Jallow v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 31, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-06260·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK YAYA JALLOW, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-6260 (LLS) CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE ORDERTO AMEND DEPARTMENT; FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that in 2019, Defendants falsely detained him and forcibly confined him at Jacobi Medical Center. By order dated August 28, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss anIFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is

entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), claiming that employees from both departments violated his rights.He alleges that these employees violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by denying him life, liberty, and property without due process of law.He does not name individual defendants. The following facts are taken from the complaint: On May 9, 2019, individuals from the NYPD Transit Division “falsely detained” Plaintiff. (ECF No. 2, at 1.) During the summer of 2019, “Police Department personnel” “tailed” Plaintiff, who was the unfortunate victim of multiple thefts and the ensuing cover-up attempt which resulted in the unfortunate forcible confinement of The Plaintiff against his will and consent at Jacobi Medical Center for 21 hours on August 9th, 2019, 4 days after the last attempt at stealing from The Plaintiff. (Id.) Later in the month, on August 30, 2019, one of those parties felt the need to call The Defendants to help them facilitate and advance along their plans. Despite not having no valid nor legitimate reason to the parties in question called The Defendant and despite having a normal casual conversation with The Defendants’ personal[sic]and not displaying any reason to warrant it The Defendants sought fitand with complete disregard for The Plaintiff’s multiple objections to forcible confine, transport, and admit The Plaintiffto the hospital, at this point the 2ndtime in less than 3 weeks by the same the City of New York Police Department precinct. (Id.) Because of “Defendants’ actions The Plaintiff was transferred from his, at the time, current shelter to a ‘disciplinary shelter’ in a last ditch attempt by several of the aforementioned parties to force The Plaintiff into silence.” (Id.at 1-2.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. NYPD and FDNY Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD and the FDNYmust be dismissed because agencies of the City of New York are not entities that can be sued.N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedingsfor the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the NYPD and the FDNYwith the City of New York. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert. B. Municipal Liability When a plaintiff sues a municipality under §1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The

plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson,131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011).

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Jallow v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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