Jalen Lampkin v. Kathleen Allison

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: June 10, 2024
• Docket: 5:24-cv-00743
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JALEN LAMPKIN, Case No. CV 5:24-00743 SB (RAO)

12 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING 14 KATHLEEN ALLISON, CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 15 Respondent. 16 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On March 21, 2024, Petitioner Jalen Lampkin (“Petitioner”), a California 19 prisoner proceeding pro se, constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 20 Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”).1 21 (Dkt. No. 1.) Petitioner seeks habeas relief from his current state custody arising 22 from a 2020 conviction in Riverside County Superior Court, case number 23 RIF2003912. (Petition at 2.) 24

25 1 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading 26 to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). 27

28 1 On April 17, 2024, the Court issued a screening order stating that the Petition 2 appeared time barred and the instant action subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. 3 No. 4.) The order directed Petitioner to file a response. (Id.) On May 7, 2024, 4 Petitioner responded with a Letter (“Letter”). (Dkt. No. 5.) In the Letter, Petitioner 5 states that he only recently discovered his legal right to seek habeas relief and that it 6 took him time to conduct research and complete and file the correct form. (Id. at 1- 7 2.) 8 For the following reasons, the Petition is summarily dismissed as time 9 barred. 10 11 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 12 Petitioner pleaded guilty to arson of an inhabited structure, in violation of 13 Cal. Penal Code § 451(b), in Riverside County Superior Court on October 15, 2020. 14 (Petition at 2.) The trial court sentenced him on November 30, 2020, to six years of 15 imprisonment. (Id.) Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. (Id. at 5.) A search 16 of the publicly available California state appellate court records confirms that 17 Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. See 18 https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search. The same search shows that 19 Petitioner has not filed any state habeas petitions. Id. 20 Petitioner constructively filed the instant Petition on March 21, 2024. 21 (Petition at 6.) The Petition raises a single claim of ineffective assistance of trial 22 counsel. (Id. at 3.) 23 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases authorizes the Court to 26 dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition 27 and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district 28 court.” Here, the Petition must be dismissed because it is time barred. 1 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) imposes a 2 deadline for the filing of federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. See 3 Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 4 (1997). AEDPA requires a prisoner to file his federal habeas petition within one- 5 year of the latest of: 6 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 7 direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 8 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 9 by the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 10 States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 11 action; 12 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 13 recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 14 the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 15 review; or 16 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 17 presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 18 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 19 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the Petition is facially untimely because it 20 was filed well over a year after Petitioner’s conviction became final.2 “A state 21 conviction and sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when 22 the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time 23 for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has 24 been finally denied.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S.Ct. 948, 953, 25 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994). Petitioner was sentenced on November 30, 2020. 26 (Petition at 2.) Petitioner then had 60 days, or until January 29, 2021, to seek a 27 2 Having reviewed the Petition and Petitioner’s Letter, the Court determines that no 28 other tolling provision of Section 2244(d)(1) is applicable. 1 certificate of probable cause or file an appeal. Cal. Penal Code § 1237.5; Cal. R. 2 Ct. 8.308(a). As noted above, Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. Thus, the 3 judgment became final on January 29, 2021. 4 Consequently, the last day for Petitioner to have timely filed his federal 5 habeas petition was January 29, 2022, one year after the judgment became final. 6 Petitioner constructively filed the instant Petition on March 21, 2024, well after the 7 one-year limitations period under AEDPA expired. See McMonagle, 802 F.3d at 8 1097. Thus, the Petition is time barred. 9 In addition to statutory tolling under § 2244(d), the AEDPA limitations 10 period may be tolled whenever “equitably required.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 11 631, 645, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010); Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 12 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). However, the threshold necessary to 13 trigger equitable tolling is high, making equitable tolling unavailable in most cases. 14 Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 15 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended). Petitioner bears the heavy burden of proving he 16 is entitled to equitable tolling. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. 17 For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show that (1) he has pursued 18 his rights diligently, and (2) an “extraordinary circumstance prevented timely 19 filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. Additionally, “[t]he petitioner must show that 20 the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the 21 extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter 22 v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 23 In his Letter, Petitioner states that he only recently learned about his right to 24 seek habeas relief through legal research and from a “lifer.” Letter at 1. Petitioner 25 also states that he has had intermittent access to legal research via a prison-provided 26 computer tablet, and it took time to complete and file the habeas form. Id. at 1-2. 27 A petitioner’s lack of legal expertise and ignorance of the law do not warrant 28 equitable tolling. See Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 2009) (petitioner’s 1 confusion or ignorance of the law does not satisfy the extraordinary circumstance 2 standard); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se 3 petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary 4 circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). Nor is Petitioner entitled to equitable 5 tolling based on the contention that he had intermittent access to legal research. As 6 noted above, “extraordinary circumstances” must have prevented an otherwise 7 diligent petitioner from filing on time. See Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839 8 (9th Cir. 2014). Petitioner does not show that the limited access to the prison tablet 9 to conduct legal research prevented the timely filing of his Petition. Rather, the 10 Letter states that Petitioner did not know about his habeas rights during the first 3 ½ 11 years of his sentence. Letter at 1. Thus, the lack of access to legal research at the 12 prison could not have been the cause of Petitioner’s untimeliness. See Gillon v. 13 Atchley, No. 2:20-cv-04960, 2021 WL 1232461, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2021), 14 adopted by, 2021 WL 1697143 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (lack of law library 15 access not basis for equitable tolling where petitioner did not contact prison legal 16 advisor for assistance until after the statue of limitations expired). 17 Because Petitioner has not shown any extraordinary circumstance prevented 18 him from timely filing the Petition, equitable tolling is not warranted, and the 19 Petition remains untimely. 20 21 IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 22 Under AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order 23 in a habeas corpus proceeding must obtain a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) 24 from the district judge or a circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA may 25 issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 26 constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard 27 by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s 28 resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues 1 || presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. 2 || Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). 3 When the Court dismisses a petition on procedural grounds, it must issue a 4 | COA if the petitioner shows: (1) “that jurists of reason would find it debatable 5 || whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right”; and 6 || (2) “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 7 || correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478, 120 S.Ct. 8 || 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). 9 Here, the Court is dismissing the Petition because it is time barred. Since the 10 || Petition is untimely, Petitioner cannot make the requisite showing that jurists of 11 || reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 12 || procedural ruling. 13 ORDER 15 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 16 1. The Petition is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice; 17 2. A Certificate of Appealability is DENIED; 18 3. All pending motions or requests are DENIED as moot. 19 20 || DATED: June 10, 2024 OfF6h SS 21 STANLEY BLUMENFELD, JR. 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28