FILED Oct 08 2024, 9:12 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana James A. Simon, Appellant
v.
William R. Simon Farms, Inc., Appellee
October 8, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-PL-935 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable Jennifer L. DeGroote, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 02D03-2402-PL-88 02D03-2402-EV-448
Opinion by Judge Brown Judges May and Pyle concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 1 of 14 Brown, Judge.
[1] James A. Simon (“James”) appeals the trial court’s order granting immediate
possession of certain real property in favor of William R. Simon Farms, Inc.,
(“Simon Farms”) and denying his request for declaratory judgment. His sole
assertion is that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to a trial by
jury. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Simon Farms is an Indiana corporation that was formed in 1979 and is
currently owned by Sheri Johnson (“Sheri”) and her sons, Travis and Kirk.
Simon Farms owns property of “about 160 acres” located north of Huntertown
at the intersection of State Road 3 and Simon Road in Allen County.
Transcript Volume II at 6. The “full 160 acres,” which includes farmland, as
well as a roughly six-acre tract of land containing a house, barns, and a garage
(the “Homestead Property”), has “been in the Simon family for generations.”
Id. After Sheri’s parents passed away, Simon Farms was owned “a third, a
third, a third” between Sheri, her sister Sandi, and her brother James. Id. at 7.
Sometime after his wife died in 2007, James and his children began residing in
the house on the Homestead Property. James ultimately sold his third share of
Simon Farms to Sheri in 2010 and Sandi sold her third to Sheri in early 2011.
Regarding James’s share of Simon Farms, the sale of his shares to Sheri was
memorialized by a stock purchase agreement dated July 27, 2010 (the
“Purchase Agreement”). The purchase price for the shares was $1,115 per
share for a total sale price of $371,667. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 2 of 14 [3] The Purchase Agreement provided that James would resign as a member of the
Simon Farms Board of Directors and as an employee of Simon Farms. The
Agreement also contained a provision that stated: “This Agreement constitutes
the entire agreement between the parties and there are no verbal agreements
that shall be binding upon any of the parties hereto, their agents, successors and
assigns, unless expressly set forth in this Agreement.” Exhibits Volume at 8.
[4] At the time the Purchase Agreement was signed, James still resided on the
Homestead Property and kept some personal belongings in the various
structures on the property. He did not pay rent to Simon Farms to live on the
Homestead Property, he paid utilities, and he was expected to “help out around
the farm.” Transcript Volume II at 39. James resided on the Homestead
Property until 2011 when he went to federal prison following his conviction on
nineteen felony counts of various forms of tax fraud. Following his release
from prison, James returned to live on the Homestead Property. He performed
different types of maintenance tasks on the barns such as painting and repair
work. Sheri did not expect James to pay rent at this time because she just
wanted to help him “get back on his feet” but she expected him to start paying
rent “when he became capable of doing that.” Id. at 15-16. There was no
agreement in “writing, oral otherwise about how long [James] could stay . . .
[w]here he could stay . . . [w]hat he could do . . . [w]hat rent he would pay. . .
[or] anything[.]” Id. at 16. It was Sheri’s hope that at some point James or his
children would be in a financial position to purchase the Homestead Property
from Simon Farms.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 3 of 14 [5] On February 2, 2024, Simon Farms filed an eviction action against James
alleging that he was an at-will month-to-month tenant on the Homestead
Property, and that he had refused to vacate the property despite being given
more than thirty days’ notice prior to the filing of the eviction action. On
February 16, 2024, James filed a Demand for Trial by Jury and a Verified
Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgement and Injunctive Relief. He alleged that
he had an oral agreement with his sister Sheri, acting on behalf of Simon
Farms, to reside on the Homestead Property for the balance of his life rent-free
in exchange for services such as protecting the Homestead Property and the
entirety of the farmland from trespass and wrongdoing, performing routine
maintenance, and managing non-routine maintenance. He requested a
declaratory judgment acknowledging this right to reside on the Homestead
Property and further that he possessed an option to purchase the entire real
estate for fair market value. He also sought an injunction to prevent Simon
Farms from removing structures from the Homestead Property that James
occupied.
[6] On February 21, 2024, Allen County Superior Court Small Claims Division
Magistrate Brian Cook entered an order that provided in relevant part:
The Court having reviewed Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff James Simon’s Demand for Trial by Jury and supporting affidavit finds that questions of fact requiring a trial by jury do exist. The Court further finds that Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff’s demand was made in good faith. The Court therefore ORDERS that this case be transferred to the plenary docket and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 4 of 14 set for trial by jury. Upon acceptance and order of Judge DeGroote.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 42. On the same date, Judge Jennifer L.
DeGroote entered an order accepting jurisdiction over this case to remove it
from the small claims court docket but found that James was “not entitled to a
jury trial on the equitable relief requested by [him] on the issue of possession,
nor with the respect to the claim for declaratory judgment.” Id. at 43.
Accordingly, the trial court set a bench hearing to address both “parts of the
claim” for March 19, 2024. Id.
[7] The court held the scheduled hearing on March 19. The three Simon siblings
testified and the court admitted numerous exhibits. James testified that on or
about October 4, 2016, he entered into an oral agreement with Sheri to live on
the Homestead Property rent-free for life. However, when asked if Sheri
actually stated that he “could live there rent-free for life,” James responded,
“[s]he didn’t use those words, no.” Transcript Volume II at 62. Sheri testified
that she never had any such discussions with James about living on the property
rent-free for life and that no such agreement, oral or otherwise, existed. Sheri
testified that she did request that James pay rent from time-to-time but that he
indicated it would be a hardship due to his financial situation. The record
indicates that James made a total of three rent payments to Simon Farms in
2023 totaling $2700. Sheri testified that on October 3, 2023, Simon Farms
passed a resolution authorizing the sale of the entire Property. She explained
that after the first offer to purchase fell through, Simon Farms signed a purchase
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 5 of 14 agreement on November 15, 2023, with Granite Ridge Builders to sell the entire
Property for four million dollars. On that same day, Simon Farms sent an
email to James giving him a little over two months, until January 31, 2024, to
vacate the Homestead Property. Simon Farms also sent him a written “Notice
to Vacate” which he received on November 22, 2023. Appellant’s Appendix
Volume II at 28-29. Sheri testified that Simon Farms was “forced” to file the
eviction action after James failed to vacate the Homestead Property by January
31, 2024. Transcript Volume II at 27.
[8] On March 20, 2024, the court issued its order on both the declaratory judgment
and possession claims. The court determined that James “failed to establish the
existence of a valid oral agreement between him and Simon Farms and,
therefore, [James] is not entitled to declaratory relief in his Counter-Claim.”
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 19 (emphasis and underlining omitted). As
to Simon Farms’s claim for possession, the court determined that the parties
“never executed a formal lease agreement for any set term” and therefore,
under Indiana law, James was “a month-to-month tenant of the property
owned by Simon Farms.” Id. at 20. Accordingly, the court concluded “[a]s a
month-to-month tenant, Simon Farms is only required to give [James] a 30-day
notice to vacate which has occurred, and Simon Farms is, therefore, entitled to
an Order for Immediate Possession.” Id. (emphasis and underlining omitted).
Discussion
[9] The sole issue presented by James is whether he “was denied his constitutional
right to trial by jury.” Appellant’s Brief at 8 (capitalization omitted). Simon Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 6 of 14 Farms argues that James had no right to a jury trial and, even if he did, the
court’s failure to conduct a jury trial was harmless under the circumstances.
[10] Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution ensures that in “all civil cases,
the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” “This fundamental guarantee
secures the right to a jury trial ‘as it existed at common law’ at the time Indiana
adopted its current constitution.” State v. $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 N.E.3d
542, 545 (Ind. 2023) (citations omitted). “For cases or claims deemed
equitable, by contrast, ‘it is a well-settled tenet that a party is not entitled to a
jury trial.’” Id. Specifically, Indiana Trial Rule 38(A) provides in pertinent
part: “Issues of law and issues of fact in causes that prior to the eighteenth day
of June, 1852, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction shall be tried by the
court; issues of fact in all other causes shall be triable as the same are now
triable.” “Thus, we first ask whether the cause of action existed in 1851. If so,
then history settles the matter. But if the cause of action did not exist in 1851,
we must decide whether the claim is analogous to one at law or one in equity,
as those terms were then understood.” $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 N.E.3d at
545 (internal citations omitted). “Whether certain claims are entitled to a trial
by jury presents a pure question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of
review.” Id.
[11] The Indiana Supreme Court has explained:
If the essential features of a suit as a whole are equitable and the individual causes of action are not distinct or severable, the entitlement to a jury trial is extinguished. The opposite is also
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 7 of 14 true. If a single cause of action in a multi-count complaint is plainly equitable and the other causes of action assert purely legal claims that are sufficiently distinct and severable, Trial Rule 38(A) requires a jury trial on the legal claims.
Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 68 (Ind. 2002).
[12] An equitable remedy is “a nonmonetary one such as an injunction or specific
performance, obtained when available legal remedies, usu[ally] monetary
damages, cannot adequately redress the injury.” Equitable Remedy, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Eviction is “[t]he act or process of legally
dispossessing a person of land or rental property.” Eviction, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Actual eviction is the “physical expulsion of a
person from land or rental property.” Actual Eviction, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
[13] It is basic and well understood that eviction falls within the category of an
equitable action, and this Court has long observed that there is no constitutional
right to a jury trial at the preliminary possession hearing in an eviction
proceeding. Bishop v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, 920 N.E.2d 772, 779 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), trans. denied, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1189 (2011). Indeed, James concedes
that Simon Farms’s claim for immediate possession of the Homestead Property
was an equitable cause not triable by jury, and he further acknowledges that he
was not entitled to a jury trial on his claim for injunctive relief. However, he
maintains that he was entitled to have a jury determine ultimate possession of
the Homestead Property, a claim based upon the existence of an oral agreement
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 8 of 14 between the parties. He argues, “an eviction can be a two[-] step process” with
the first step being determining “the right to immediate possession” and the
“second phase” being “to determine the right of ultimate possession of the
property.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. He asserts that the “existence of [an]
agreement” and the right to “ultimate possession” of the Homestead Property
was an issue triable by jury. Id. 1 He maintains that the fact that “a declaratory
judgment was sought did not deprive [him] of his right to trial by jury” on this
issue. Id. at 11 (citing Winney v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vigo Cnty., 174 Ind. App. 624,
627, 369 N.E.2d 661, 663 (1977)) (observing that a “party may have a right to a
jury trial upon issues of fact in a declaratory judgment action” and, “[w]here
there are material issues of fact in an action which was a legal action at
common law and not an equitable action, the right to trial by jury is
preserved”).
[14] As noted by Simon Farms, pursuant to Ind. Code § 32-30-3-5, a trial court may
hold a hearing on a request for immediate possession and, after the hearing,
“the court shall: (1) consider the pleadings, evidence, and testimony presented
at the hearing; and (2) determine with reasonable probability which party is
entitled to possession, use, and enjoyment of the property.” The court’s
determination “is preliminary pending final adjudication of the claims of the
parties. If the court determines that the action is an action in which a
1 In his main brief, James does not mention the portion of his declaratory judgment request regarding his alleged option to purchase the entire property, and he does not suggest he was entitled to a jury trial based upon that request. Accordingly, we decline to discuss it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 9 of 14 prejudgment order of possession in plaintiff favor should issue, the court shall
issue the order.” Ind. Code § 32-30-3-5. A final judgment supersedes any
prejudgment order for possession. Ind. Code § 32-30-3-12. In other words, the
Indiana statute merely allows the trial court to make a preliminary decision as
to the right to immediate possession of the property. Bishop, 920 N.E.2d at 779.
The right to a trial by jury remains on the issue of final possession of the
property. Id.
[15] Although his arguments are difficult to discern, it appears that James’s claim is
essentially that, although the trial court did not err in conducting the March 19,
2024, hearing without a jury and determining the immediate possession issue,
the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial when it issued an
order that resolved “issues which were triable by jury, the existence of the
agreement and the right to [final] possession of the Homestead.” Appellant’s
Brief at 7. Simon Farms responds that, while James “may have been entitled to
a jury trial on the issue of final possession if there were outstanding issues of
material fact which required a fact-finder, here there were no outstanding
factual issues” and therefore, under the circumstances presented, it was proper
for the trial court to decide ultimate possession as a matter of law. Appellee’s
Brief at 14. We agree with Simon Farms.
[16] Here, the pivotal question presented to the trial court regarding James’s claim
for declaratory relief, as well as the issue of immediate possession of the
Homestead Property, was a pure question of law; namely, whether an oral
agreement existed between James and Simon Farms entitling James to live on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 10 of 14 the Homestead Property rent-free for the remainder of his life. As this Court
has explained,
Contracts are formed when parties exchange an offer and acceptance. For an oral contract to exist, parties have to agree to all terms of the contract. If a party cannot demonstrate agreement on one essential term of the contract, then there is no mutual assent and no contract is formed. A meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, having the same intent, is essential to the formation of a contract. Whether a set of facts establishes a contract is a question of law.
Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[17] James asserts that the trial court “improperly weighed conflicting evidence and
assessed credibility in reaching its decision that there was no agreement” and
that there remained “factual issues to be decided.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6,
8 (citing City of Indianapolis v. Twin Lakes Enterprises, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1073, 1079
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“While the question of whether a certain or undisputed
state of facts establishes a contract is one of law for the court, where the
existence and not the validity or construction of a contract or the terms thereof
is the point in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one
inference, it is for the jury to determine whether a contract in fact exists”) reh’g
denied, trans. denied). Despite these assertions, we agree with the trial court’s
resolution of this issue as a matter of law because the relevant facts as to the
existence of a valid oral agreement were undisputed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 11 of 14 [18] Both James’s and Sheri’s testimony made clear that the parties never agreed to
the essential terms of any oral agreement, and James admitted that Sheri, acting
on behalf of Simon Farms, never actually told him that he could live on the
Homestead Property rent-free for the remainder of his life. Based upon the facts
presented, we agree with trial court that “[i]n this case there was no meeting of
the minds, even taking [James’s] testimony as truthful[.]” Appellant’s
Appendix Volume II at 19. Thus, after the trial court determined that no valid
oral contract existed and that Simon Farms was entitled to immediate
possession of the Homestead, which James concedes was a claim not triable by
a jury, no factual issues remained to present to a jury on the issue of final
possession.2
[19] We further agree with Simon Farms that any error in the court’s failure to hold
a jury trial on the issue of final possession was harmless. We note that the
Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, under proper circumstances, trial
courts often decide cases as a matter of law. Specifically, in considering both
summary judgment and judgment on the evidence standards, the Court recently
explained, “the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a
2 Having found that no valid oral agreement existed, the trial court proceeded to determine that James was a month-to-month tenant pursuant to Indiana law and his tenancy was subject to termination upon one- month’s notice which was served upon James on November 22, 2023. See Ind. Code § 32-31-1-2 (“A general tenancy in which the premises are occupied by the expressed or constructive consent of the landlord is considered to be a tenancy from month-to-month. However, this section does not apply to land used for agricultural purposes.”); Ind. Code § 32-31-1-4(b) (“Notice to the tenant equal to the interval between the periods is sufficient to determine a tenancy described in subsection (a).”). James states in is reply brief that his “occupancy was for part of the property the parties called the Homestead which contained the house and other buildings” and “[t]hat area was not used for farming.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 7. James does not challenge the court’s findings as to his month-to-month tenancy on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 12 of 14 sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Cosme v. Clark, 232
N.E.3d 1141, 1151 (Ind. 2024) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986)). When determining whether
judgment on the evidence is appropriate, “a judge may assess both the quantity
and quality of the evidence . . . but may not weigh the conflicting evidence or
assess witness credibility; these are fact-finding functions within the jury’s sole
province.” Id. at 1148. Judgment on the evidence is available when the
claimant “has not proved its claim because no reasonable jury could find for it.”
Id. at 1150.
[20] Stated another way, we must be “mindful that error in the denial of a jury trial
may be harmless.” Corrigan v. Al-Trim Corp., 700 N.E.2d 481, 484-485 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing Builders Square v. Haines, 696 N.E.2d 453, 455 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998), trans. denied), reh’g denied, trans. denied. This Court has explained:
The test for deciding whether the failure to conduct a jury trial constituted harmless error is to determine whether the trial court would have been required to enter a directed verdict had a jury trial been held, or whether a jury verdict in favor of the losing party could have been sustainable. In making this determination, we review the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party asserting the right to a jury trial.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 13 of 14 [21] Here, the trier of fact was required to determine the existence of a valid oral
agreement between James and Simon Farms. As concluded by the court, even
assuming James’s testimony was true, and considering all reasonable inferences
in his favor, a valid oral agreement allowing him “to possess, occupy, use,
reside, and enjoy the Homestead and the improvements thereon for the
remainder of his life” could not be found to exist. Appellant’s Appendix
Volume II at 20. Thus, a verdict which differed from the judgment entered by
the trial court in this case would not have been sustainable on the record.
Therefore, we conclude that the court’s failure to conduct a jury trial on the
issue of final possession was harmless.
[22] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[23] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT David W. Stone IV Anderson, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Patrick G. Murphy Caleb W. Peery Barrett McNagny LLP Fort Wayne, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-935 | October 8, 2024 Page 14 of 14