Jacobs v. Jacobs

35 S.E.2d 119, 184 Va. 281, 1945 Va. LEXIS 149
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedSeptember 5, 1945
DocketRecord No. 2928
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 35 S.E.2d 119 (Jacobs v. Jacobs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 35 S.E.2d 119, 184 Va. 281, 1945 Va. LEXIS 149 (Va. 1945).

Opinion

Spratley, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is here to review a decree annulling a marriage and declaring void a conveyance of real estate from the appellee to the appellant upon the ground that the appellant fraudulently induced the appellee to marry her and convey to her the real estate in consideration of the marriage, when, at the time of the marriage and conveyance of the property, the appellant had a preconceived intention not to consummate the marriage, and in pursuance of which intention the marriage was not consummated.

No question of equitable jurisdiction is involved. In Pretlow v. Pretlow, 177 Va. 524, 14 S. E. (2d) 381, Mr. Justice Holt reviewed and analyzed many of the cases and authorities, American and English, dealing with the jurisdiction of courts of equity to annul a marriage where assent thereto was induced by artifice or gross fraud, and firmly declared courts of equity in Virginia to be vested with such jurisdiction.

The historical facts are as follows:

On May 21, 1940, Benjamin L. Jacobs, who was then 79 years of age, married the appellant, Lenore daCruz, who was then 42 years of age. By deed dated June 27, 1940, Jacobs conveyed to his wife for the stated consideration of fio, a house and lot valued around $9,000, located in Arlington county, Va. The deed contained the following provision: “This conveyance is made subject to the restrictions of record, and to a reservation of a life interest in Benjamin L. Jacobs in said property for use as a home”. The deed was signed by both of the parties and acknowledged by each of them on July 1, 1940, and recorded on July 12, 1940.

Appellee filed his bill on December 7, 1942, in which he set out that although Mrs. Jacobs “conducted herself [284]*284amiably and properly toward complainant during the first few weeks of their marriage”, she was not affectionate towards him and that, after the execution and delivery of the deed, she “began to and has ever since consistently mistreated complainant and failed and refused to conduct herself as a wife”, treating him with extreme cruelty, “abusing and cursing him in the • vilest language and physically assaulting him”; that the only purpose of the appellant in marrying him was to get possession of his property; that she had no intention at the time of the marriage or at the time of receiving the deed of acting as his wife; and that the consideration for the conveyance of the property has failed. He prayed for annulment of the marriage and a reconveyance of the property on the ground of fraud, and if an annulment of the marriage should be deniéd that a divorce a mensa, et thoro be decreed him on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Appellant answered, denying the material allegations as to fraud, non-consummation of the marriage and misconduct on her part, and by way of cross-bill set up a claim to affirmative relief and prayed for a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of wilful desertion and abandonment by the appellee.

The trial court referred the cause to a commissioner in chancery to ascertain whether the appellee was entitled to have the marriage annulled or to have a divorce a mensa et thoro, and whether the deed conveying his real estate to the appellant should be declared null and void.

Jacobs gave his testimony by depositions out of the presence of the commissioner. . All other witnesses testified in his presence. The commissioner concluded and reported that the marriage should be annulled and that the appellee, was entitled to recover his property.

Numerous exceptions were taken by Mrs. Jacobs, the principal one being that the evidence did not support the findings of the commissioner. The trial court on .June 2, 1944, approved and confirmed the findings of the commissioner, and thereupon entered a decree annulling the [285]*285marriage and directing a reconveyance of the described property to the appellee. From this decree the appellant appealed.

A correct decision in the case depends entirely upon the question whether the evidence is sufficient to support the decree. A large portion of the testimony relates to the causes for divorce alleged in the bill. Since the decree granted an annulment of the marriage, not a divorce, the evidence relating to divorce will be considered only so far as it may be said to indicate or reflect the intention of the appellant in contracting and entering into the marriage. The right of either party to a divorce is not before us for review, and we will give it no consideration.

In the consideration of the evidence it is well to remember the rule of universal recognition, that where fraud is relied upon the burden of proof is upon the one alleging it, and that if it is not strictly and clearly proven as alleged, by circumstantial or direct evidence, no relief will be granted.

At the time of his marriage to the appellant Jacobs was a retired government employee. He had formerly been a clerk in the office of the Chief of Finance, U. S. War Department, Washington, D. C. He was drawing retirement pay of 1100 per month. The only property he owned was his home (the house and lot. he conveyed to Mrs. Jacobs), and a small bank account. He was indebted to a relative in the sum of about $900, which under pressure by the creditor he was repaying at the rate of $25 per month. He had been married twice before. His first wife died shortly after their marriage and his second wife in 1939. He had no children.

In the fall of 1939 Jacobs became seriously ill with uremic poisoning, occasioned by an enlargement of the prostate gland. He was admitted to Georgetown hospital in Washington, D. C., on October 5, 1939. After the removal of his prostate gland his physical condition became much improved. While in the hospital Jacobs was attended by three nurses, one of whom was Mrs. Lenore daCruz. He apparently became interested in her at that time, his surgeon recalling that Jacobs made some statement to him about liking [286]*286one of his nurses. The surgeon thought that as a result of the operation the chances were that his patient’s sexual virility was somewhat impaired, but that there frequently occurred in such cases delusions of increased vitality.

Jacobs was discharged from the hospital about November 1, 1939, and he immediately returned to his home. Three months later, after making some inquiries, he ascertained the address of Mrs. daCruz, and visited her at the home of her sister in the District of Columbia. It is conceded by counsel for each of the parties that thereafter his courtship, of the lady waxed fast and furious. The ardor and intensity of his wooing is shown by a series of affectionate and endearing letters from Jacobs importuning marriage, and offering his property as a gift to induce her acceptance of his proposal. His attitude and state of mind towards the appellant is best evidenced by the following extracts from his letters.

• On March 23, 1940, addressing hen as “Dear Mrs. daCruz,” he said: “The other day when I ’phoned you, you did not appear quite natural but cut me off before I finished. You remember that I said when you are about to come out here (Which I hope will be real soon) if you will advise me that I will meet you in Georgetown and accompany you in order that you would not have to pick your way to a strange place and intended to add that I wished you to have lunch with me.

“Please do not forget your promise to come, so make it snappy, see.

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Bluebook (online)
35 S.E.2d 119, 184 Va. 281, 1945 Va. LEXIS 149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jacobs-v-jacobs-va-1945.