Jai Jalaram Lodging Group, LLC v. Leribeus

225 S.W.3d 238, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1108, 2006 WL 304496
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 9, 2006
Docket08-04-00192-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 225 S.W.3d 238 (Jai Jalaram Lodging Group, LLC v. Leribeus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jai Jalaram Lodging Group, LLC v. Leribeus, 225 S.W.3d 238, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1108, 2006 WL 304496 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION

DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Justice.

The Jai Jalaram Lodging Group, L.L.C. d/b/a Comfort Inn-Alvin appeals from a judgment in a negligence suit, where a jury found Appellant partially responsible for the injuries Appellee Rhonda LeRibeus sustained in an armed robbery, kidnaping, and aggravated assault that began in the parking lot of its Comfort Inn motel. On appeal, Appellant argues that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that this crime was foreseeable as required to establish a legal duty for it to protect Mrs. LeRibeus from the criminal acts of third parties. Further, Appellant contends the evidence was legally or factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that it proximately caused Mrs. LeRibeus’ injuries. We find that we must reverse and render a take-nothing judgment.

*241 In 1998, Daxaben Bhakta, her husband Mukeshbhai Bhakta, and two others, formed Jai Jalaram Lodging Group, L.L.C. for the purposes of owning and operating a Comfort Inn motel in Alvin, Texas, a forty-unit motel franchised through Choice Hotels International, Inc. The Comfort Inn-Alvin opened in March 2000 and was a completely new facility.

In February 2001, Mrs. LeRibeus was staying at Appellant’s motel with relatives and in town to visit her ailing father. After spending the day at a hospital with her father, she returned in the evening and parked her car in the motel parking lot in a space between two cars, across from the side entrance of the motel in a well-lit area. As she got out of her car, a man coming from the back of the parking lot near the garbage dumpster, was walking toward her car. As he walked past her car, Mrs. LeRibeus was hit with a baseball bat by an accomplice. Mrs. LeRibeus was hit several times before she was threatened with a gun and forced into her car. One of the men took the car keys from her and they drove out of the parking lot. The assailants demanded her jewelry, drove directly to a bank ATM machine, demanded the pin numbers for her credit and bank cards and then withdrew substantial sums of money from her accounts. Mrs. LeRi-beus was left in her vehicle after her assailants were picked up by other persons in another car. She was found by a passing motorist who took her to the hospital for emergency treatment. At the time of the attack, Mrs. LeRibeus’ assailants, Beerien Crouch and DeCarlos Garrett, were already wanted for a series of similar armed robberies they had committed in Houston. Crouch confessed to the crime and implicated Garrett. Crouch pled guilty and was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of forty-five years’ imprisonment while Garrett received stacked sentences of forty-five years and ninety-nine years’ imprisonment.

Mrs. LeRibeus and her husband sued Appellant and Choice Hotels International, Inc., alleging that the defendants were negligent in faffing to provide proper and adequate security and safety measures, which proximately caused Mrs. LeRibeus’ injuries. 1 Beerien Crouch and DeCarlos Garrett were later added as defendants to the suit, but are not parties on appeal. The jury found that Appellants’ negligence proximately caused Mrs. LeRibeus’ injuries, finding it 24 percent responsible for the occurrence. The judgment rendered on the jury’s verdict awarded Mrs. LeRi-beus $288,181.49 and Mr. LeRibeus $28,813.14 against Appellant.

We first address Appellant’s contention that there was no evidence to establish that the particular crime against Mrs. LeRibeus was foreseeable, thus no duty on the part of Appellant to protect her from the criminal acts of a third party. The essential elements of a negligence claim are: the existence of a legal duty; a breach of that duty; and damages proximately caused by that breach. D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex.2002); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex.1995). In general, a person has no legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person. See Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.1998); Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996). However, one who controls the security and safety of a premises does have a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from criminal acts *242 of third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Id.

Foreseeability requires only that the general danger be foreseeable, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm. Id. When the general danger is the risk of injury from criminal activity, the evidence must reveal specific previous crimes on or near the premises in order to establish foreseeability. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756. A duty exists only when the risk of criminal conduct is so great that it is both unreasonable and foreseeable. Id. Whether such risk was foreseeable must not be determined in hindsight but rather in light of what the premises owner knew or should have known before the criminal act occurred. Id. at 757. Factors to be considered in determining foreseeability of the occurrence of certain criminal conduct are: (1) whether any criminal conduct previously occurred on or near the property; (2) how recently the criminal conduct occurred; (3) how often criminal conduct occurred; (4) how similar the conduct was to the conduct on the property; and (5) what publicity was given to the occurrences to indicate that the landowner knew or should have known about them. Id.

Proximity

For a landowner to foresee criminal conduct on property, there must be evidence that other crimes have occurred on the property or in its immediate vicinity. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 757. Criminal activity occurring farther from the owner’s property bears less relevance because crime rates may be expected to vary significantly within a large geographic area. Id. Evidence of remote criminal activity, however, may indicate that crime is approaching an owner’s property, but such evidence must be especially strong and must show that the risk of criminal conduct on the owner’s property is not merely increasing but has reached a level as to make crime likely. Id. Thus, for a risk to be foreseeable, there must also be evidence of criminal activity within the specific area at issue, either on the landowner’s property or closely nearby. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 757.

Recency/Frequeney

Foreseeability also depends on how recently and how often criminal conduct has occurred in the past. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 757-58. The occurrence of a significant number of crimes within a short time period strengthens the claim that the particular crime at issue was foreseeable. Id.

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225 S.W.3d 238, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1108, 2006 WL 304496, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jai-jalaram-lodging-group-llc-v-leribeus-texapp-2006.