Jai'Ceon Xavier King v. NaphCare Inc., et al.

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided May 4, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-03694·Unknown

Opinion

1 MH 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Jai'Ceon Xavier King, No. CV-25-03694-PHX-JAT (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 NaphCare Inc., et al., 13 Defendants.

15 Plaintiff Jai'Ceon Xavier King, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 16 Complex-Tucson, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7). The Court will 18 dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 20 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $27.16. The remainder 23 of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income 24 credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate 26 government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 7 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 2 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 3 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 4 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim, but because it may 5 possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 6 III. Complaint 7 In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims based on a failure to provide 8 adequate medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff names 9 NaphCare Inc., Registered Nurses Barbara Barnett and Channachloe Atis, and Physician’s 10 Assistant Manacey Clermont as Defendants. He is seeking damages and injunctive relief. 11 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2024, he submitted a health 12 needs request (HNR) complaining of gastrointestinal issues, lower abdomen pain, 13 abdominal sounds, and vomiting. Plaintiff saw Defendant Barnett and told her, in 14 “complete detail[,] of the pain [he] was experiencing.” (Doc. 1 at 3.)1 Plaintiff said he 15 would like to see a gastrointestinal specialist, and Barnett responded that such requests 16 require authorization from the corporate office and “rarely get approved.” (Id.) Barnett 17 failed to make any follow-up appointments for Plaintiff and failed to follow the standards 18 of care for treatment. Plaintiff was later diagnosed with stage-four colon cancer, which 19 spread to his liver after his appointment with Barnett. Plaintiff claims that Defendant 20 Barnett should have sent him to the hospital or referred him to a medical provider and that 21 her failure to do so caused his cancer to spread to his liver. 22 In Count Two, Plaintiff claims that he submitted multiple HNRs concerning severe 23 abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhea, and dehydration, and NaphCare staff failed to provide 24 effective medication, treatment, or medical advice, thereby allowing his cancer to spread. 25 According to Plaintiff, NaphCare nurses refused to submit a request for additional testing 26 after a medical report from Yuma Regional Hospital stated that a benign cyst had been 27

28 1 The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 1 discovered on Plaintiff’s liver. Plaintiff’s request for a liver biopsy was also denied, even 2 though he was still experiencing “multiple severe issues.” (Id. at 4.) The cyst found on 3 Plaintiff’s liver was later determined to be cancerous. Plaintiff alleges that his colon cancer 4 spread to his liver as a result of Defendant NaphCare’s inaction. 5 In Count Three, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Clermont saw him in response to an 6 HNR he submitted in 2024 that referenced “serious abdomen pain [and] discomfort.” (Id. 7 at 5.) Clermont and another nurse visually assessed Plaintiff, asked about his symptoms, 8 and concluded he was suffering from a “buildup of gas.” (Id.) Plaintiff told Clermont that 9 his pain was not consistent with gas and that, based on his lack of appetite and consistent 10 vomiting and diarrhea, he believed he was suffering from “something more serious.” (Id.) 11 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Clermont offered no medication, testing, or other follow- 12 up procedures and failed to follow the relevant standards of care when evaluating and 13 diagnosing Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff’s cancer went undetected, allowing it to spread. 14 IV.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Jai'Ceon Xavier King v. NaphCare Inc., et al., (D. Ariz. 2026).

Jai'Ceon Xavier King v. NaphCare Inc., et al. (Jai'Ceon Xavier King v. NaphCare Inc., et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Buckner v. Toro
116 F.3d 450 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
Gardner v. Collins
27 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1829)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
United States v. Pomponio
429 U.S. 10 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Powell v. Alexander
391 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2004)
Elviraida Laracuente v. The Chase Manhattan Bank
891 F.2d 17 (First Circuit, 1989)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Parks
698 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)