Jacqueline Anna Reed v. State of Michigan

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 24, 2018
Docket339835
StatusPublished

This text of Jacqueline Anna Reed v. State of Michigan (Jacqueline Anna Reed v. State of Michigan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jacqueline Anna Reed v. State of Michigan, (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

JACQUELINE ANNA REED, FOR PUBLICATION May 24, 2018 Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:00 a.m.

v No. 339835 Court of Claims STATE OF MICHIGAN and DEPARTMENT OF LC No. 16-000163-MZ TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

Defendants-Appellants.

Before: METER, P.J., and GADOLA and TUKEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this case brought under the public-building exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406, defendants appeal as of right the order of the Court of Claims denying their motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.

On June 12, 2015, plaintiff was walking on the “front porch” of the Michigan Hall of Justice in Lansing when she tripped on “sunken and uneven brick pavers,” causing her to fall and sustain personal injuries. On September 29, 2015, plaintiff filed, in triplicate, a “Notice of Injury and Defect pursuant to MCL 691.1406” with the clerk of the Court of Claims. Plaintiff later filed a complaint in the Court of Claims on July 12, 2016.

Defendants sought summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), claiming that they were immune from suit because plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of MCL 691.1406 by not serving notice on “the responsible governmental agency,” defendant Department of Technology, Management and Budget (DTMB). In response, plaintiff argued that she satisfied the notice requirements by filing her notice in triplicate with the Court of Claims, as required by MCL 691.1404. The trial court denied defendants’ motion, holding that based on MCL 691.1404, MCL 691.1406, and this Court’s decision in Goodhue v Dep’t of Transp, 319 Mich App 526; 904 NW2d 203 (2017), filing the notice in triplicate with the clerk of the Court of Claims was all that was required to fulfill the notice requirements of MCL 691.1404 and MCL 691.1406.

-1- Defendant argues that governmental immunity bars this action because the statute required plaintiff to serve notice on the DTMB individually and also file the notice in triplicate with the Court of Claims. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Moraccini v Sterling Heights, 296 Mich App 387, 391; 822 NW2d 799 (2012). In deciding a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must consider any affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence in the action or submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5). The facts as alleged in the complaint “must be accepted as true unless contradicted” by the submitted evidence, and the court evaluates all evidence “in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party” in evaluating a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Moraccini, 296 Mich App at 391. We also review de novo a determination regarding the application of a statutory exception to governmental immunity. Snead v John Carlo, Inc, 294 Mich App 343, 354; 813 NW2d 294 (2011).

When interpreting a statute, the “primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 202; 731 NW2d 41 (2007). The words used in a statute are the “most reliable indicator” of intent and the words “should be interpreted based on their ordinary meaning and the context within which they are used in the statute.” Dep’t of Envtl Quality v Worth Twp, 491 Mich 227, 237-238; 814 NW2d 846 (2012). When the words are unambiguous, the court gives them “their plain meaning.” Rowland, 477 Mich at 202. When the Legislature’s intent is not clear from the plain language, “courts must interpret statutes in a way that gives effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” Haynes v Village of Beulah, 308 Mich App 465, 468; 865 NW2d 923 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., provides immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies when they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. MCL 691.1407(1); Moraccini, 296 Mich App at 391. However, the GTLA also provides several exceptions to this broad grant of immunity. Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75, 84; 746 NW2d 847 (2008). One of those exceptions is the public- building exception and is codified in MCL 691.1406 and states in relevant part:

Governmental agencies have the obligation to repair and maintain public buildings under their control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous condition or defective condition of a public building if the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition. . . . As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any dangerous or defective public building, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred, shall serve a notice on the responsible governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.

-2- The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against the responsible governmental agency, anything to the contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding. . . . Notice to the state of Michigan shall be given as provided in [MCL 691.1404]. [Emphasis added.]

MCL 691.1404(2), in turn, provides in pertinent part,

The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against the governmental agency, anything to the contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding. In case of the state,[1] such notice shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court of claims. Filing of such notice shall constitute compliance with [MCL 600.6431 of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq.2]

Once the notice is filed with the clerk of the Court of Claims, the clerk transmits a copy to the Attorney General and to the governmental agency designated in the notice. MCL 600.6431(2).

This Court recently addressed the interaction between MCL 691.1404, the highway exception, and MCL 600.6431 of the Court of Claims Act. Goodhue, 319 Mich App 526. In Goodhue, the issue was whether the plaintiff’s claims under the GTLA’s highway defect and public-building exceptions were barred under MCL 691.1404 when the plaintiff filed notice in the Court of Claims more than 120 days after an accident; that is, the issue was which time limit applied to the plaintiff’s claims—the 120-day time limit applicable to these GTLA exceptions or the higher six-month time limit of MCL 600.6431(3) for filing an injury claim in the Court of Claims. Id. at 529, 534-536. The Goodhue Court concluded that “the notice provisions of MCL 691.1404 control[led]” and that because the plaintiff filed his notice with the clerk of the Court of Claims more than 120 days after the injury occurred, his filing was deficient and fatal to his claim. Id. at 534-537.

Defendants argue that the trial court, in denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition, should not have relied on Goodhue because Goodhue is inapplicable due to the fact that the issue in that case was the timeliness of the plaintiff’s notice, rather than the manner of service. Defendants, while relying on the fact that filing and serving have different definitions

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Related

Department of Environmental Quality v. Worth Township
814 N.W.2d 646 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2012)
Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission
731 N.W.2d 41 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2007)
Empire Iron Mining Partnership v. Orhanen
565 N.W.2d 844 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1997)
Wesche v. Mecosta County Road Commission
746 N.W.2d 847 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2008)
Snead v. John Carlo, Inc.
813 N.W.2d 294 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2011)
Moraccini v. City of Sterling Heights
822 N.W.2d 799 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2012)
Haynes v. Village of Beulah
865 N.W.2d 923 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Jacqueline Anna Reed v. State of Michigan, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jacqueline-anna-reed-v-state-of-michigan-michctapp-2018.