Jaime Mendoza-Hernandez v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 15-73611
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIME JAVIER MENDOZA- No. 15-73611 HERNANDEZ, Agency No. A094-108-591 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 12, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, NGUYEN, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Jamie Javier Mendoza-Hernandez, a native and citizen of El-Salvador,

petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming

the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for protection under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 Mendoza-Hernandez also petitions for

review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. As the parties are familiar

with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We deny the petition for review.

1. We review due process challenges to immigration proceedings de novo.

Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010). “The BIA’s decision will

be reversed on due process grounds if (1) the proceeding was so fundamentally

unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the

alien demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome of the proceeding may

have been affected by the alleged violation.” Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d

614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Mendoza-Hernandez claims the agency deprived him of due process by (1)

returning the record to the IJ without specifically ordering a new IJ to conduct a de

novo hearing on his application for CAT protection; and (2) applying post-Real ID

Act rules to his pre-Real ID Act CAT claim. His claims fail.

First, the record does not suggest that the IJ failed to consider all evidence or

prevented Mendoza-Hernandez from presenting his evidence, as due process

1 Petitioner does not challenge the denial of CAT protection on the merits. Instead, he challenges the BIA’s denial on due process grounds. Accordingly, the merits of Petitioner’s CAT claim are not before us. See Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1988).

2 requires. A fair reading of the IJ’s 2014 decision shows a complete examination of

the evidence gathered over the course of nearly a decade. The IJ’s 2014 discussion

of Mendoza-Hernandez’s diminished credibility did not exclude evidence; it

addressed the evidentiary weight to be given to his recent testimony, a decision

within the IJ’s discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2014). Further, nothing in the

record or Mendoza-Hernandez’s arguments provides any basis to conclude that the

IJ’s consideration of previous evidentiary findings deprived Mendoza-Hernandez

of a full and fair hearing. Id.

Additionally, Mendoza-Hernandez’s claim that the IJ violated due process

by applying post-REAL ID Act rules to his pre-REAL ID Act CAT claim fails.

The record does not reflect any misapplication of the law in the IJ’s decision.

While the IJ did not specifically state that he was applying pre-REAL ID Act law,

his decision does not reflect that he applied the statutory amendments made by the

REAL ID Act of 2005. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.

2010); see, e.g., Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, Mendoza-Hernandez has not established any due process violation in

this regard.

2. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of

discretion. Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023).

Under this standard, the BIA abuses its discretion when it acts “arbitrarily,

3 irrationally, or contrary to law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To

succeed on a motion to remand, a petitioner must “establish prima facie eligibility

for the relief sought.” Ochoa-Amaya v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.

2007); see Coria v. Garland, 114 F.4th 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining that

motions to remand and motions to reopen are “evaluated by the same standards”).

Mendoza-Hernandez’s motion for remand was primarily based on perceived

due process violations. The BIA denied Mendoza-Hernandez’s motion on the

ground that he had not shown a “due process violation or other basis for remand.”

As already discussed, Mendoza-Hernandez has not established a due process

violation. Further, the BIA meaningfully considered the evidence in the record

when assessing, and ultimately denying, Mendoza-Hernandez’s CAT claim on the

merits. See Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001). In light of

the CAT merits determination, which is not before us, and our finding that no due

process violation occurred, the BIA’s decision to deny remand was not arbitrary,

capricious, or contrary to the law. See id.; Alcarez-Rodriguez, 89 F.4th at 759.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.