Jacoby Goehler v. State of Arkansas

2023 Ark. 186, 678 S.W.3d 745

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: December 7, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2023 Ark. 186 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-23-72

Opinion Delivered: December 7, 2023 JACOBY GOEHLER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FULTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 25CR-21-35] V. HONORABLE TIM WEAVER, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED. APPELLEE

CODY HILAND, Associate Justice

On October 21, 2022, a jury in the Fulton County Circuit Court found Jacoby

Goehler guilty of the first-degree murder of Davidlee Stansbury and sentenced him to life

in prison, plus fifteen years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Goehler appeals his

conviction. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Crime and Arrest

In early April 2021, Goehler walked into his living room to find his sister telling their

parents that Goehler’s best friend, Stansbury, had raped her in the previous year. Testimony

revealed the Goehler family previously moved to Salem, Arkansas, after Goehler’s brother

was sexually assaulted in Oklahoma. Additionally, not only did Goehler’s wife attempt

suicide just hours before Goehler learned about his sister and Stansbury, but also, Goehler’s

mother historically struggled with drug abuse and bipolar disorder. After Goehler told his friend, Travis Barker, that he believed his sister’s accusation,

he traveled to Barker’s home in Jefferson City, Missouri, on April 22, 2021. While there,

Barker showed Goehler a handgun he had recently repaired. Later that night, Goehler told

Barker he wanted to kill Stansbury. Barker replied, “Let’s go.” In possession of the

aforementioned gun, the two men left Barker’s home in Goehler’s truck and drove back to

Salem, Arkansas.

Goehler called Stansbury on the road and convinced him to accompany Goehler to

a remote place to pick up a fictitious bag of drugs. Goehler dropped Barker off at Barker’s

Arkansas property where he waited while Goehler picked up Stansbury at approximately

4:00 a.m. Upon arrival, the three walked into the woods, scaled a fence, and entered a more

secluded area. As they walked, Goehler repeatedly asked Stansbury if he had raped Goehler’s

sister. Stansbury denied doing so.

Eventually the group stopped near a large boulder. Goehler asked Stansbury once

more whether he had raped Goehler’s sister, and Stansbury again said no. Goehler then took

out the pistol and shot Stansbury in the hand. Goehler then shot him again, this time in the

head. After Stansbury had fallen, Goehler stood over him and shot him a third time, again,

in the head. Goehler then directed Barker to help him look for the shell casings, but they

could not find them. They left Stansbury’s body and drove back to Barker’s Missouri home.

Goehler returned to Salem the next day where he met his wife at their home and

told her he shot Stansbury three times, killing him as revenge for the rape. While Goehler’s

parents and brother were also present, it is not clear whether they overheard the

conversation. Later that same evening, Goehler called his squad leader in the Arkansas

2 National Guard and asked for a lawyer because he had killed someone. The squad leader

eventually put Goehler in touch with the commanding officer. After Goehler informed him

he had shot his best friend, the commanding officer contacted another National Guard

member employed by the Arkansas State Police, and Goehler was arrested.

While in custody, Goehler told a Fulton County jail detainee he had shot Stansbury.

After the police Mirandized Goehler, Goehler requested counsel, and law enforcement

stopped all questioning and contacted the public defender. Goehler’s counsel then told

police not to speak with Goehler anymore.

After three days passed following Goehler’s arrest, the search for Stansbury’s body

was unsuccessful. A deputy then told Fulton County Sheriff Al Roark that Goehler wanted

to speak with him. Roark approached Goehler’s jail cell, and Goehler asked if they could

talk. Roark agreed, but he told Goehler he would not ask any questions. When Goehler

heard a search helicopter fly by, he asked Roark if the police had found Stansbury’s body.

Roark said no. Goehler replied that they would not find it, then asked to call his lawyer.

Roark tried to get the public defender on the phone, but he was out of state on vacation.

Goehler then asked to call his wife. After the call ended, Goehler motioned Roark over and

said, “If you’ll let me smoke a cigarette[,] I’ll take you to the body.” When Roark told

Goehler he ought to talk to his attorney, Goehler refused, saying, “You’re not going to find

him, but I’ll take you to him.”

Roark again Mirandized Goehler, after which Goehler rode along to guide the police

to Stansbury’s body. He showed the officers where they should be able to find spent shell

casings, of which they found two, both from the same 9mm handgun. They did not recover

3 the murder weapon. After they returned to the jail, law enforcement filed the criminal

information and officially charged Goehler with murder in the first degree.

B. Circuit Court Proceedings

On May 13, 2021, Goehler’s defense attorney filed a motion with the Circuit Court

of Fulton County to suppress statements Goehler made while in police custody without his

attorney present. The court did not hold a suppression hearing and made no rulings

regarding those statements.

Over a year later, the defense moved to change venue, claiming that public interest

in the case was significant and so adverse to Goehler that his trial would be unfair. The

pretrial process continued, including routine voir dire of the jury. On October 19, 2022,

the first day of trial, the court denied Goehler’s motion for change of venue.

The State called Goehler’s wife as a witness, and Goehler claimed that spousal

privilege allowed him to prevent her from testifying. The court allowed her to testify,

though it sustained a hearsay objection Goehler later raised regarding Stansbury’s last words.

On the second day of trial, the State introduced an autopsy photograph of Stansbury’s

face and the uppermost portion of his torso. The court admitted the photograph over

Goehler’s objection that it was substantially more prejudicial than probative.

At the end of trial, Goehler requested that the court give jury instructions regarding

the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and second-degree murder. The court denied

this request as well, and on October 21, 2022, Goehler was convicted of first-degree murder

and sentenced to life in prison plus fifteen years for using a firearm.

II. Points on Appeal

4 A. Goehler’s Incriminating Statements

Goehler maintains that the trial court erred in admitting incriminating statements he

made in police custody without counsel present as well as statements made after he requested

counsel and after counsel directed police to no longer speak with Goehler.

This court generally will not hear issues of error that were not preserved below.

Goehler did not object to this evidence at trial. But he asserts that this court can nevertheless

address this issue for the first time on appeal through an exception outlined in Marshall v.

State, 316 Ark. 753, 760, 875 S.W.2d 814, 819 (1994). He then argues we should weigh

the totality of the circumstances and find that the trial court’s admission of Goehler’s

statements into evidence violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights according to Bussard

v. State, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71 (1988).

1. The Wicks exception

In four circumstances, this court may review an issue of error not presented to the

trial court. See Marshall, 316 Ark. at 760, 875 S.W.2d at 819. Goehler’s proffered exception

arises “when evidentiary errors affect a defendant’s substantial rights although they were not

brought to the court’s attention.” Id. We first recognized this exception in Wicks v. State,

considering it arguably possible based on language in Uniform Evidence Rule 103(d) that

we reasoned could apply “at most . . . only to a ruling to admit or exclude evidence.” 270

Ark. 781, 787, 606 S.W.2d 366, 370 (1980).

Here, the trial court made no such ruling. While the record shows that the defense

filed a motion to suppress, among other things, “[a]ny statement or statements made by

[Goehler],” it contains no transcript of a suppression hearing for this court to review. Absent

5 a ruling, and given this exception’s restricted scope, we decline to extend it to the facts of

this case; thus, we affirm the trial court on this point. We need not analyze this case under

Bussard because no exception shields Goehler from the general rule that this court does not

address issues of error not preserved below. See Bussard, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71.

B. Goehler’s Motion for Change of Venue

This court reviews a denial of a motion to change venue for abuse of discretion.

Porter v. State, 359 Ark. 323, 324, 197 S.W.3d 445, 446 (2004). A trial court properly grants

change of venue if it is clear the defendant could not likely receive a fair trial in the county.

Id. The law does not entitle a defendant to jurors who are ignorant of his case, but only to

those jurors who can set aside any impressions they might have and make decisions based

on the evidence alone. Id. at 324, 197 S.W.3d at 446–47.

Because voir dire sufficiently protects a defendant against publicity before trial, the

court does not err in denying a motion for change of venue when the transcript shows that

the court selected an impartial jury. Tucker v. State, 2011 Ark. 144, at 17, 381 S.W.3d 1, 11.

Here, the record reveals a robust voir dire involving fifty-four potential jurors and a 113-

page transcript. The parties made their allotted strikes from the panel to their satisfaction.

When potential jurors expressed concerns about their fitness to serve, the trial court

respectively dismissed or retained them after careful questioning and deliberation with both

sides. Finally, most potential jurors’ concerns were personal and independent of public

interest, social media, or other coverage about the case. The potential jurors who said public

opinion had swayed them were excused by the court after both parties agreed.

6 The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Goehler’s motion to change venue,

and Goehler has not shown that his trial was unfair because of this denial. Accordingly, we

affirm.

C. Testimony of Goehler’s Wife

When the State called Goehler’s wife as a witness, Goehler sought to exclude her

testimony pursuant to the spousal-privilege rule. Ark. R. Evid. 504. Rule 504 allows a

criminal defendant to prevent his or her spouse from testifying about anything the two

communicated in confidence exclusively to one another. At trial, Goehler argued that what

he had told his wife, he had told no one else, and intended to keep the communication

between the two of them. The State disagreed, characterizing the testimony as little more

than repeating what Goehler had already told others, and therefore, it was unprivileged.

The trial court permitted Goehler’s wife to testify.

On appeal, Goehler maintains that his wife’s testimony included confidential,

privileged matters. The State responds that Goehler waived his privilege concerning

anything significant that he disclosed to third parties under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 510.

In admitting the testimony of Goehler’s wife, the trial court made an evidentiary

ruling this court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bragg v. State, 2023

Ark. 66, at 7, 663 S.W.3d 375, 380. Abuse of discretion requires thoughtlessness,

improvidence, or lack of due consideration on the trial court’s part—not merely error. Id.

at 7, 663 S.W.3d at 381.

Arkansas Rule of Evidence 504(b) extends the spousal privilege to “confidential

communication between the accused and the spouse,” and Rule 504(a) defines

7 “confidential” as what is private and meant to remain that way. Rule 510 negates that

privilege once the defendant chooses to share with a nonspouse “any significant part of the

privileged matter.”

Yet waiver need not pertain to this case. The parties stipulated that Goehler told his

wife and others that he had killed Stansbury. That fact, then, was never privileged under

Rule 504. Goehler contests the admission of his wife’s testimony about how many times he

shot Stansbury, but Goehler’s friend and accomplice, Travis Barker, also testified that he

saw Goehler shoot Stansbury three times. So this fact likewise enjoyed no Rule 504

privilege. Even if it had been privileged when Goehler’s wife presented it, Barker’s identical

testimony would have come before the jury.

All that remains at issue is the testimony of Goehler’s wife revealing Stansbury’s last

words, which the trial court excluded by sustaining Goehler’s hearsay objection. Though it

was too late to “unring” the bell, the jury simply hearing this testimony did not prejudice

Goehler. Goehler could have requested a limiting instruction but did not do so. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm on this point.

D. The Photograph of the Victim

On the second day of trial, the State offered into evidence a photograph of Stansbury.

Goehler objected and argued that the “grotesque” photograph, which depicts Stansbury’s

partially decomposed face and the tops of his shoulders but does not show the wounds that

caused his death, was substantially more prejudicial than probative. The State asserted the

evidence tended to show that Goehler purposely killed Stansbury. The court admitted the

8 photograph over Goehler’s objection, reasoning that the image showed the jury “the

consequence of what the State is saying is purposeful conduct.”

We reverse a trial court’s admission of photographs only if that admission abused the

court’s discretion. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 461, at 9, 385 S.W.3d 214, 220–21.

Generally, photographs clarifying testimony are admissible; a trial court need not exclude

such a photograph merely because it is inflammatory or cumulative. Robertson v. State, 2011

Ark. 196, at 4. Even a “gruesome” photograph may come in if it can assist the jury in any

of several ways, including “showing the condition of the victim’s body.” Id.

The record contains a bench discussion over the photograph. Both parties had

sufficient opportunity to argue their perspectives on its relevance and potential prejudicial

effect. Before admitting the photograph, the court conceded it was “difficult to look at,”

but went on to explain that to see the condition of Stansbury’s body would help the jury

better understand the result of Goehler’s actions and decide whether his conduct was

purposeful; an element of the first-degree murder charge. These were proper, adequately

reasoned grounds to admit the photograph despite its graphic nature.

The trial court was neither thoughtless nor improvident, nor did it fail to duly

consider the matter. We affirm.

E. The Jury Instructions on Lesser-Included Offenses

At the close of evidence, Goehler sought to introduce jury instructions on

manslaughter, which means to cause someone’s death under otherwise murderous

circumstances while experiencing “extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a

reasonable excuse.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). The trial court ruled

9 there was no rational basis for a manslaughter instruction. Goehler then sought instruction

on second-degree murder, which can involve a knowing killing “under circumstances

manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-

103(a)(1). The trial court likewise found no rational basis for this instruction, reasoning that

there was no doubt Goehler purposely killed Stansbury.

We review a trial court’s rulings concerning jury instructions for abuse of discretion.

Marshall v. State, 2021 Ark. 158, at 3, 627 S.W.3d 810, 811. If even the slightest evidence

supports giving an instruction, a trial court commits reversible error by refusing to give it.

Id. But a trial court need not give instructions on a lesser-included offense unless there is a

rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the charged crime and instead convicting him

of the lesser. Id., at 3, 627 S.W.3d at 812; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(c).

1. Manslaughter

Goehler would have this court consider several facts: (1) Goehler’s sister said that

Stansbury had raped her; (2) Goehler’s wife attempted suicide; (3) Goehler’s family suffered

other sexual abuses; and (4) Goehler’s accomplice, Travis Barker, encouraged Goehler to

act. Goehler argues these facts support a manslaughter instruction because they are at least

slight evidence he killed Stansbury in the heat of reasonably excusable passion.

With the exception of Travis Barker, none of the other events occurred in the

timeframe immediately preceding the murder of Stansbury. We have repeatedly held that a

killing meriting a manslaughter instruction must occur “in the moment following some kind

of provocation” like a fight or threat. See Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. 433, at 4 (per curiam).

10 Goehler waited nearly three weeks before visiting Barker, discovering Barker had a

gun, and devising a plan to lure Stansbury to a remote location in the woods under a false

premise of finding drugs. As he, Stansbury, and Barker walked through the woods, Goehler

repeatedly asked Stansbury if he had raped Goehler’s sister, which Stansbury denied each

time. There is no evidence that either of these men ever threatened one another along the

way, and Goehler was the only one armed. When the group eventually stopped near a

boulder, Goehler shot Stansbury––not during a struggle––but while standing some feet

away. The first bullet passed through Stansbury’s hand, and before Stansbury could do more

than express confusion and surprise, Goehler shot him in the head at closer range. Then,

after standing over Stansbury’s body for some moments, Goehler shot him again in the head.

These circumstances do not lend themselves to a manslaughter instruction because

they do not demonstrate Stansbury (or anyone or anything else) provoked Goehler by

threatening or fighting with him just before he fired the shots. Instead, they reveal calculated

action. The trial court did not err when it found no rational basis for acquitting Goehler of

his charged crime, first-degree murder, and instead convicting him of manslaughter. And it

did not err in refusing to give such instructions to the jury.

2. Second-degree murder

Goehler argues that the following evidence supports an instruction for second-degree

murder: (1) Goehler shot Stansbury first in the hand; (2) the two men were several feet

apart; and (3) they were deep in the woods at night. His position is that these facts could

lead a jury to believe that Goehler killed Stansbury under circumstances showing his extreme

indifference to the value of human life. The State responds that the law does not require

11 second-degree-murder instructions when fatal gunshot wounds are not point-blank; it was

not too dark for the men to scale a fence to reach the place where Goehler stopped them

or for Goehler to shoot Stansbury in the head twice; and the location’s remoteness highlights

that Goehler’s actions were purposeful.

We agree with the State that Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001),

controls the outcome here. In Britt, we affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury

on second-degree murder where all the evidence revealed a purposeful, execution-style

killing, and there was no evidence that the defendant had acted with any mental state other

than with the purpose of killing the victims. Id. at 23, 38 S.W.3d at 370. Reincorporating

the facts mentioned above, there was no evidence that Goehler acted only knowingly and

with extreme indifference. On the contrary, the evidence shows that he formed and then

realized a plan for the purpose of taking Stansbury’s life.

III. Rule 4-3(a) Review

Because Goehler received a life sentence, the record has been examined for all

objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to him

in compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a) (2021), and no prejudicial error

has been found.

Affirmed.

Digby Law Firm, by: Mathew R. Ingle, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.