC' s decision was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly

erroneous, or in violation of Davis' s rights. After receiving Davis' s traversal, the

1 The record does not reflect the date upon which the property was actually destroyed.

2 Besides naming DPSC as a defendant, Davis also named as defendants in his petition for judicial review James LeBlanc, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and Robert Tanner, Warden of RCC. However, the only proper defendant in an administrative appeal filed by a prisoner is the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. See La. R.S. 15: 1177(A)( 1)( b); Martinez v. Tanner, 2011- 0692 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 9/ 11), 79 So. 3d 1082 n. 1, writ denied, 2011- 2732 ( La. 7/ 27/ 12), 93 So. 3d 597.

3 The Office of Commissioner of the 19th JDC was created by La. R.S. 13: 711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state prisoners. La. R. S. 13: 713( A). The Commissioner' s written findings and recommendations are submitted to a district court judge, who may accept, reject, or modify them. La. R.S. 13: 713( C)( 5); see Martinez, 79 So. 3d at 1084 n. 3.

3 district court affirmed DPSC' s decision and dismissed his petition with prejudice in

a judgment signed July 10, 2020. It is from this judgment that Davis appeals.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Lost property claims by offenders are matters of prison administration or

conditions of confinement that are governed by La. R.S. 15: 1177 of CARP. See

Brown v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety and Corrections, 2015- 1958 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 9/ 19/ 16), 277 So. 3d 326, 328. Louisiana Revised Statutes

15: 1177( A)(9) sets forth the appropriate standard of review by the district court,

which functions as an appellate court when reviewing DPSC' s administrative

decisions. Judicial review is mandated to be conducted by the trial court without a

jury and must be confined to the record. La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(5). Specifically, the

court may reverse or modify the administrative decision only if substantial rights of

the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings are: ( 1) in

violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, ( 2) in excess of the statutory

authority of the agency, ( 3) made upon unlawful procedure, ( 4) affected by other

error of law, ( 5) arbitrary, capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion, or

unwarranted exercise of discretion, or ( 6) manifestly erroneous in view of the

reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. La. R. S.

15: 1177( A)( 9); Lightfoot v. Stalder, 2000- 1120 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 6/ 22/ 01), 808 So.

2d 710, 715- 716, writ denied, 2001- 2295 ( La. 8/ 30/ 02), 823 So. 2d 957.

On review of the district court' s judgment under La. R.S. 15: 1177, no

deference is owed by the court of appeal to the factual findings or legal conclusions

of the district court, just as no deference is owed by the Louisiana Supreme Court to

factual findings or legal conclusions of the court of appeal. McCoy v. Stalder, 99-

1747 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 9/ 22/ 00), 770 So. 2d 447, 450- 51.

Davis asserts that RCC does not provide adequate storage of personal property

for Disciplinary Segregation Level 1 offenders and any excess personal property

4 must either be sent home or destroyed, while Level 2 offenders are provided

adequate storage space. He further maintains that the Inventory of Offender' s

Personal Property Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C ( Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C) and RCC Directive

3. 1. 2( N)4 afford an offender to have his property either placed in storage, sent

home, or destroyed. However, he asserts that the inventorying officer struck through

the option of adding excess property to storage, which is the reason Davis claims he

refused to sign Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C. Davis admitted that he refused to sign Form

3. 1. 2( N) -C because he desired the option of storing his excess property as opposed

to the choices given him— send the property home or have it destroyed. Davis

alleges that Regulation C -03- 007( B) 5 was also violated.

As we stated above, lost property claims are governed by La. R.S. 15: 1177.

A reviewing court may reverse or modify DPSC if a substantial right ofthe petitioner

has been prejudiced. Barnes v. Ducote, 2011- 2216 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 12/ 12), 2012

WL 2130556, at * 2 ( unpublished). The substantial rights of an inmate were found

to be prejudiced when personal property was not returned to an inmate, thereby

entitling him to compensation. Barnes, 2012 WL 2130556, at * 2; see Truman v.

Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety & Corrections, 2015- 1616 ( La. App. 1st Cir.

12/ 15/ 18) ( remanding to allow inmate to introduce inventory sheets regarding his

4 RCC Directive # 3. 1. 2( N) is not contained in the record. Davis addressed RCC Directive 3. 1. 2( N) in his traversal to the district court. Pursuant to CARP' S statutory framework, the opportunity for the parties to present evidence occurs at the administrative level, not at the trial court level, and review by the trial court is limited to the record established at the administrative level, absent alleged irregularities in procedure. Lee v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety and Corrections, 2017- 0740 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 12/ 21/ 17), 240 So. 3d 244, 247. However, if the district court determines that additional evidence is needed, it does have the authority to order the addition of such evidence at the administrative level. Thus, the district court must remand the case to the agency for the evidence to be introduced. See La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(4) & ( A)( 8); Curry v. Cain, 2005- 2251 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 6/ 06), 944 So. 2d 635, 639. Davis appears to quote from RCC Directive #3. 1. 2( N) in his appellate brief. This court has no ready means of ascertaining applicable departmental regulations and no such authority has been introduced into evidence. See Anderson v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2017- 0987 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 7/ 18), 242 So. 3d 614, 619.

5 Regulation C -03- 007( B) is also not contained in the record, and it does not appear that the regulation was referred to at the administrative level or that the district court reviewed the regulation in reference to the petition for judicial review.

5 lost property); Curry, 944 So. 2d at 638 ( remanded to allow inmate to introduce

inventory sheets regarding his lost property claim).

The appellate record in the present case provides insufficient support for the

district court' s conclusion that the denial of Davis' s ARP was neither arbitrary,

capricious, manifestly erroneous, or in violation of his rights. The district court

relied upon USOPPs # 35 and # 36, which the Commissioner stated, " outline the type

and amount of property that offenders housed on Disciplinary Segregation Level [ 1]

may have" and RCC Directive # 5. 4. 2( N), which provides, " Should an offender fail

to provide postage for a package/ letter within 21 days after being notified, it will be

disposed of." The district court also relied on the DPSC' s answer stating "[ t] his

procedure has been in effect for years and [ Davis] was given the choice to mail his

property home."

In response to step one, DPSC referred to USOPPs # 35 and #36, outlined what

each provided, and stated, " In complying with these policies, offenders are given the

opportunity to have their excess property sent home or destroyed." Contained in the

record is USOPP # 36 which is a list of items allowed for the different areas of RCC,

including " Extended Lockdown Level 1." With regard to legal papers, we note that

an asterisk indicates that legal papers will be "[ k]ept in a filing cabinet on tier." We

also note that USOPP # 36 refers to DPSC regulation No. IS -A-3, which is not

contained in the record. USOPP # 35 is a time schedule for the different areas of

RCC and includes a list of some personal items that may or may not be kept, such

as radios, hobby crafts, or writing materials. USOPP # 35 refers to numerous DPSC

regulations, none of which are contained in the record. Nothing contained in

USOPPs # 35 and/or #36 provides authority for RCC to destroy an inmate' s property.

DPSC also relies on RCC Directive # 5. 4. 2( N), which contains a section titled

Outgoing Packages" that refers to the disposal of outgoing packages/ letters

following notification to an offender of lack of postage. However, RCC Directive

0 5. 4. 2( N) makes no reference to personal property of inmates or legal papers, as it

is specific to outgoing packages/ letters lacking postage. Therefore, DPSC' s reliance

on RCC Directive # 5. 4. 2( N), regarding outgoing packages, is misplaced. We find

that the district court erred in finding that USOPPs # 35 and # 36 and RCC Directive

5. 4. 2( N) provided support for DPSC to destroy Davis' s personal property.

DPSC also asserted that "[ RCC] does not have sufficient space to store

property. This procedure has been in effect for years and [ Davis] was given the

choice to mail his property home." As we noted with regard to RCC Directive

3. 1. 2( N), the opportunity for the parties to present evidence occurs at the

administrative level, not at the trial court level, and review by the trial court is limited

to the record established at the administrative level, absent alleged irregularities in

procedure. Lee, 240 So. 3d at 247. The district court has no authority to accept

evidence or testimony at the hearing on review. Curry, 944 So. 2d at 639. However,

if the district court determines that additional evidence is needed, it does have the

authority to order the addition of such evidence at the administrative level. Thus,

the district court must remand the case to the agency for the evidence to be

introduced. See La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(4) & ( A)( 8); Curry, 944 So. 2d at 639. Judicial

review of an adverse agency decision is available under CARP, but is " confined to

the record," as developed by the administrative proceedings. La. R. S.

15: 1177( A)(5); Boddye v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety and Corrections,

2010- 1008 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 22/ 10), 2010 WL 5465633, at * 1 ( unpublished).

DPSC has not set forth any statute, rule, promulgated policy, or regulation

authorizing its practice of destroying the personal property of an inmate. See

Anderson, 242 So. 3d at 618; Menesses v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety &

Corrections, 2017- 0386 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 16/ 17), 2017 WL 5494595, at * 2.

Furthermore, this court has no ready means of ascertaining applicable departmental regulations and no such authority has been brought to this court' s attention.

Anderson, 242 So. 3d at 619.

We also note that the Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C, listing the inventory of Davis' s

personal property, contained the typed headings " ADDED TO STORED

PROPERTY," " REMOVE FROM STORED PROPERTY," and " PROPERTY

SEAL # s." These headings were all scratched out and handwritten over to state

ITEMS SEND HOME." The heading " ITEMS SEND HOME OR DESTROYED"

had the " SEND HOME" circled. Davis asserted in his petition for judicial review

that he refused to sign Form #3. 1. 2( N) -C because the form specifically provided him

the option to store his excess property, which he desired to do. Davis maintains on

appeal that he did not sign the inventory form because the inventorying officer struck

through the option of adding the excess property to his storage. DPSC has not set

forth any statute, rule, promulgated policy, or regulation authorizing its practice of

destroying the personal property of an inmate rather than providing storage. See

Anderson, 242 So. 3d at 618- 19. In contrast to the present case, in Lewis v. Louisiana

Department ofPublic Safety & Corrections, 2019- 1693 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 8/ 5/ 20),

So. 3d , 2020 WL 4498170, at * 2, writ denied, 2021- 00158 ( La. 3/ 9/ 21),

2021 WL 869070, the agency had a specific policy that required inmates in extended

lockdown to send their property home or have it destroyed. No such policy has been

introduced into the record before us. Furthermore, we note that DPSC has not filed

a brief with this court.

Having concluded that the district court erred in finding that DPSC' s action

was neither arbitrary, capricious, manifestly erroneous, or in violation of Davis' s

rights, we pretermit any discussion as to Davis' s second assignment of error that he

was provided inadequate notice that his property would be destroyed. This matter

is remanded to the district court for consideration of the merits of Davis' s claims,

following remand to DPSC to obtain the addition of necessary evidence at the

0 administrative level, and the basis of DPSC' s authority, if any, to destroy Davis' s

property due to lack of storage space at RCC.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the July 10, 2020 judgment of the district court

dismissing the petition for judicial review filed by James Davis is reversed, and this

matter is remanded to the district court with instructions for the court to consider the

claims raised therein following remand to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety

and Corrections to obtain the addition of necessary evidence at the administrative

level. All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $726. 50, are to be paid by the

Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.