Jameice Nash v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 23-3018
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 23-3018 ________________

JAMEICE NASH, Appellant

v.

SUPERINTENDENT HOUTZDALE SCI; DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA ________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:20-cv-04431) District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone ________________

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on May 22, 2025

Before: PHIPPS, CHUNG and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 8, 2025)

OPINION* ________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. ROTH, Circuit Judge

Jameice Nash1 was convicted of slitting his daughter’s neck with a kitchen knife.

He now alleges that Pennsylvania suppressed disciplinary records that could have helped

impeach an officer who testified at his trial. But that officer’s testimony was both relatively

inconsequential and heavily corroborated. The impeachment value of those disciplinary

records is marginal at best. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order denying

Nash’s petition for habeas corpus.

I.

On the morning of June 12, 2013, Monica Baker-Henry called 911 to report that her

son, Jameice Nash, was acting erratically. She told the operator that her son appeared to

be under the influence of a drug she believed was called “wet,”2 and that she had locked

herself in her room to place the 911 call. She further told the operator that:

He has the baby with him. He’s about to take her to school, but he has a knife. He is demanding to see the baby’s mother. Him and the baby's mother are have [sic] something is going on, and I think the baby’s mother busted up his lip, and he is saying he is going to -- inaudible -- he has a knife. Please approach carefully, because I don’t want the baby to get hurt.3

Philadelphia police arrived at Baker-Henry’s residence shortly afterwards and found

Nash standing outside with his seven-year-old daughter R.H., whose neck had been slashed

open. One of the officers at the scene took Nash into custody, while another officer rushed

1 Appellant’s first name is spelled throughout his state court record as “Jamice.” In this proceeding, he has consistently spelled it “Jameice,” so we will do the same. 2 “Wet” is commonly used as “street-language for PCP [phencyclidine].” See United States v. Gaines, 918 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 2019). 3 See Supplemental Appendix (SA) 183.

2 R.H. to a local hospital. According to medical records, R.H. “presented with a ten-

centimeter laceration” which “[c]ut through the skin and muscle layers, as well as fat.”4

R.H. informed hospital staff that “her father kicked her mother out of the house then

threatened to kill her, and put the knife up to her neck.”5 She later said that the cut was

accidental, but then reported that “her father told her, hurry up, you’ll be late for school or

I’ll kill you” before retrieving a knife and cutting her neck.6 Doctors succeeded in

surgically repairing R.H.’s neck, and she was released two days later.

While R.H. was being taken to the hospital, Baker-Henry went to the Philadelphia

Special Victims Unit (SVU), where she gave a statement to Officer Justin Montgomery.

According to that statement, Nash had come home that morning “fussing,” “mad,” and with

blood on his shirt—saying that R.H.’s mother had “busted him in the mouth” and that “he

was going to go find her and kill her.”7 Baker-Henry noticed Nash had a knife near him,

which she tried to hide along with her other kitchen knives. Seeing that Nash possessed

another knife, she locked herself in her room and called 911. After the call, Baker-Henry

overheard Nash telling R.H. to hurry up, and that she was “just like [her] mother.”8 Baker-

Henry subsequently observed Nash, who had left the house, standing under a tree with

R.H., whose shirt was now bloody. Baker-Henry asked the arriving officers to hurry up.

4 SA 163. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 SA 153–54. 8 SA 154. 3 When asked if Nash was a drug user, Baker-Henry said that he was, and that she was told

the drug Nash used was called “wet”.9

In 2014, two years after her release from the hospital, R.H. gave a forensic interview

to an employee of the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance. In that interview, R.H. confirmed

that her father had cut her neck with a knife, and made a visible slashing motion across her

neck while doing so. She also confirmed many of the details of her grandmother’s

statement—including that her father had been holding a knife during breakfast because he

was mad at her mother, and that after Baker-Henry took the knife away he replaced it with

a new one. When asked why she believed her father had cut her, she responded that he

was angry and bleeding because of her mom.

II.

Following repeated delays, Nash’s bench trial in the Philadelphia County Court of

Common Pleas began on June 6, 2017.10

At trial, the prosecution called multiple police officers to the stand. The prosecution

also called R.H. (now age 11) who confirmed that her father had cut her neck and showed

her scar to the court, while admitting on cross-examination that Nash had been a generally

loving father, that she did not recall him expressing anger at her that morning, and that she

was confused why he had attacked her (and thought it must have been an accident).

9 Id. 10 See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 14 at 2 (noting that Nash’s trial was delayed by repeated continuance requests, counsel changes, and periods of legal incompetency). 4 In her trial testimony, Baker-Henry confirmed that she had been concerned about

Nash’s behavior and had called 911 on him. Nevertheless, her trial testimony differed

markedly from her prior statements. Baker-Henry stated she could not remember seeing

Nash with a knife at any point that morning, and deferred to what the tape said. While she

conceded that she had taken some knives off the table, she said that this was only to “put

them back in the kitchen where they should be.”11 She denied expressing concern about

Nash hurting R.H. (and claimed she had been worried only about him taking her to school

while mentally impaired). Finally, she denied that Nash had uttered any threatening

comments.

As its final witness, the prosecution called Officer Montgomery to the stand. Other

than authenticating some prosecution photographs and testifying that he had been unable

to take a statement from R.H. around the time of the incident due to her medical condition,

Montgomery’s direct testimony consisted almost entirely of reading portions of Baker-

Henry’s statement into the record, confirming they had been accurately transcribed, and

verifying that Baker-Henry had been given an opportunity to review the statement.

Montgomery was then cross-examined extensively, facing questions about his

recordkeeping, his confidence level in his ability to recall Baker-Henry’s interview, and

the voluntariness with which Baker-Henry had been brought to SVU.

Nash was the sole defense witness. He denied ever intending to harm R.H. (or her

mother) and testified to the seriousness with which he took his role as her caretaker in the

11 SA 139. 5 period prior to his arrest. He explained that, after R.H.’s mother attacked him that morning,

he had taken R.H. to Baker-Henry’s house while leaving behind two sheetrock knives he

used for work. He then took a kitchen knife with him from Baker-Henry’s home for a

sheetrock repair he had scheduled after dropping R.H. off at school, and, after it fell out of

his pocket, decided to carry it. Nash testified that, while walking out to his car with R.H.,

he noticed that her collar was improperly tucked in, and he accidentally cut her while trying

to fix it. Nash had no explanation for the extent of R.H.’s injuries and denied being under

the influence of drugs.

Nash was convicted of attempted murder and other crimes, and was sentenced to an

aggregate term of ten to twenty years’ incarceration followed by ten years’ probation.12

III.

Nash filed a pro se habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on September 8,

2020. That petition was held in abeyance because Nash had not yet sought state post-

conviction relief.13 Nash subsequently filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), asserting ineffectiveness and sufficiency claims as well as

12 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that Nash’s aggravated assault charge was improperly merged with his attempted murder charge and vacated the portion of Nash’s sentence relating to his aggravated assault conviction. However, because Nash was set to serve his sentences for aggravated assault and attempted murder concurrently, the Superior Court concluded that the error did not disturb the trial court’s overall sentencing scheme and decided not to remand the case for resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Nash, No. 716 EDA 2018, 2020 WL 4436308, at *5–6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2020) (Nash I). Nash did not seek allocatur. 13 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (requiring petitioners to first exhaust available state remedies). 6 a claim that the government had failed, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,14 to turn over

evidence of prior disciplinary infractions by Officer Montgomery.15 Nash’s PCRA petition

was denied on September 13, 2021, and that denial was affirmed by the Pennsylvania

Superior Court on April 6, 2023.16

In June 2022, Nash filed an amended, counseled § 2254 petition, which he later

supplemented. Like his PCRA petition, this petition alleged ineffectiveness and

sufficiency claims, as well as a Brady claim that the prosecution had suppressed evidence

of prior misconduct by Officer Montgomery. The evidence in question consisted of (1) a

sustained disciplinary complaint alleging that, on October 25, 2014, a group of officers

(including Montgomery) failed to properly investigate the complaint’s allegation that a

victim had been indecently assaulted in a taxi cab, and (2) a widely publicized story that

Montgomery had minimized and failed to properly investigate a victim’s claims that she

had been sexually assaulted at the 2016 Democratic National Convention.17

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, concluding that Nash’s

petition should be denied in full.18 Later, with one procedural exception, the District Court

14 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 15 See Commonwealth v. Nash, No. 2145 EDA 2021, 2023 WL 2808473, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2023) (Nash II). 16 See id. 17 It is unclear from the record whether Nash raised both incidents before the PCRA Court, or only the incident concerning Snyder. 18 See Nash v. Close, CV 20-4431, 2023 WL 6771954 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2023). 7 adopted that report and recommendation in full.19 Nevertheless, finding that “reasonable

jurists could debate whether” the prosecution had violated Brady, the District Court granted

Nash a certificate of appealability on his Brady claim.20 Nash appealed.

IV.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Where a

state court has ruled on the merits of a legal question, federal habeas courts are bound by

that ruling unless it is either “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 21 Here,

the state court rejected Nash’s Brady claim solely because the disciplinary records at issue

could have been located by Nash with proper diligence.22 But it is clearly established that

“the concept of ‘due diligence’ plays no role in the Brady analysis.”23 The District Court

therefore reviewed Nash’s Brady claim de novo, without regard to the state court’s

decision.24 Because the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, our review

of its holding is likewise de novo.25

19 Nash v. Smith, No. CV 20-4431, 2023 WL 6690704, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2023) (Nash III). While finding it unnecessary to address the issue of exhaustion, the District Court rejected the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the Commonwealth had forfeited its exhaustion arguments. Id. at *1 n.1; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). 20 Nash III, 2023 WL 6690704, at *1 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We denied Nash’s motion to expand his certificate of appealability to include his remaining habeas claims. 21 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 22 Nash II, 2023 WL 2808473, at *6. 23 See Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 291 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). 24 See id. at 284; Nash III, 2023 WL 6690704, at *1. 25 See Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2012). 8 V.

Under Brady and its progeny, prosecutors must disclose evidence which might help

impeach one of their witnesses.26 “[N]ot every failure to disclose,” however, amounts to a

Brady violation.27 Instead, a petitioner must show that “(1) the withheld evidence was

favorable to him . . . (2) the State suppressed the evidence . . . and (3) the evidence was

material such that prejudice resulted from its suppression.”28

Here, the Commonwealth concedes that evidence of Montgomery’s prior

disciplinary incidents was both withheld and favorable. As such, the only issue is whether

it was material—put otherwise, whether there is “a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.”29 Nash argues that it was. In particular, he claims that had his trial attorney

been given the suppressed records she would have argued that Montgomery “had a motive

to embellish, or mischaracterize what the witnesses in this case told him during their

respective interviews in order to ensure that he was not accused of taking [sic] an alleged

victim’s story seriously.”30

However, to the extent that Montgomery’s testimony played a role in securing

Nash’s conviction, it was through rebutting Baker-Henry’s claim that her SVU statement

had been inaccurately transcribed. It is far from clear to us that Baker-Henry’s SVU

26 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (noting that “impeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule”). 27 See Rega v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.4th 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2024). 28 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 29 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). 30 App. Br. 20. 9 statement was needed for Nash’s conviction, given the uncontroverted evidence of Nash’s

cutting R.H.’s neck with a kitchen knife, R.H.’s medical records showing the depth of her

injuries, R.H.’s statements to the Children’s Alliance concerning her father’s mental state,

and the sheer implausibility of Nash’s version of the incident.

Moreover, even assuming that Baker-Henry’s statement was necessary, a juror

could reasonably conclude that her efforts to retract it at trial were not credible. Baker-

Henry had a motive to reduce her son’s legal exposure. We are not persuaded that any

reasonable juror would have voted differently if presented with the suppressed evidence

about Officer Montgomery.31

Finally, whatever the plausibility of Baker-Henry’s retractions, Nash’s argument

that Montgomery was motivated to bolster her original statements is weak. Montgomery

took and transcribed Baker-Henry’s statement in 2013, over a year before the first

disciplinary complaint against her, and three years before the second allegation of

misconduct. Even if the ensuing disciplinary proceedings provided Montgomery with a

motive to embellish, Baker-Henry’s statement had already been taken and documented.

The bulk of Montgomery’s testimony consisted of reading the statement into the record

verbatim. To the extent that Montgomery’s remaining testimony provided marginal

additional support to the prosecution, we see no reasonable probability that it bore a role

in the trial’s outcome.

31 See Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that, where suppressed evidence “would be used to impeach testimony of a witness whose account is strongly corroborated,” it “is generally not considered material for Brady purposes”). 10 In short, the impeachment value of the suppressed evidence is insufficient to shake

our confidence in Nash’s verdict. It follows that he has failed to make out a cognizable

claim under Brady, and as such, a cognizable claim for relief.

VI.

For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying

Nash’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.