Jamaal Akil Long v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 1, 2007
Docket01-07-00685-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Jamaal Akil Long v. State (Jamaal Akil Long v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jamaal Akil Long v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

Opinion issued November 1, 2007





In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas





NO. 01-07-00685-CR





EX PARTE JAMAAL AKIL LONG, Appellant





On Appeal from the 351st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1126565




MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Jamaal Akil Long, challenges the trial court’s order denying his request to reduce his pretrial bail from $500,000. We affirm.

I. Background

          On December 6, 2006, Houston Police officers executed a search warrant at 3727 Cosby where Long lived. Long was not there at the time, but a grandmother and two children were. The police found 9.3 kilos of cocaine, a diamond watch, 11 firearms, and three new flat screen television sets.

          On January 2, 2007, a warrant was issued for Long’s arrest, and on January 12, 2007, the State indicted Long for possession with intent to deliver cocaine weighing at least 400 grams. Long’s live-in companion, Marchanel, testified that a few weeks before the August 8, 2007 habeas hearing, appellant learned of the warrant for his arrest and that bail had been set at $2.4 million. They consulted legal counsel, who advised them that the offense with which Long was charged was a first degree felony, punishable by up to life in the penitentiary. According to Marchanel, Long surrendered himself to the Harris County Sheriff’s Office on July 16, 2007.

          On July 23, 2007, the parties approached the bench to ask about the bail, and the trial court lowered it to $500,000. Two days later, Long filed his application for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the $500,000 bail is excessive.

          At the habeas hearing, Long introduced evidence through the testimony of his uncle Eddie, that he was born and raised in Houston. Before Marchanel moved in with Long, he lived at 3727 Cosby in a house belonging to Eddie. For the last two years, Long has worked for Eddie in the carpet business, a job to which he could return if he were released on bond. Eddie, who has known Long all of his life, pays him at least cash of $450 per week. Long has two children, ages five and 10, whom he supports. The five-year-old’s mother is Marchanel. In March 2007, Marchanel, who has known Long for eight years, purchased from Eddie the house at 3727 Cosby where she, Long, and their son now live. The insurance on the house is carried in Long’s name. Long owns no passport.

          As far as Eddie knows, Long has no bank accounts and no homes. His only asset is a 2005 GMC truck, which Long has given Eddie to raise money to make a bond. Eddie has spoken to a bail bondsman and, given the collateral that Long’s friends and family are willing to pledge, the maximum bond that can be made is for $200,000. Eddie testified that, if Long purchased the cocaine, weapons, watch, and flat screen television sets found in 3727 Cosby, it is a possibility that Long has some other source of income that Eddie does not know about.

          Marchanel testified that she works at Methodist DeBakey Cardiology making about $3,000 a month. To Marchanel’s knowledge, Long has not been convicted of a felony in Texas or any other state, but she is aware that Long has had some misdemeanor trouble. Marchinel does not know whether Long was working before 2005. She does not know where Long would get the money to buy the 11 weapons and the three flat screen television sets. She agrees that there is a lot about Long’s comings and goings she does not know because she is working.

          Houston Police Officer Saulter testified that the street value of 9.3 kilos of cocaine would be over $900,000. Saulter also testified that several of the 11 weapons seized were assault weapons. One was a Herstal semi-automatic pistol that shoots a bottleneck cartridge designed to defeat a bullet-proof vest. Another firearm seized was an AR-15, a civilian version of the M-16 semiautomatic military rifle. A third firearm seized was a Carbon 15, which is basically an AR-15 that has been cut down to be compact. It also shoots the bottleneck cartridge. The AR-15 is worth about $1,000, the Carbon 15 would probably be more expensive than the AR-15, and the Herstal’s value would be in the $1,500 range. Amongst the other weapons were a Sig Sauer, a Mauser, a Smith and Wesson, a Keltic rifle, a Vulcan Arms rifle, which is an assault weapon, and a Winchester shotgun. Saulter believes one of the weapons was reported stolen.

II. Standard of Review

          The standard of review for reviewing bail settings is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App.1981); Ex parte Ruiz, 129 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In the exercise of its discretion, a trial court should consider the following factors in setting a defendant’s bail:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.


          2. The power to require bail is not to be used as an instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken on this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be considered.


Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (Vernon 2005); Ludwig v. State, 812 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that the court is “to be governed in the exercise of [its] discretion by the Constitution and by the [article 17.15 factors]”). The burden of proof is upon a defendant who claims bail is excessive. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849;Ex parte Martinez-Velasco, 666 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.). The primary purpose for setting bond is to secure the presence of the defendant in court at his trial. Ex parte Vasquez

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Related

Ex Parte Ruiz
129 S.W.3d 751 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Ex Parte Bonilla
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848 S.W.2d 693 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Ludwig v. State
812 S.W.2d 323 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Ex Parte Vasquez
558 S.W.2d 477 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1977)
Ex Parte Rubac
611 S.W.2d 848 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1981)
Ex Parte Martinez-Velasco
666 S.W.2d 613 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1984)
Ex Parte Willman
695 S.W.2d 752 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Ex Parte Parish
598 S.W.2d 872 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1980)
Ex Parte Bufkin
553 S.W.2d 116 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1977)

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