Jahn v. Regan

610 F. Supp. 1269, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5819, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19653
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMay 21, 1985
DocketCiv. 82-72012
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 610 F. Supp. 1269 (Jahn v. Regan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jahn v. Regan, 610 F. Supp. 1269, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5819, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19653 (E.D. Mich. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP PRATT, District Judge.

This action against the Secretary of the Department of Treasury of the United States (“Secretary”) and a similar case filed against the Director of the Department of Social Services of the State of Michigan 1 were initially brought by Patrick and Melba Jahn, husband and wife, who challenged the validity of the Internal *1270 Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) transmittal of plaintiffs’ 1981 joint tax refund to the State pursuant to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 664, 2 and 26 *1271 U.S.C. § 6402. 3 The refund was applied to the husband’s debt to the State for child support. 4 Plaintiffs alleged various violations of state law and the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the federal Constitution. Now before the Court is the Secretary’s second motion to dismiss. 5

I. BACKGROUND

On April 18, 1984, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the Secretary and the State. That opinion is reported at 584 F.Supp. 399 and sets forth the extensive facts of these cases which will not be repeated here. In the Memorandum Opinion the Court considered several grounds for dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint asserted by the Secretary and the State. Two of these grounds are relevant to the present motion: (i) the Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred plaintiffs’ claim for damages, but not for injunctive and declaratory relief; 6 and (ii) the Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment concerning Patrick Jahn’s due process claim, but declined to rule that Melba Jahn’s rights were not violated. This ruling significantly narrowed the issues raised by plaintiff’s complaint. The claims that remain against the government defendants are Melba Jahn’s claim for a tax refund *1272 and her request for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of the procedures for implementing 42 U.S.C. § 664 and 26 U.S.C. § 6402.

In the present motion the Secretary asserts two further contentions for the dismissal of Melba Jahn’s claim. First, the Secretary argues that plaintiff cannot seek a tax refund since she has failed to file a claim with the Secretary as required by 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Second, the Secretary asserts that Melba Jahn’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are now moot since newly implemented procedures comport with due process. For the following reasons the Secretary’s motion is granted.

II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR REFUND

In their complaint plaintiffs requested damages and an amount representing their 1981 tax refund- which was turned over to the State. 7 In the previous Memorandum Opinion the Court considered the Secretary’s contention that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred plaintiffs’ suit. The Court held that since the plaintiffs were alleging that the Secretary’s actions and the statutes at issue were unconstitutional, plaintiffs’ claims were under one of the exceptions to the sovereign immunity rule — the exceptions being that government officials can be sued in their official capacity absent an expressed waiver of Congress where the official acted outside his authority or where the statute or order conferring power upon the official is claimed to be unconstitutional. E.g., Larson v. Domestic Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1461-62, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). Although the plaintiffs’ action was not generally barred, the Court further recognized that the principles underlying sovereign immunity could limit the relief which may be afforded if the relief would require an improper imposition upon the government. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., supra, 337 U.S. at 691 n. 11, 69 S.Ct. at 1462 n. 11. The Court concluded that the circumstances of this case did not warrant the relief of damages. 584 F.Supp. at 406. See e.g., DeLao v. Califano, 560 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.1977); Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.1974); State of Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1969).

In discussing the plaintiffs’ claim for damages in the April 18th Memorandum Opinion, the Court expressed its reservations concerning plaintiffs’ claim for a refund. 584 F.Supp. at 406 n. 14. The plaintiffs argued that they could properly seek damages and a refund in this Court because Congress had waived sovereign immunity by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). Section 1346(a)(1) states:

(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Claims Court, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws ...

The difficulty with this position is that the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 7422 must *1273 be satisfied before an action can be pursued under § 1346(a)(1). E.g. Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.1983); Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct.Cl.1981); Bird v. United States, 534 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir.1976); Theophelis v. United States, 571 F.Supp. 516 (E.D.Mich.1983). 8 Section 7422(a) provides:

No Suit Prior to Filing Claim for Refund

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
610 F. Supp. 1269, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5819, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19653, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jahn-v-regan-mied-1985.