Jamel H. Brown v. United States of America

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JAMEL H. BROWN, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) No. 1:26-cv-01092-SEB-MJD ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Respondent. )

Order Denying Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence and Denying Certificate of Appealability

Petitioner Jamel H. Brown ("Mr. Brown") seeks relief from his convictions in No. 1:11-cr- 00202-SEB-TAB-1. Mr. Brown does so after having previously challenged his convictions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in Brown v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00606-SEB-MPB, which action was decided on the merits. Because Mr. Brown's prior § 2255 petition was denied on the merits, the instant § 2255 petition is successive and must be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit has explained: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act requires a prisoner to receive the prior approval of the Court of Appeals before filing a second or successive motion under § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). "No matter how powerful a petitioner's showing, only [the appellate] court may authorize the commencement of a second or successive petition. . . . From the district court's perspective, it is an allocation of subject-matter jurisdiction to the court of appeals. A district court must dismiss a second or successive petition, without awaiting any response from the government, unless the court of appeals has given approval for its filing." Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991 (emphasis in original).

Adams v. United States, 911 F.3d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 2018). Here, Mr. Brown has not obtained the requisite appellate authorization to bring a successive § 2255 petition. Accordingly, this action is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Judgment consistent with this entry shall now issue, and a copy of this entry shall be docketed in No. 1:11- cr-00202-SEB-TAB-1. The Motion to Vacate, Crim. Dkt. [112], shall also be terminated in the underlying criminal action. A habeas petitioner does not have the absolute right to appeal a district court's denial of his habeas petition; rather, he must first request a certificate of appealability. See Miller—El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003); Peterson v. Douma, 751 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court finds that Mr. Brown has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find it "debatable whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court therefore denies a certificate of appealability. IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: 5/28/2026 Wud Gaus Bier SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE United States District Court Southern District of Indiana

Distribution: JAMEL H. BROWN 10253-028 LEE - USP LEE U.S. PENITENTIARY Inmate Mail/Parcels P.O. BOX 305 JONESVILLE, VA 24263