Jagroop S. v. Minga Wofford, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAGROOP S.,

12 Petitioner, No. 1:26-cv-00381-TLN-CKD

13 14 v. ORDER MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16

17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jagroop S.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ 19 of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 20 Petitioner’s Petition. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The Court need not set forth the background facts of this case as they are set forth fully in 3 the Court’s prior Order. (ECF No. 4.) On January 20, 2026, the Court granted Petitioner’s 4 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and ordered Respondents to show cause why 5 the Petition should not be granted. (ECF No. 4.) On January 27, 2026, Respondents filed a 6 response to the order to show cause, stating the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 7 opposes the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction in this case and likewise opposes the 8 grant of habeas relief. (ECF No. 7.) Petitioner did not file a reply. The Court therefore considers 9 the Petition on its merits. 10 II. STANDARD OF LAW 11 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 12 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 13 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 14 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 15 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 16 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 17 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 18 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 19 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 20 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 21 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 22 III. ANALYSIS 23 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully 24 subjected to mandatory detention in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 25 and due process. (See ECF No. 1.) In response, Respondents filed a two-sentence opposition 26 opposing injunctive relief and the grant of habeas relief. (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Respondents state 27 DHS “submits that the detention authority in this case is lawful under the Constitution and 28 applicable provisions of the [INA].” (Id.) The Court discusses each of Petitioner’s claims in turn. 1 A. Violation of the INA 2 Under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) “provides the general process for 3 arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for 4 removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the 5 Government has broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual. Id. Further, 6 § 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination. Id. It also 7 confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented 8 by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when 9 circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) 10 (“§ 1225(b)(2)”) mandates detention during removal proceedings for applicants “seeking 11 admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing. 12 This Court has agreed with Petitioner that the text and legislative history of the INA 13 demonstrates that § 1226(a) governs his detention, not § 1225, and he is entitled to the process 14 § 1226(a) requires, including a bond hearing. (ECF No. 2 at 3; ECF No. 4 at 3.) This Court and 15 many others have repeatedly found that § 1225(b) applies only to noncitizens “seeking 16 admission” –– a category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioner who were detained 17 within the United States. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 18 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this Court’s reasons for taking this 19 position). To reiterate, absent a higher court order holding otherwise, this Court finds Petitioner 20 is not an applicant “seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). 21 Petitioner is instead subject to § 1226(a) and is therefore entitled to the process that statute 22 requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. Yet, Respondents have not provided any 23 hearing to Petitioner either pre- or post-detention. Respondents further offer no substantive 24 opposition to these arguments. (See ECF No. 7.) The Court accordingly finds Respondents 25 violated Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA. 26 B. Violation of Procedural Due Process 27 The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or 28 property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 1 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 2 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 3 These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. at 693–94. 4 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 5 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 6 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 7 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 8 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 9 the question remains what process is due.”). 10 i. Liberty Interest 11 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has established a protectable liberty 12 interest. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. 13 Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by 14 statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he 15 government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon 16 which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to 17 the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 18 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original)). “Accordingly, a 19 noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in 20 remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 21 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional 22 release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific 23 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 24 Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. 25 Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 26 Here, the Court has agreed with Petitioner that he gained a liberty interest after he was 27 released from custody on his own recognizance to pursue his asylum claim. (ECF No. 2 at 5; 28 ECF No. 4 at 5.) Under Morrisey, this release implied a promise that he would not be re- 1 detained, during the pendency of his immigration proceedings, if he abided by the terms of his 2 release. As this Court has found previously, along with many other courts in this district when 3 confronted with similar circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in his continued freedom as 4 he awaits the outcome of his asylum proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 5 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in 6 the community for over five years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). 7 ii. Procedures Required 8 As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three 9 factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 10 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 11 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including 12 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 13 procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set 14 forth below, the Court finds Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights were violated. 15 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. 16 “Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 17 restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 18 at 690. Petitioner asserts he has built a life in the United States and was pursuing his asylum 19 claim, and then he was re-detained and held in custody despite abiding by the rules. (ECF No. 2 20 at 5.) Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been 21 impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 22 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly). 23 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received 24 any hearing, either pre- or post-detention. Petitioner maintains that he has not been given any 25 bond hearing. (ECF No. 2 at 5); see also Manzanarez, 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (quoting A.E. v. 26 Andrews, No. 25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (“The 27 risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received any 28 bond or custody redetermination hearing.”)). Thus, the Court finds Petitioner was likely 1 erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Without any procedural safeguards to determine 2 whether his detention was justifiable, the probative value of additional procedural safeguards is 3 high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. 4 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide 5 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- 6 TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Where removal is not imminent 7 under a final order of removal, “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining 8 individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose 9 appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or 10 alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994; see also R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 11 (“Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect is justified when a 12 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” (cleaned up)). 13 Petitioner asserts the Government’s interest in detaining him is low and the cost of 14 providing additional safeguards is not burdensome. (ECF No. 2 at 5.) The Court agrees. The 15 cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal here. Petitioner notes that Respondents’ own 16 regulations require notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, which they did not provide. (Id.) Notice 17 and custody determination hearings are routine processes for Respondents. Indeed, these are the 18 very processes owed to Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which Petitioner contends applies to 19 him. (ECF No. 2 at 4.) Any delay in detention (if justified) for the time to provide notice and a 20 hearing would be minimal. Moreover, it would be less of a fiscal and administrative burden for 21 the Government to return Petitioner home to await a determination on his asylum application than 22 to continue to detain him. (Id.); see also Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, 23 at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public 24 of immigration detention are staggering.”). 25 The Court finds that, under these circumstances, Respondents are required to provide 26 notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. The United States Supreme Court “usually has held that the 27 Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or 28 property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). The Court 1 | describes post-deprivation remedies as the “special case” where those are “the only remedies the 2 | State could be expected to provide.” /d. at 129. Here — where Petitioner has substantially 3 | complied with the conditions of his release and there is no final order of removal — the Court 4 | finds pre-deprivation notice and a hearing are possible and valuable to preventing erroneous 5 | deprivation of liberty. Further, Respondents have not provided any substantive opposition to the 6 | contrary. (See ECF No. 7.). 7 On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioner was entitled to 8 | pre-deprivation notice and hearing to determine whether detention was warranted. Respondents 9 | did not provide either. Moreover, Respondents did not provide a post-deprivation opportunity to 10 | beheard. The Court accordingly finds Respondents violated Petitioner’s procedural due process 11 | rights. 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 14 | (ECF No. 1.) Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 15 | Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice and a 16 | pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents show material 17 | changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the 18 | reasonably foreseeable future; or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 19 | before a neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight 20 | risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 21 The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this case. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 | Date: February 2, 2026 Lu Pl 25 TROY L. NUNLEY %6 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28