Jake Alan Ray Prince v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-0874
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JUNE 26, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0874-MR

JAKE ALAN RAY PRINCE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE BRIAN C. MCCLOUD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CR-00036

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Jake Alan Ray Prince (“Prince”), seeks review of

the Greenup Circuit Court’s Judgment issued June 12, 2025, after Prince entered a

conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine precursors.

The Circuit Court accepted the plea while allowing Prince to reserve for appellate

review its November 14, 2024, Order overruling his motion to suppress, in which

he contended that evidence leading to his arrest and eventual indictment resulted from an unconstitutional, motor-vehicle checkpoint. Upon review of the record

and relevant law, we find no error and affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On December 14, 2023, the Greenup County Sheriff’s Office

(“GCSO”) established several motor-vehicle, safety checkpoints, including one on

Kentucky State Route 1 (“SR-1”) in the Crane Creek area of Greenup County

beginning at approximately 7:30 p.m. About 15 minutes after setting up the

checkpoint and after multiple vehicles came through it, deputies with the GCSO

stopped Prince. Video Record (“V.R.”) 11/14/24, at 2:07:30-33. While checking

Prince’s license, registration, and seatbelt, GCSO Deputy Dustin Charles

(“Charles”) asked Prince if he had anything illegal in his vehicle. V.R. at 2:07:34-

48; see also Record (“R.”) at 29. Prince stated that he had a “marijuana roach in

the vehicle and said that was all he had.” Id. Charles asked Prince to pull to the

shoulder of SR-1 and then asked if he could search his vehicle, whereupon Prince

consented to the search. V.R. at 2:07:50, 2:10:50-55.

Charles and Deputy Zach Clark (“Clark”) conducted the search of

Prince’s vehicle and found the marijuana roach; they also discovered a bag

containing Claritin-D (pseudoephedrine), lithium batteries, plastic tubing, and

receipts for various other items indicative of the manufacturing of

methamphetamine. V.R. at 2:07:49-2:08:30, 2:44:40-2:45:05. The deputies

-2- arrested Prince for possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of

methamphetamine precursors, 1st offense. R. at 29-30. After Charles advised

Prince of his Miranda1 rights, Prince admitted to Charles that he manufactured

methamphetamine for his own use, but he claimed that he did not sell it. V.R. at

2:08:30-53.

As deputies were searching Prince’s vehicle, a confidential informant

(“CI”) came through the same checkpoint and told Clark that he had observed

Prince “cooking” methamphetamine at his home and soliciting other individuals to

purchase boxes of pseudoephedrine. V.R. at 2:10:05-17, 2:45:15-2:46:55; R. at

25-26. Based on the methamphetamine precursors found in Prince’s car and the

information from a credible CI, Clark obtained a search warrant for Prince’s

residence. R. at 27-28. GCSO deputies conducting the search inside and outside

of Prince’s residence found further evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing,

including coffee filters, liquid drain cleaner, camp fuel, crystal drain opener, a

measuring cup with white powder residue, green plastic tubing, and a burnt plastic

bottle with a battery and residue. V.R. at 2:09:07-42; R. at 33. After locating the

evidence at the residence and interviewing witnesses, the GCSO issued a post-

arrest citation charging Prince with manufacturing methamphetamine, 1st offense.

R. at 31-33.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

-3- On March 27, 2024, the Greenup County Grand Jury indicted Prince

for one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, 1st offense, and possession of

marijuana. R. at 4. Thereafter, Prince filed a motion to suppress the evidence

stemming from the checkpoint, search, and subsequent arrest. R. at 84. On

November 14, 2024, the Trial Court conducted a suppression hearing, during

which Charles and Clark testified regarding the checkpoint stop and Prince’s

search and arrest.

Pursuant to Prince’s motion, the Trial Court admitted into evidence

the GCSO Policy and Standard Operating Procedures Manual’s guidelines for

establishing and conducting “traffic safety checkpoints.” V.R. at 2:22; R. at 78-81.

The guidelines define these checkpoints as “[a] preplanned, systematic stopping of

vehicles to check motorists for impaired driving on alcohol and/or drugs, then

compliance with other motor vehicle laws.” R. at 78. The policy’s declared intent

is “to promote safety for motorists . . . and to provide a deterrent for those who

violate the laws . . .” by utilizing checkpoints to enforce motor vehicle licensing

and registration and prevent driving “under the influence of intoxicants.” R. at 79.

The guidelines also require GCSO supervisors to: (1) select the locations “based on

considerations of safety and visibility,” (2) “note the locations[,] approximate

times and officer-in charge,” and (3) issue “[m]edia announcements . . .

periodically to inform the public that traffic safety checkpoints would be

-4- established in the area.” Id. Deputies participating in traffic-safety checkpoints

“shall insure their arrival and departure times are logged” with the computer-aided

dispatch (“CAD”). R. at 80.

Charles testified that the Sheriff was on the scene and that “more than

likely” he or the chief deputy approved the checkpoint based on predetermined and

published locations. V.R. at 2:16:30-2:18:07. He also testified that the checkpoint

was “logged” with dispatch and documented in the CAD report, which was not

available during the suppression hearing. V.R. at 2:23:40-2:24:55. During his

testimony, Clark substantiated written evidence that the Sheriff had selected and

posted locations for the checkpoints on the GCSO website, including various

locations along SR-1. V.R. at 2:18-20; 2:42:32-42; R. 82, Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 1. Additionally, the Commonwealth supplied an undated media

advertisement that the GCSO published in the local newspaper advising of the

possibility of checkpoints. R. at 83.

Regarding the purpose of the checkpoint, Prince’s counsel cross-

examined both deputies, with Clark’s testimony proceeding as follows:

Counsel: Do you know why this particular location was picked?

Clark: We, on random times, the Sheriff will start discussing early in the week and look at staffing and see when we have the availability to come and do checkpoints. We had started the night on Route 7, I

-5- believe. And the decision was made by either the Sheriff or the chief deputy to go across 784 on to Route 1 and setup. No reason, just luck of the draw. We went to several different places. We try to cover as much of the county as we can just at random.

Counsel: Do you know how long you were at these other checkpoints that day?

Clark: I don’t recall. I want to say the initial one at [Route] 7 and 784, three prong, I think we were there for a half hour or so.

Counsel: And why was it determined to do these checkpoints that day?

Clark: Just staffing, staffing met, and it was one of the times that we try to provide our guys with overtime when we can close to the holidays. It’s a way to get it and for safety around the holidays. So, it’s not uncommon. We’ll do it three or four times a year. But there was no set reason other than that particular day just happened everything aligned.

Counsel: So, the reason to do the checkpoints in part was to try to get the deputies some overtime?

Clark: Well, it’s to enforce safety laws. But, yeah, when we have the money and the availability, we do them at random times. Yes.

Counsel: What sort of safety laws were you enforcing?

-6- Clark: Seatbelts, making sure the vehicles were registered, not having suspended driver’s licenses, DUI.

Counsel: Do you know how many of those traffic violations came across to you during these checkpoints that day?

Clark: No, sir. I don’t.

V.R. at 2:49:30-2:50:55.

In response to similar cross-examination questions, Charles also

testified that he, Clark, the Sheriff, and other deputies were present at the

checkpoint, including one deputy who was tasked with performing field-sobriety

tests. V.R. at 2:16:20-25. Shortly after Prince’s arrest, the GCSO closed the

checkpoint, since several deputies were then tasked with obtaining and executing

the search warrant.

Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the suppression

hearing, the Trial Court denied Prince’s motion. V.R. at 2:57:57-2:58:30; R. at 88.

Thereafter, Prince entered a guilty plea to the reduced charge of possession of

methamphetamine precursors (from manufacturing methamphetamine); his plea

was specifically conditioned on his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to

suppress. R. at 105. The Trial Court sentenced Prince to five years to serve

consecutively to a prior felony conviction. R. at 105-08.

-7- II. Standard of Review

Our review of a Trial Court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress is

twofold:

First, we review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Under this standard, the trial court’s findings of fact will be conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Second, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.

Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Ky. 2026) (quoting Rhoton v.

Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d 273, 275-76 (Ky. 2020)). Moreover, in Hernandez,

the Kentucky Supreme Court most recently elaborated on this standard, holding

that:

Substantial evidence is “evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Commonwealth v. Jennings, 490 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998)). In undertaking such a review, we are mindful “to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996). A trial court’s decision on a suppression motion is “based squarely [on] the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Hampton v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 740, 749 (Ky. 2007). Such testimony does not require corroboration. As a reviewing Court, we will not substitute our view of the evidence for that of the trial court. Payne v. Commonwealth, 681 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2023).

-8- Id.

III. Analysis

We now turn to Prince’s claim that the Trial Court erred by declining

to suppress the evidence obtained at the checkpoint and the additional evidence

subsequently seized as the result of the search warrant executed upon his residence.

First, Prince contends that the GCSO’s primary purpose for the checkpoint was for

general crime control, which state and federal caselaw has previously held

insufficient to justify a checkpoint. Second, he argues that, even if we find that the

GCSO had a sufficient purpose for erecting the checkpoint, that checkpoint failed

to meet the standards established by caselaw and violated the GCSO’s own written

policy, making it unreasonable, and, thus, unconstitutional.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section

10 of the Kentucky Constitution mandate that any warrantless search or seizure be

reasonable. Commonwealth v. Cox, 491 S.W.3d 167, 169 (Ky. 2015). “[A]

highway stop of motorists at a government-operated checkpoint effectuates a

seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Commonwealth v. Buchanon, 122

S.W.3d 565, 568 (Ky. 2003). While individualized suspicion is not required for

such a checkpoint stop to be reasonable, Courts must still balance “the gravity of

the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances

the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Id.

-9- (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d

357, 362 (1979)). In the context of a traffic checkpoint, the Courts recognize

“limited circumstances” where this balance reasonably supports a stop, including

to verify drivers’ licenses, check vehicle registrations, and ensure the safety of

motorists from impaired drivers. Singleton v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 97, 102

(Ky. 2012) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d

660 (1979) and Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct.

2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990)).

Further, Kentucky Courts hold “that inherent in all constitutional

checkpoints is constrained discretion of officers at the scene, and that the

checkpoint be well established pursuant to some sort of systemic plan.” Buchanon,

122 S.W.3d at 569. While the Kentucky Supreme Court has not mandated specific

criteria, it has “suggest[ed] several non-exclusive factors courts may consider in

determining the reasonableness of a particular roadblock.” Id. at 570. These

factors include that: (1) the location, time, and procedures governing the

checkpoint are determined by supervisory law enforcement; (2) the law

enforcement at the scene complies with the procedures established by their

supervisors to ensure each motorist is treated “in exactly the same manner”; (3) the

nature of the checkpoint is readily apparent; and (4) the length of the stops runs no

-10- longer than necessary to “look for signs of intoxication or check for license and

registration.” Id. at 571.

Addressing the purpose of the checkpoint, Prince argues that the

“G[CS]O provided no reason to believe that this checkpoint, at this location, and at

this time, was related to any specific law enforcement purpose” but rather that it

“had no real purpose—other than to give law enforcement overtime before the

holidays.” Appellant’s Brief at 5, 9. He argues that the actual purpose of the

GCSO checkpoint was general crime control, which has previously been held

constitutionally impermissible. Buchanon, 122 S.W.3d at 570 (citing City of

Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000)).

In Buchanon, where the officer’s testimony was “that the purpose of the roadblock

was ‘to detect any violation of the law,’” and there was other evidence indicating

“that the primary purpose of the roadblock was general crime control, or more

specifically, the interdiction of illegal narcotics[,]” our Supreme Court held that

“there is no need to perform the balancing test enumerated in Brown.” Id.

However, unlike in Buchanon, the evidence presented at Prince’s

suppression hearing was that the checkpoint was indeed part of a systematic policy

and plan to enforce traffic safety and prevent intoxicated driving. The availability

of staffing driven by voluntary overtime prior to the holidays did not negate the

GCSO’s affirmative and declared purpose. Further, consistent with this purpose,

-11- deputies on the scene testified that they were stopping vehicles to check tags,

drivers’ licenses, registrations and seatbelts, and to detect any motorists impaired

by alcohol and/or drugs and, if detected, conduct field sobriety tests. Therefore,

we discern no error in the Trial Court’s finding that the checkpoint was established

for the GCSO’s legitimate interest in ensuring traffic safety.

Regarding the administration of the checkpoint, Prince argues that

there was insufficient notation of its location and time and that the media

advertisement produced by the GCSO was insufficiently proximate to the date of

the checkpoint where he was stopped. Prince cites to this Court’s unpublished

opinion in Commonwealth v. Crosby, in which we noted that having a written,

local, law-enforcement policy on checkpoints and providing advance notice to the

media, while not mandatory, do offer “greater assurance” that a particular

checkpoint was conducted properly. No. 2017-CA-000572-MR, 2018 WL

3193074 at *4 (Ky. App. 2018). Even if we viewed our prior, unpublished

decision as persuasive authority and more than dicta, we find that the GCSO’s

implementation of this checkpoint would still meet the mark.

The GCSO had a detailed, written policy on its traffic safety

checkpoints with which it complied. Evidenced by the notice that was available to

the public on the GCSO’s website, the location and times of checkpoints were

predetermined by the Greenup County Sheriff and his supervisory staff. And,

-12- although not mandatory, the GCSO’s policy was to announce “periodically” to the

media that it would be conducting such checkpoints. An example of such an

announcement was tendered as evidence of substantial compliance with this

guideline. Perhaps more significantly, the administration of the checkpoint met

other indicia of reasonableness that our Courts require. GCSO deputies at the

scene testified that they complied with the standard operating procedures by having

supervisory officers present, reporting their location at the checkpoint via CAD,

making the checkpoint readily apparent, and conducting a consistent evaluation of

each vehicle and motorist passing through the checkpoint. Moreover, they

described the manner in which Prince’s stop was conducted according to these

established procedures and related that only after Prince stated that he had

marijuana did deputies ask to search his vehicle, to which Prince consented.

We also note that Prince’s theory of the reasons that he was stopped

has changed. In addition to the procedural concerns that he cites on appeal, his

questioning of Charles and Clark at the hearing implied that they had ulterior

motives for the traffic and safety checkpoint. Specifically, Prince suggested that

the GCSO targeted him by choosing the location intentionally to fall between the

retail location where Prince had made purchases of pseudoephedrine and his

residence. He also pointed with suspicion to the coincidence of the CI stopping at

the same checkpoint. However, Prince provided no evidence to the Trial Court

-13- either before or after the hearing that the testimony of Charles and Clark was

anything other than credible and reliable. Benton v. Commonwealth, 598 S.W.3d

102, 106 (Ky. App. 2020). And, as the Kentucky Supreme Court has held, “an

officer’s testimony provides sufficient evidence to meet the substantial evidence

standard.” Cobb v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Ky. 2017).

The Trial Court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was based

squarely upon the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and giving due

weight to the testimony of the deputies. It was, therefore, not clearly erroneous.

Moreover, balancing the objective factors established by caselaw, the checkpoint

was reasonable and, thus, constitutionally permissible.

IV. Conclusion

Finding no error, we affirm the Order denying the motion to suppress

and the final Judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Robert T. Renfroe Russell Coleman Greenup, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-14-