Jacqueline Lee Valentine v. San Mateo County; Chad Peace; and Daniel Radovich

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05607
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JACQUELINE LEE VALENTINE, Case No. 25-cv-05607-LJC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING SECOND 9 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT

10 SAN MATEO COUNTY; CHAD PEACE; Re: Dkt. No. 13 and DANIEL RADOVICH 11 Defendant.

13 The undersigned previously granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 14 and reviewed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), issuing an Order to 15 Show Cause as to why the action should not be dismissed and providing Plaintiff until November 16 26, 2025 to file a Second Amended Complaint curing the identified deficiencies. Following the 17 Case Management Conference on December 4, 2025, the undersigned extended Plaintiff’s 18 deadline to file a Second Amended Complaint to December 11, 2025. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff has 19 now filed her Second Amended Complaint (SAC), which the Court must screen pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915(e). ECF No. 13 (SAC). 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 In its prior Order to Show Cause, the Court identified three main deficiencies with 23 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 11. First, Plaintiff did not identify who she was 24 suing. Second, although Plaintiff identified the laws that she claimed Defendants violated, the 25 Amended Complaint in large part lacked factual allegations describing Defendants’ conduct. 26 Third, Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1702 27 (prohibiting interfering or taking another person’s mail), but that statute does not create a private 1 cause of action. See ECF No. 11 at 2-4. Plaintiff’s SAC resolves the first and third of these 2 deficiencies.1 Plaintiff has clearly identified that she is suing the County of San Mateo, ADA 3 Coordinator Chad Peace in his individual and official capacities, and court administrator Daniel 4 Radovich in his individual and official capacities. ECF No. 13 at 2. She is no longer asserting a 5 claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1702. Id. at 4. However, as was the case in her Amended Complaint, 6 Plaintiff includes scant factual allegations describing Defendants’ conduct. 7 Plaintiff brings 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendants for the due process and equal 8 protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and claims that Defendants violated the 9 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 4. She further 10 claims that Defendants violated California Government Code § 11135, which prohibits 11 discrimination based on disability as well as numerous other protected characteristics; California 12 Civil Code § 43, which establishes that “every person has … the right of protection from bodily 13 restraint or harm, from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal 14 relations”; California Civil Code § 44, which provides that defamation may be “effected by either” 15 libel or slander; California Civil Code § 46, which establishes the elements of slander; and 16 California Civil Code § 1708, which establishes that “[e]very person is bound, without contract, to 17 abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her 18 rights.” 19 Plaintiff’s claims stem from her alleged mistreatment as a pro se litigant in San Mateo 20 Superior Court. ECF No. 13 at 3. She alleges that she was involved in “dissolution and custody 21 proceedings” between 2015 and the present, and, due “to financial constraints,” proceeded without 22 counsel. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the court “changed its rules to prohibit online ex parte filings, 23 effectively preventing Plaintiff from filing without counsel” and that court staff “altered Plaintiff’s 24 filings and improperly added an ADR designation that Plaintiff never requested” and repeatedly 25 rejected Plaintiff’s filings. Id. She asserts that, despite reporting “multiple instances of domestic 26 abuse and child endangerment by her ex-husband,” the court “failed to provide” Plaintiff 27 1 “meaningful protection or remedies,” awarded her insufficient spousal support, and has failed to 2 provide Plaintiff with her final divorce decree. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff claims that she is disabled and 3 is unable to drive due to her medical conditions, but “reasonable accommodations were denied.” 4 Id. at 2. 5 II. EVALUATION OF CLAIMS 6 A district court must dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it 7 determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief 8 may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 9 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). An action is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable 10 basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). For an action to 11 state a viable claim, the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 12 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 13 (quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 14 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 15 alleged.” Id. The factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief 16 above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other 17 words, a complaint needs to include enough facts, which, assuming they are true, would support 18 the plaintiff’s legal claims. 19 Applying the above standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on 20 which relief may be granted, as follows. 21 A. § 1983 Claims 22 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes lawsuits against any individual who, under the color of state 23 law, “subjects … any citizen of the United States or other person within its jurisdiction thereof to 24 the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 25 “To state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by 26 the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a 27 person acting under color of state law.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 1 equal protection” rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. SAC at 4. First, it is not clear 2 what liberty or property interest Defendants denied from Plaintiff without adequate procedural 3 protections, or which of Plaintiff’s fundamental rights Defendants infringed upon. See Portman v. 4 County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A section 1983 claim based upon 5 procedural due process ... has three elements: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 6 Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.”); Albright v. 7 Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (“The protections of substantive due process have for the most 8 part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily 9 integrity.”). 10 Second, as the Court explained in its prior Order to Show Cause, without sufficient factual 11 “allegations regarding Defendants’ specific conduct, the Court cannot assess if Plaintiff has 12 plausibly pled her due process and equal protection claims.” ECF No. 11 at 3. Plaintiff alleges 13 that court staff altered Plaintiff’s filings, that the court “changed its rules to prohibit online ex 14 parte filings” but permitted Plaintiff’s ex-husband attorney to file electronically, and that 15 Defendant Chad Peace rejected Plaintiff’s filings. SAC at 3-4. She alleges that she “has been 16 medically unable to drive due to” disabilities, “yet reasonable accommodations were denied.” Id. 17 at 3. In the context of Plaintiff’s ADA claim, she references Defendants’ “[d]enial of reasonable 18 accommodations for electronic filing, remote appearances, and meaningful access to court 19 services.” Id. at 4. The Court can make a reasonable guess at the overall shape of Plaintiff’s 20 claims: she is disabled; she needed certain accommodations so that she could participate in court 21 proceedings remotely; and these accommodations were denied. But while Plaintiff’s statements 22 regarding her disability and Defendants’ denials may provide the overall “framework” of her 23 claims, they are insufficient to provide Defendants with “fair notice” of the claims against them 24 and the factual “grounds upon which” the claims rest. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. 25 at 545. For instance, Plaintiff includes no specific allegations regarding when Defendants denied 26 her accommodations; does not allege when, or if, she requested the accommodations or informed 27 Defendants that they were necessary due to her disability; and does not provide any factual details 1 harmed her in enough detail so that Defendants can understand what they are being accused of. 2 Plaintiff also claims that the County of San Mateo implemented “policies, practices, [and] 3 customs” that caused this deprivation of her rights. SAC at 4. This claim is similarly lacking in 4 factual allegations. “To bring a § 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff must 5 plead that a municipality’s policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional 6 rights.” Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986, 992-93 (9th 7 Cir. 2011); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff’s Second Amended 8 Complaint includes no factual allegations to support her conclusion that the County of San Mateo 9 implemented “policies, practices, [and] customs” leading to the constitutional violations. SAC at 10 4. 11 B. ADA and § 504 Claims 12 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated her rights under the ADA and § 504 of the 13 Rehabilitation Act. Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability 14 shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 15 the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 16 such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a disability discrimination claim under Title II of the 17 ADA, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either 18 excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or 19 activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, 20 denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 21 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). The public entity’s or program’s failure to provide a reasonable 22 accommodation for a disability may constitute discrimination. See id. The elements of a § 504 23 claim are largely the same as those for a Title II ADA claim, although the plaintiff must plead that 24 “the program providing the benefit” at issue “receives federal financial assistance.” Csutoras v. 25 Paradise High Sch., 12 F.4th 960, 968 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). Because 26 “there is no significant difference in the analysis of rights and obligations created by” Title II of 27 the ADA and § 504, claims under the two acts are frequently analyzed together. Vinson v. 1 As discussed above, the SAC does not plead facts to plausibly support Plaintiff’s ADA or 2 § 504 claims. These claims are based on Defendants’ alleged denial of “reasonable 3 accommodations for electronic filing, remote appearances, and meaningful access to court 4 services.” SAC at 4. But Plaintiff does not clearly allege that she requested these particular 5 accommodations, only that Defendants did not provide them and that the San Mateo Superior 6 Court “changed its rules to prohibit online ex parte filing.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff has not “identif[ied] 7 with specificity” what accommodations she requested, when she made such requests, if “she 8 provided [D]efendants with sufficient notice concerning her disability such that [D]efendants were 9 able to investigate whether the requested accommodations were reasonable,” details regarding 10 Defendants’ alleged denials, or “any other facts suggesting that [D]efendants acted with deliberate 11 indifference” to her requests. Seales-Perkins v. Sac. Cty. Sup. Ct., No. 25-cv-3058, 2025 WL 12 3704458, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2025); Razavi, 2019 WL 1676018, at *5; see Green v. Tri- 13 Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219 (D. Or. 2012), aff’d, 583 F. 14 App’x 832 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The Ninth Circuit has made clear that under the ADA a plaintiff is 15 required to identify specific, reasonable accommodations that a defendant failed to provide.”). 16 Plaintiff’s ADA and § 504 claims, as currently pled, are accordingly deficient. See Iqbal, 556 17 U.S. at 678. 18 C. State Law Claims 19 Lastly, the undersigned addresses Plaintiff’s state law claims. These claims are brought 20 against all Defendants, and Plaintiff does not specify if she is bringing them against Chad Peace 21 and Daniel Radovich in their individual capacities, official capacities, or both. This is a problem 22 because, absent abrogation by Congress or consent from the state, federal courts may not hear 23 “state law causes of actions against state entities.” Barrilleaux v. Mendocino Cnty., 61 F. Supp. 3d 24 906, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Stanley v. Trs. of California State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 25 2006). To the extent Plaintiff asserts her state law claims against Defendants Peace and Radovic 26 in their official capacities, and to the extent she brings the claim against the County of San Mateo, 27 such claims would be barred. 1 capacities would not necessarily be barred by state sovereign immunity. See Ashker v. California 2 Dep’t. of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394–95 (9th Cir. 1997). However, as with Plaintiff’s other 3 causes of action, she fails to include enough factual allegations to plausibly support her state law 4 claims. California Civil Code §§ 44 and 46 pertain to defamation and California Civil Code § 43 5 establishes that “every person” is entitled to “protection from bodily restraint or harm, from 6 personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal relations.” See Senator v. 7 Macomber, No. 24-cv-00439, 2024 WL 4029570, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2024) (“Section 43 thus 8 codifies causes of action for assault, battery, and invasion of privacy.”) (internal quotations 9 omitted). The Second Amended Complaint includes no factual allegations indicating that Plaintiff 10 was defamed, restrained, insulted, or that her personal relationships were harmed. For the reasons 11 explained in the context of Plaintiff’s ADA and § 504 claims, there are insufficient factual 12 allegations to plausibly support that Defendants violated California Government Code § 11135, 13 which prohibits discrimination based on disability. 14 Lastly, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated California Civil Code § 1708, which 15 establishes that “[e]very person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or 16 property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.” Section 1708 codifies a “general 17 principle” of tort law; but, as far as the undersigned is aware, does not create a private right of 18 action. Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 328 (2002) (internal 19 quotations omitted); see Ley v. State of California, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1306 (2004); Aldini 20 AG v. Silvaco, Inc., No. 21-cv-06423, 2023 WL 3749792, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 21 2023), aff’d, No. 23-15630, 2024 WL 5165600 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2024) (“Section 1708 does not 22 provide a cause of action.”). Plaintiff accordingly has failed to state a viable claim under § 1708. 23 III. CONCLUSION 24 For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned determines that Plaintiff’s SAC “fails to state a 25 claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 26 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). Plaintiff may file a Third Amended 27 Complaint addressing the deficiencies in the SAC by January 23, 2026. The Third Amended 1 Plaintiff wants to be included in this case. The Third Amended Complaint must: [C]ontain a short and plain statement of each claim for relief 2 [Plaintiff] wishes to assert, identify the provisions of law and the set of facts that support each claim, and link specific defendants by name 3 to each claim. [Plaintiff] must also describe each such defendant’s involvement in the claim and the specific factual basis of liability. 4 [She] must also specify what relief [she] is seeking from the court. 5 || Moreno vy. Brettkelly, No. 20-cv-02082, 2020 WL 1812187, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2020). 6 The undersigned again strongly encourages Plaintiff to use the Northern District of 7 California’s resources for pro se litigants, available online at: https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se- 8 || litigants/. Guidelines for drafting a complaint, titled “Writing and Filing a Civil Complaint,” are 9 available online at: https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/legal-help-center-templates-packets/. 10 || The Northern District’s handbook for pro se litigants is available online at: 11 https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-handbook/ and hard copies are available at the JDC Legal Help a 12 Center at the United States Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 15" Floor, Room 2796, San

13 || Francisco. The Legal Help Center also offers free legal information to pro se litigants.

v 14 || Appointments may be scheduled by calling 415-782-8982. O 15 The undersigned may recommend that this case be dismissed if Plaintiff does not file her Q 16 || Third Amended Complaint by February 6, 2026, or if the Third Amended Complaint does not

17 address the deficiencies identified in this Order.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: January 13, 2026 20 jo 21 7 phe larire LISA. CISNHR@ 22 UnitedStates Magistrate Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28