James Campbell v. Frank Miller

373 F.3d 834

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: August 20, 2004
• Docket: 03-3018
• Status: Published

Opinions

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Police in Indianapolis arrested James Campbell for possessing marijuana. Because the local jail is crowded, Indianapolis does not make a full custodial arrest of each person arrested for a misdemeanor; instead it issues a summons and citation. Before releasing Campbell, however, the police conducted a body-cavity search for drugs. Nothing was found, and no criminal prosecution ensued. Campbell then sued ten officers, the Chief of Police, and the City of Indianapolis, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the search violated the fourth amendment. He seeks not only damages but also an injunction against this practice. The district court denied Campbell’s request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that he has an adequate remedy at law. He immediately appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

Campbell supposes that money never is an adequate remedy for a constitutional wrong. That belief is incorrect. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 89-92, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974); Second City Music, Inc. v. Chicago, 333 F.3d 846 (7th Cir.2003); Webb v. Ball State University, 167 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir.1999). Damages are a normal, and adequate, response to an improper search or seizure, which as a constitutional tort often is analogized to (other) personal-injury litigation. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Erroneous grants of injunctive relief that hamper enforcement of the criminal law have the potential to cause havoc, while erroneous awards (or denials) of damages to a single person have more limited ability to injure the general public. Judges are fallible, so the costs of false positives always must be considered when choosing among remedies. When the costs of false negatives are low — and this is what it means to say that the remedy at law is adequate — there is correspondingly slight reason to incur the risk of premature or overbroad injunctive relief. Campbell’s suit is just getting under way, and the City has not had a full opportunity to explain and justify its practices. Once this litigation has run its course, the decision will have precedential effect even if the only remedy is monetary. If this court decides that the City’s practice is unconstitutional then it must cease whether or not a formal injunction issues (for the prospect of damages paid to thousands of suspects would bring the City into line). If, however, the City prevails in the end, or suffers only a partial defeat, then avoiding premature injunctive relief will prove to have been a wise exercise of restraint.

What is more, it is difficult to see how a court could issue an injunction at Campbell’s behest. Unless the same events are likely to happen again to him there is no controversy between him and the City about the City’s future handling of other arrests. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). Campbell has sought to represent all persons arrested for misdemeanors, but the district court has not certified that class and may never do so. Thus Campbell cannot rely on the prospect that other arrested persons may be subjected to body-cavity searches. Cf. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). He represents his own interests, not those of third parties. Only if he is apt to be arrested and searched again would prospective relief be apt, and nothing in this record suggests that Campbell is a repeat offender. He alleges, to the contrary, that he does not use drugs and has never been arrested before. These allegations mean that he is not the right party to pursue injunctive relief.

Affirmed