James and Son Metal Products, Inc., and McCreless Holdings, LLC v. Renasant Bank

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: October 24, 2025
• Docket: CL-2025-0656
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: October 24, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________

CL-2025-0656 _________________________

James and Son Metal Products, Inc., and McCreless Holdings, LLC

v.

Renasant Bank

Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court (CV-25-10)

FRIDY, Judge.

James and Son Metal Products, Inc., and McCreless Holdings, LLC

("the business entities"), appeal from a judgment on the pleadings the

Morgan Circuit Court ("the trial court") entered in favor of Renasant

Bank ("Renasant") in this matter involving a property dispute. For the CL-2025-0656

reasons set forth herein, we dismiss the appeal with instructions to the

trial court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the matter.

Background

On February 4, 2025, James E. Norsworthy, Jr., acting pro se, filed

against Renasant an "emergency motion for temporary restraining order

and preliminary injunction" seeking to halt a foreclosure sale regarding

real property located in Morgan County ("the property"). He did not,

however, file a complaint. In the motion, Norsworthy asserted that he

had superior ownership rights to the property by means of a tax deed and

a quitclaim deed. Norsworthy's motion included a certificate of service

indicating that he had served the motion on an attorney by certified mail;

the certificate of service did not indicate service on Renasant. On the

same day Norsworthy filed his emergency motion, the trial court entered

an order requiring Norsworthy to provide proof of ownership of the

property.

On February 7, 2025, despite the fact that Norsworthy had not filed

a complaint, Renasant -- through the attorney on which Norsworthy had

served the motion -- filed what it styled as an "answer" that responded to

Norsworthy's motion for injunctive relief. In its filing, Renasant stated

2 CL-2025-0656

that Norsworthy did not have a deed to the property but, rather, that the

business entities were the deed holders. Renasant also, within its filing,

purported to assert a third-party complaint against the business entities.

In its third-party complaint, Renasant requested judicial redemption and

asked the trial court to enter a judgment (1) finding that Renasant was

entitled to redeem the property, (2) determining the amount required to

be paid to redeem the property, (3) quieting title to the property, and (4)

canceling the tax-sale-purchase interest held by the business entities. 1

On February 10, 2025, Norsworthy submitted two quitclaim deeds

to the trial court: one indicating that he had obtained an interest in the

property from Kruse Capital, LLC, on April 9, 2019, and another showing

that he subsequently had transferred his interest in the property to the

business entities on May 14, 2019. Later that same day, the trial court

1It is not clear to us that the third-party complaint Renasant filed

actually constituted a third-party complaint under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 14, Ala. R. Civ. P., which governs third-party practice, provides that a third-party complaint is appropriate when a defendant seeks to bring into the action a nonparty who the defendant claims is or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant. We question whether Renasant's claims against the business entities fit that description, but we need not answer that question because we conclude, infra, that the trial court never had jurisdiction over the matter. 3 CL-2025-0656

entered an order purporting to dismiss the matter, finding that the

property was owned by the business entities and that Norsworthy had no

authority to bring an action. The trial court amended its order on

February 12, 2025, to clarify that Renasant's third-party complaint

against the business entities remained pending.

On February 18, 2025, Norsworthy filed a counterclaim for

damages and an objection to the redemption claim on behalf of the

business entities. The counterclaim was signed by both Norsworthy and

Nick McCreless, who, the filing indicated, was an authorized

representative of McCreless Holdings, LLC, but there was nothing on the

document that indicated that either man was an attorney. Norsworthy

also attached an affidavit asserting that he was the sole owner and

representative of the business entities and that he was making the

affidavit on behalf of the business entities in support of the objection to

Renasant's redemption claim and statement of costs.

On February 19, 2025, Norsworthy filed a motion for clarification

on behalf of the business entities in response to one of Renasant's earlier

motions. On February 20, 2025, the trial court entered an order declaring

that, although Norsworthy had filed a motion on behalf of the business

4 CL-2025-0656

entities, he did not appear to be an attorney. The trial court explained

that the practice of law without a license is not allowed, and it purported

to deny the motion. The trial court did not specifically identify the motion

it had denied; however, the order appeared to be in response to the motion

for clarification.

On February 21, 2025, Norsworthy filed a motion seeking to

represent the business entities in his capacities as the sole owner of

James and Son Metal Products, Inc., and as the authorized

representative of McCreless Holdings, LLC. In response, the trial court

entered an order stating that Norsworthy was allowed to represent

himself but that it had not found any claims for which Norsworthy had

standing. The trial court specified that Norsworthy was not allowed to

represent the business entities.

On February 24, 2025, Renasant filed a motion for a judgment on

the pleadings, asking the trial court to allow it to redeem the property.

On March 6, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment purporting to grant

Renasant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, allowing it to redeem

the property as it had requested.

5 CL-2025-0656

On April 7, 2025, the business entities, through retained counsel,

moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, contending, among other

things, that, because Norsworthy's unauthorized filings on their behalf

had been "implicitly struck," the pleadings had not been closed at the

time Renasant filed its motion for a judgment on the pleadings and that,

despite the fact that they had been entitled to thirty days to answer the

third-party complaint, after they were served with that pleading on

February 13, 2025, the trial court had entered its judgment on the

pleadings only twenty-one days after service.2

The trial court purported to deny the business entities'

postjudgment motion. The business entities filed a notice of appeal to the

Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court

pursuant to Coprich v. Jones, 406 So. 3d 58 (Ala. 2024), or, alternatively,

§ 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.

2Rule 59(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a postjudgment motion

must be filed no later than thirty days after the entry of the judgment. The thirtieth day following the trial court's entry of the judgment on the pleadings on March 6, 2025, was Saturday, April 5, 2025. Therefore, the business entities' April 7, 2025, postjudgment motion was timely. See Rule 6(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. 6 CL-2025-0656

Analysis

Although neither side raises an issue with regard to the trial court's

subject-matter jurisdiction, "jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude

that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu."

Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987). Having reviewed the

record in this matter, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court

lacked jurisdiction because Norsworthy's initial filing -- a motion styled

as an "emergency motion for temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction" -- did not commence an action in the trial court.

Rule 3(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., like Rule 3, Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that

"[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Upon

filing a complaint, the plaintiff must provide instructions to the clerk for

how service of process is to be completed, along with, if requested, copies

of the summons to accompany the complaint. Rule 4(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. A

motion -- even one requesting injunctive relief -- is not a substitute for a

complaint and cannot by itself invoke the trial court's subject-matter

jurisdiction. See D.T. v. W.G., 210 So. 3d 1143, 1147-48 (Ala. Civ. App.

2016) (distinguishing motions from pleadings and confirming that only a

complaint or petition commences an action); Stewart v. INS, 762 F.2d

7 CL-2025-0656

193, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a preliminary injunction is

available only after an action has been commenced by the filing of a

complaint); In re Warrant Authorizing Interception of Oral Commc'ns,

673 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1982) ("But since no complaint was ever filed in

this case, the court did not have jurisdiction over any ordinary civil

action.").

Here, Norsworthy never filed a complaint. Instead, he filed an

emergency motion seeking to halt foreclosure. Because Norsworthy never

filed a complaint, an action never commenced, and the trial court never

obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. See P.K. Fam. Rest.

v. IRS, 535 F. Supp. 1223, 1224 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Zinman v. Simi Valley

Police Dep't, No. 2:21-CV-09442-JVS-JC, Dec. 13, 2021 (C.D. Cal. 2021)

(not reported in Federal Supplement) (holding that court did not have

subject-matter jurisdiction over claim seeking injunctive relief because

plaintiff had not filed a complaint in the matter). 3

3We disagree with those jurisdictions that have permitted, in exigent circumstances, a trial court to entertain a request for injunctive relief before a party has filed a complaint. See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1966). In our view, the language of Rule 3(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., is straightforward -- an action commences upon the filing of a complaint, not the filing of a motion. 8 CL-2025-0656

We are not inclined to treat Norsworthy's emergency motion as a

complaint. It was styled as a motion, not a complaint, it sought relief as

a motion, and it purported to accomplish service not in a manner

consistent with Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P. -- with all its attendant procedural-

due-process requirements for the service of a complaint -- but, instead, as

a motion would be served under Rule 5(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., on a party's

attorney who had already appeared in an action. See P.K. Fam. Rest.,

535 F. Supp. at 1224 (dismissing matter that was initiated by a motion

for a temporary restraining order, noting that, because "[a] civil action is

commenced with the filing of a complaint," "[a]bsent a complaint, this

Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's petition for injunctive

relief"); Adair v. England, 193 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) ("A

party commences a civil action by filing a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

3. When no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the

plaintiff's petition for injunctive relief."); Shake v. Yes We Are Mad Grp.,

Inc., 315 So. 3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) ("The motion for

temporary injunction is not a complaint. The motion was not served on

the respondent as a complaint would be required to have been served.

The motion is styled as an ex parte request for emergency relief."). But

9 CL-2025-0656

see Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1966) (treating

affidavit filed with order to show cause as a complaint but noting that

complaint was filed two days later).

Because the trial court did not obtain jurisdiction over the matter

from the outset, it lacked jurisdiction over the later-filed documents in

the matter, including Renasant's third-party complaint 4 and

Norsworthy's counterclaims on behalf of the business entities. See

Blevins v. Hillwood Office Ctr. Owners' Ass'n, 51 So. 3d 317, 321-23 (Ala.

2010) (ordering dismissal of action, which included counterclaims, after

concluding that plaintiff lacked standing); R.J.R. v. C.J.S., 72 So. 3d 643,

648 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) ("[B]ecause the mother's petition did not invoke

the juvenile court's and the circuit court's jurisdiction, those courts

likewise could not have obtained jurisdiction over the father's

counterpetition, filed in the same action."). Moreover, because the trial

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the orders it entered in the

matter, as well as its judgment on the pleadings, are void. See State v.

Property at 2018 Rainbow Dr., 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999). Lacking

4See Rule 14(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. (permitting a defendant to file a

third-party complaint "[a]t any time after commencement of the action" (emphasis added)). Here, no action was ever commenced. 10 CL-2025-0656

subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court was authorized only to dismiss

the matter. See Bernals, Inc. v. Kessler-Greystone, LLC, 70 So. 3d 315,

319 (Ala. 2011).

Conclusion

Because Norsworthy never filed a complaint, no action was ever

commenced below, and, as a result, the trial court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to proceed with the matter, rendering its final judgment void.

Because a void judgment will not support an appeal, see Burkes v.

Franklin, 370 So. 3d 235, 241 (Ala. 2022), we dismiss the appeal with

instructions to the trial court to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the

matter.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.