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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE
9 10 JAKOB SHANK, CASE NO. C25-1366JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, 13 et al. , 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Defendants Guild Mortgage Company, LLC,1 (“Guild”) and 17 Terry Schmidt’s (collectively, “Defendants”) first motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff 18 Jakob Shank’s complaint. (MTD (Dkt. # 10); see also Compl. (Dkt. # 1).) Mr. Shank did 19 20 21
1 Guild Mortgage Company, LLC, is incorrectly named in the complaint as Guild 22 Mortgage Company. (See Compl. at 2.) 1 not respond to the motion.2 (See generally Dkt.; see also 10/29/25 Not. (Dkt. # 12) 2 (noting that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is unopposed).) The court has reviewed the
3 parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being 4 fully advised, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 5 II. BACKGROUND 6 On July 21, 2025, Mr. Shank filed the instant complaint in which he alleges claims 7 for violations of the RICO Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1964; conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 8 § 241; deprivation of rights under Color of Law under 18 U.S.C. § 242; aggravated
9 identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; and fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 10 and 1344. (Compl. at 3.3) Mr. Shank does not include any factual allegations in his 11 complaint. (See generally id.) Instead, he asks the court to review the exhibits to his 12 complaint for “evidence of a completed Private Administrative Procedure” and asserts 13 that Defendants “have acquiesced to the commission of all offenses listed above.” (Id. at
14 5.) Mr. Shank seeks the following relief: (1) “deletion of the fraudulent debt(s)”; (2) 15 “complete reversal of all payments back to payer”; and (3) treble damages. (Id.) Mr. 16 Shank did not file an affidavit of service on Defendants. (See generally Dkt.) 17 18
19 2 “Except for motions for summary judgment, if a party fails to file papers in opposition to a motion, such failure may be considered by the court as an admission that the motion has 20 merit.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(2). 3 Mr. Shank also purports to bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 63 for “mail fraud and other 21 offenses.” (Id.) That statute, however, does not exist. The court liberally construes the complaint as purporting to raise a claim under Title 18, chapter 63, which includes 18 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1341, 1343, and 1344. 1 On October 2, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss the case with prejudice 2 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, to dismiss for
3 lack of service. (MTD at 1.) Defendants assert that on November 18, 2024, Mr. Shank 4 obtained two loans from Guild, one in the amount of $699,103 and one in the amount of 5 $27,964. (Id.) For each loan, the parties executed a promissory note that was secured by 6 a deed of trust against real property in King County, Washington. (Id. at 1-2; see RJN 7 (Dkt. # 11) Exs. 1-2 (copies of deeds of trust).4) Defendants assert that, given the 8 absence of a statement of facts in Mr. Shank’s complaint, they are unable to determine
9 “what actions by either Defendant could give rise to liability under any theory.” (Id. at 10 2.) The court now addresses Defendants’ motion. 11 III. ANALYSIS 12 When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the 13 allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Livid
14 Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005), and asks 15 whether the claim contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 16 relief that is plausible on its face[,]’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 17 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility 18 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
20 4 The court grants Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of the deeds of trust. (See generally RJN.) See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (“[The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial 21 jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) 22 (holding that a court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record). 1 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The burden 2 is on the plaintiff to identify directly in the complaint facts that are sufficient to state a
3 claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (setting forth that in order to state a claim, a complaint 4 must plead the facts that underlie the claim); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th 5 Cir. 1996) (providing that a complaint should “fully set forth who is being sued, for what 6 relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”). When a party fails to 7 respond to a motion, the court may consider such failure “as an admission that the motion 8 has merit.” See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(2). The court is mindful that Mr.
9 Shank is proceeding pro se and, therefore, it must construe his pleadings liberally. See 10 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant 11 must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See, e.g., Briones v. 12 Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). 13 Here, Mr. Shank has not met his burden to state facts directly in the complaint
14 sufficient to allege that Defendants have violated his rights. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 15 Because of the absence of a statement of facts in the complaint, the court cannot draw 16 any reasonable inferences that the Defendants are liable for any alleged misconduct. Id. 17 First, to state a civil RICO claim, Mr. Shank must plausibly allege: “(1) conduct 18 (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate
19 acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff's ‘business or property.’” Grimmett v. Brown, 75 20 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 18 U.S.C.
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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE
9 10 JAKOB SHANK, CASE NO. C25-1366JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, 13 et al. , 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Defendants Guild Mortgage Company, LLC,1 (“Guild”) and 17 Terry Schmidt’s (collectively, “Defendants”) first motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff 18 Jakob Shank’s complaint. (MTD (Dkt. # 10); see also Compl. (Dkt. # 1).) Mr. Shank did 19 20 21
1 Guild Mortgage Company, LLC, is incorrectly named in the complaint as Guild 22 Mortgage Company. (See Compl. at 2.) 1 not respond to the motion.2 (See generally Dkt.; see also 10/29/25 Not. (Dkt. # 12) 2 (noting that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is unopposed).) The court has reviewed the
3 parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being 4 fully advised, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 5 II. BACKGROUND 6 On July 21, 2025, Mr. Shank filed the instant complaint in which he alleges claims 7 for violations of the RICO Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1964; conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 8 § 241; deprivation of rights under Color of Law under 18 U.S.C. § 242; aggravated
9 identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; and fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 10 and 1344. (Compl. at 3.3) Mr. Shank does not include any factual allegations in his 11 complaint. (See generally id.) Instead, he asks the court to review the exhibits to his 12 complaint for “evidence of a completed Private Administrative Procedure” and asserts 13 that Defendants “have acquiesced to the commission of all offenses listed above.” (Id. at
14 5.) Mr. Shank seeks the following relief: (1) “deletion of the fraudulent debt(s)”; (2) 15 “complete reversal of all payments back to payer”; and (3) treble damages. (Id.) Mr. 16 Shank did not file an affidavit of service on Defendants. (See generally Dkt.) 17 18
19 2 “Except for motions for summary judgment, if a party fails to file papers in opposition to a motion, such failure may be considered by the court as an admission that the motion has 20 merit.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(2). 3 Mr. Shank also purports to bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 63 for “mail fraud and other 21 offenses.” (Id.) That statute, however, does not exist. The court liberally construes the complaint as purporting to raise a claim under Title 18, chapter 63, which includes 18 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1341, 1343, and 1344. 1 On October 2, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss the case with prejudice 2 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, to dismiss for
3 lack of service. (MTD at 1.) Defendants assert that on November 18, 2024, Mr. Shank 4 obtained two loans from Guild, one in the amount of $699,103 and one in the amount of 5 $27,964. (Id.) For each loan, the parties executed a promissory note that was secured by 6 a deed of trust against real property in King County, Washington. (Id. at 1-2; see RJN 7 (Dkt. # 11) Exs. 1-2 (copies of deeds of trust).4) Defendants assert that, given the 8 absence of a statement of facts in Mr. Shank’s complaint, they are unable to determine
9 “what actions by either Defendant could give rise to liability under any theory.” (Id. at 10 2.) The court now addresses Defendants’ motion. 11 III. ANALYSIS 12 When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the 13 allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Livid
14 Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005), and asks 15 whether the claim contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 16 relief that is plausible on its face[,]’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 17 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility 18 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
20 4 The court grants Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of the deeds of trust. (See generally RJN.) See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (“[The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial 21 jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) 22 (holding that a court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record). 1 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The burden 2 is on the plaintiff to identify directly in the complaint facts that are sufficient to state a
3 claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (setting forth that in order to state a claim, a complaint 4 must plead the facts that underlie the claim); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th 5 Cir. 1996) (providing that a complaint should “fully set forth who is being sued, for what 6 relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”). When a party fails to 7 respond to a motion, the court may consider such failure “as an admission that the motion 8 has merit.” See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(2). The court is mindful that Mr.
9 Shank is proceeding pro se and, therefore, it must construe his pleadings liberally. See 10 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant 11 must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See, e.g., Briones v. 12 Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). 13 Here, Mr. Shank has not met his burden to state facts directly in the complaint
14 sufficient to allege that Defendants have violated his rights. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 15 Because of the absence of a statement of facts in the complaint, the court cannot draw 16 any reasonable inferences that the Defendants are liable for any alleged misconduct. Id. 17 First, to state a civil RICO claim, Mr. Shank must plausibly allege: “(1) conduct 18 (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate
19 acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff's ‘business or property.’” Grimmett v. Brown, 75 20 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c), 1962(c)). Here, Mr. Shank 21 fails to state a claim for a RICO violation because he does not plausibly allege any facts 22 sufficient to establish any element of a RICO violation. (See generally Compl.) 1 Second, the court dismisses Mr. Shank’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 2 because those statutes are federal criminal statutes that do not confer a private right of
3 action. Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the 4 dismissal of plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because they are criminal 5 statutes that do not give rise to civil liability). For the same reason, the court must also 6 dismiss Mr. Shank’s claims for mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, and fraud arising 7 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, and §1028A. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 8 275, 286-87 (2001) (affirming that “private rights of action to enforce federal laws must
9 be created by Congress” and that without statutory intent, “a cause of action does not 10 exist and courts may not create one”); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1028A; see 11 Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 533 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987)) (recognizing that 12 no private right of action exists under § 1341); Lassetter v. Brand, No. C11-0482JCC, 13 2011 WL 4712188, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2011) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1028
14 provides no private right of action). 15 For the reasons stated above, and because Mr. Shank failed to respond to 16 Defendants’ motion (see generally Dkt.), the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss 17 Mr. Shank’s claims with prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see Local Rules W.D. 18 Wash. LCR 7(b)(2). Because none of Mr. Shank’s claims survive Rule 12(b)(6) review,
19 the court declines to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of service. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss 22 (Dkt. # 10). Mr. Shank’s claims for conspiracy, deprivation of rights under color of law, 1 fraud, mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, and civil RICO are DISMISSED with 2 prejudice.
3 4 Dated this 13th day of November, 2025. A 5 JAMES L. ROBART 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
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