Jaime Givens v. Revlon, Inc., et al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 12, 2025
Docket4:23-cv-00857
StatusUnknown

This text of Jaime Givens v. Revlon, Inc., et al. (Jaime Givens v. Revlon, Inc., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jaime Givens v. Revlon, Inc., et al., (E.D. Tex. 2025).

Opinion

United States District Court EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

JAIME GIVENS, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-857 § Judge Mazzant REVLON, INC., et al. § § Defendants. § § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the Court is Defendants Revlon, Inc. and Revlon Consumer Products LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(1) For Lack of Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (the “Motion”) (Dkt. #27). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED. BACKGROUND This case revolves around the alleged presence of ammonia in hair dye. Plaintiff argues that Defendants sold her an ammonia-laced hair dye product despite advertising otherwise, while Defendants argue that Plaintiff is simply mistaken. Their disagreement ultimately led them to this Court. Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on February 6, 2024 (Dkt. #11). The Parties filed a Joint Status Report on August 6, 2025 (Dkt. #26). On September 8, 2025, Defendants filed the present Motion (Dkt. #27). Plaintiff filed her Response on September 22, 2025 (Dkt. #28). Defendants filed their Reply four days later, on September 26, 2025 (Dkt. #29). The matter is now ripe for adjudication. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the district court does not have statutory and constitutional power to

adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). If a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the Court will consider the jurisdictional attack under Rule 12(b)(1) before addressing any attack on the legal merits. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented

by undisputed facts plus the [C]ourt’s resolution of disputed facts.” Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Court will accept as true all well-pleaded allegations set forth in the complaint and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994). Once a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and challenges jurisdiction, the party invoking jurisdiction has the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). The

Court will grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if it appears certain that the claimant cannot prove a plausible set of facts to support a claim that would entitle it to relief. Lane, 529 F.3d at 557. ANALYSIS Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a federal claim for three reasons: (a) that Plaintiff has not satisfied the amount in controversy to avail herself of diversity jurisdiction; (b) that Plaintiff has not satisfied the amount in controversy to maintain federal question jurisdiction under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.); and (c) that the Class Action Fairness Act no longer provides Plaintiff with a means to maintain subject

matter jurisdiction. In response, Plaintiff concedes that she has abandoned her class allegations but argues that her Amended Complaint nevertheless satisfies the requirements of both federal diversity and federal question jurisdiction (See Dkt. #28 at p. 4). Because Plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to satisfy federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the Court must deny Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion. A. Plaintiff has Pleaded Facts Sufficient to Satisfy the $75,000 Amount in Controversy Requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides that the United States district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different states . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To decline jurisdiction based on the amount in controversy requirement, “[i]t

must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1409 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)). It is undisputed that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. Additionally, having considered the pleadings and motions, the Court finds that there is at least a “plausible set of facts” that would allow Plaintiff to recover more than $75,000. See Lane, 529 F.3d at 557. As a result, Plaintiff has successfully availed herself of federal

diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(1). The pertinent 12(b)(1) Motion repeatedly emphasizes the fact that Plaintiff spent a mere $3.99 on the hair dye product that constitutes the crux of Plaintiff’s case. However, in focusing on the price of the product, the Motion misses the forest for the trees. In total, the Amended Complaint lists six causes of action that have survived Defendants’ prior motion to dismiss: (a) breach of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (b) violation of TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE

§§ 17.46(a) and 17.46(b); (c) fraud; (d) negligent misrepresentation; (e) negligence; and (f) unjust enrichment (Dkt. #11 at pp. 14– 22). Of these six, two expressly list “physical injury” as a source of damages, and another references the term “injury” as separate and distinct from the damage resulting from the act of paying “more for a product than [one] would have[,] had the presence of ammonia been accurately disclosed” (Dkt. #11 at p. 19). Furthermore, when the Amended Complaint addresses the topic of “Plaintiff’s injuries,” it mentions and provides multiple images

of an alleged “allergic reaction and . . . swollen lymph nodes in her arm and neck area and chemical burns on her scalp” (Dkt. #11 at p. 8). Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages a result of Defendants’ alleged fraud and gross negligence (Dkt. #11 at p. 23; Dkt. #28 at p. 3).

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Related

Truman v. United States
26 F.3d 592 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
De Aguilar v. Boeing Co.
47 F.3d 1404 (Fifth Circuit, 1995)
Garcia v. Koch Oil Co. of Texas Inc.
351 F.3d 636 (Fifth Circuit, 2003)
Lane v. Halliburton
529 F.3d 548 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.
303 U.S. 283 (Supreme Court, 1938)

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