Jaime FLORES-BALDERAZ v. Pamela BONDI, et al.

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Jaime FLORES-BALDERAZ, Case No.: 25-cv-1424-AGS-DEB

4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. (ECF 1) AND APPOINTING COUNSEL (ECF 3) 6 Pamela BONDI, et al., 7 Respondents. 8

9 Self-represented petitioner Jaime Flores-Balderaz seeks a writ of habeas corpus 10 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to free him from immigration detention and appointed counsel to 11 represent him in this matter. 12 A. Habeas Petition Screening 13 At this stage, Flores-Balderaz need only make out a habeas claim that is sufficiently 14 cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 15 United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly appears 16 from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id., 17 Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any “habeas 18 corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of 19 claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 20 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous 21 or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 22 In 1999, petitioner, a “citizen of Mexico,” “came into the United States” with “his 23 parents” when he was three years old. (See ECF 2, at 2.) Though the petition does not state 24 why or how he came to find himself in detention, he alleges that he “has remained in ICE 25 custody continuously since” September 5, 2025, “pursuant to 8 U.S.C. [§] 1231(a).” 26 (ECF 1, at 1–2.) He seeks release “on the grounds that continued detention violates the Due 27 Process Clause . . . and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).” (Id. at 1.) The Zadvydas 28 Court held that—after a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of “six months” 1 —§ 1231(a)(6) allowed the release of immigration detainees under certain circumstances. 2 533 U.S. at 701. Specifically, after this “6-month period,” if the detainee “provides good 3 reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 4 foreseeable future,” and the government does not “rebut that showing,” then further 5 detention is “no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699–701. 6 As Flores-Balderaz has been detained for over six months, he potentially qualifies 7 for Zadvydas relief. Thus, this challenge warrants an answer or return. 8 B. Appointed Counsel 9 Petitioner also requests appointed counsel in support of his habeas corpus petition. 10 (See ECF 3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus). Courts may appoint an attorney 11 for an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when “the interests of justice so require.” Bashor 12 v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) (cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. 13 § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this assessment, courts evaluate an indigent petitioner’s 14 (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and (b) “ability . . . to articulate his claims pro 15 se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 16 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 17 1. Financial Eligibility 18 As a threshold matter, Flores-Balderaz asserts that: he “do[es] not have the ability to 19 pay thousands of dollars to private attorneys,” has no checking or savings account, has two 20 children, and only receives “$100.00 for commissary items” in detention. (ECF 3, at 3–6.) 21 He also asserts he had “$15[,000] for [the] last 6 months before [his] arrest.” (Id. at 4.) 22 Petitioner sufficiently alleges that he cannot afford counsel. 23 2. Likelihood of Success 24 Although Flores-Balderaz potentially qualifies for Zadvydas relief, he has not yet 25 offered sufficient facts to establish that he is likely to succeed on that claim. Beyond the 26 mere length of his detention—which is barely longer than the presumptively reasonable 27 six-month period—it is not clear what “good reason” he offers “to believe that there is no 28 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See Zadvydas, 1 533 U.S. at 701. Still, courts regularly grant release to detainees in Flores-Balderaz’s 2 circumstances once their custodial period exceeds six months, so the Court ultimately 3 views this factor as neutral. See, e.g., Guarin v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-03085-DMS-VET, 2025 4 WL 3440689 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2025) (ordering “release” after just over six months’ 5 detention). 6 3. Complexity 7 The final attorney-appointment consideration—the complexity of the legal issues— 8 favors appointing counsel. The parties here must interpret intricate statutes, grapple with 9 indefinite-detention-related common law, and navigate agency regulations. See, e.g., 10 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). This undertaking 11 is entirely within the immigration legal context, which has been deemed “second only to 12 the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.” United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 295 F.3d 13 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted); see also Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 14 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Divining [the immigration laws’] meaning is ordinarily not for the faint 15 of heart.”). Flores-Balderaz asserts that he does not “have any type of legal knowledge,” 16 that “the law library . . . does not help,” and that “the computer[s] have limited access.” 17 (ECF 6, at 3.) He has adequately shown that he cannot articulate his claims without a 18 lawyer. 19 Though it is a close case, the Court will appoint counsel for Flores-Balderaz. 20 CONCLUSION 21 Petitioner’s attorney-appointment request is GRANTED. The Court provisionally 22 appoints Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to initially determine if petitioner qualifies 23 for representation by that organization. The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this order 24 to Federal Defenders. 25 By March 17, 2026, Federal Defenders must submit a notice to the Court concerning 26 whether it can and will accept the appointment. By that same date, Federal Defenders must 27 also state whether, under Chief Judge Order 134, it “requests to file supplemental briefing.” 28 1 a result, the current briefing schedule—including for the pending motion for a 2 temporary restraining order—will be set once the Court hears from counsel. 3 || Dated: March 10, 2025

5 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28