1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SOUTHERN DIVISION 10 11 JACOBO CHAN, CASE NO. SA CV 23-00178-CAS (AS) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 13 v. LEAVE TO AMEND 14 ORANGE COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 On January 27, 2023, Jacobo Chan (“Plaintiff”), a California 22 state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint 23 (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1). 24 25 The Complaint sues Orange County, Orange County Health Care 26 Agency, Orange County Sheriff’s Department, and five individuals, 27 Sheriff Don Barnes, Sergeant N. Spangenberg, Deputy Lynd, Deputy 28 Maldonado, and Deputy Guillen (collectively, “Individual 1 Defendants”) for the Individual Defendants’ alleged involvement in 2 denying Plaintiff his medication and treatment. (See Complaint at 3 1, 3-5). Plaintiff asserts violations of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 Due Process Clause, Eighth Amendment, and Plaintiff’s state law 5 rights. (See Complaint at 5). All Individual Defendants are sued 6 in both their individual and official capacities. (Complaint at 7 3-4). 8 9 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES 10 Plaintiff’s Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.1 11 12 II. 13 STANDARD OF REVIEW 14 15 Congress mandates that district courts initially screen civil 16 complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental 17 entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A court may dismiss such 18 a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the court concludes that 19 the complaint: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a 20 claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary 21 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. 22 § 1915A(b); see also id. § 1915(e)(2) (“[The court] shall dismiss 23 the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the 24 action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a 25 claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary 26 1 Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to 27 amend without approval from the district judge. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1991). 28 1 relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”); 2 accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) 3 (en banc). In addition, dismissal may be appropriate if a complaint 4 violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. McHenry 5 v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. North 6 Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 7 8 In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, a court is 9 generally limited to the pleadings and must construe “[a]ll factual 10 allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in 11 the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los 12 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal 13 quotation marks omitted). Moreover, pro se pleadings are “to be 14 liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards” than 15 those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 16 (2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, dismissal for failure to 17 state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a 18 cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a 19 cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 20 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 22 III. 23 DISCUSSION 24 25 Plaintiff claims that the Individual Defendants violated his 26 constitutional rights by denying him his medication and treatment 27 after he was transferred to the Orange County Central Men’s Jail. 28 (Complaint at 5, 7-10). The Court has reviewed the Complaint under 1 the aforementioned standards and has concluded the Complaint is 2 deficient and must be dismissed with leave to amend. 3 4 A. Plaintiff Fails to State Claims Against Orange County, Orange 5 County Health Care Agency, and Orange County Sheriff’s 6 Department 7 8 Plaintiff seeks damages from Orange County, Orange County 9 Health Care Agency, and Orange County Sheriff’s Department for the 10 actions and/or inactions of the Individual Defendants. A local 11 government entity “cannot be held liable solely because it employs 12 a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held 13 liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. 14 Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 15 Instead, a municipality, such as Orange County, or the departments 16 and agencies within these entities, is liable under § 1983 only 17 for constitutional violations occurring as the result of an 18 official government policy or custom. Collins v. City of Harker 19 Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992). To prove municipal 20 liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must show both a deprivation of 21 a constitutional right and a departmental policy, custom, or 22 practice that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional 23 violation. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 24 957 (9th Cir. 2008). There must be a “direct causal link between 25 a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional 26 deprivation.” Collins, 503 U.S. at 123 (citation omitted). 27 “[P]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity,” or 28 even a series of “isolated or sporadic incidents,” will not give 1 rise to liability under § 1983. Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 2 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Rather, 3 liability must be “founded upon practices of sufficient duration, 4 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional 5 method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 6 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 7 8 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation 9 pursuant to any policy, custom, or practice of Orange County, 10 Orange County Health Care Agency, or Orange County Sheriff’s 11 Department. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient 12 to establish municipal liability, and any claims against Orange 13 County, Orange County Health Care Agency, and Orange County 14 Sheriff’s Department are dismissed with leave to amend. 15 16 B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Lynd, 17 Maldonado, Guillen, or Barnes 18 19 Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Lynd, 20 Maldonado, Guillen, or Barnes in their individual capacities. 21 “[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he causes the 22 plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of his constitutional 23 rights.” Baker v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SOUTHERN DIVISION 10 11 JACOBO CHAN, CASE NO. SA CV 23-00178-CAS (AS) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 13 v. LEAVE TO AMEND 14 ORANGE COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 On January 27, 2023, Jacobo Chan (“Plaintiff”), a California 22 state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint 23 (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1). 24 25 The Complaint sues Orange County, Orange County Health Care 26 Agency, Orange County Sheriff’s Department, and five individuals, 27 Sheriff Don Barnes, Sergeant N. Spangenberg, Deputy Lynd, Deputy 28 Maldonado, and Deputy Guillen (collectively, “Individual 1 Defendants”) for the Individual Defendants’ alleged involvement in 2 denying Plaintiff his medication and treatment. (See Complaint at 3 1, 3-5). Plaintiff asserts violations of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 Due Process Clause, Eighth Amendment, and Plaintiff’s state law 5 rights. (See Complaint at 5). All Individual Defendants are sued 6 in both their individual and official capacities. (Complaint at 7 3-4). 8 9 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES 10 Plaintiff’s Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.1 11 12 II. 13 STANDARD OF REVIEW 14 15 Congress mandates that district courts initially screen civil 16 complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental 17 entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A court may dismiss such 18 a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the court concludes that 19 the complaint: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a 20 claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary 21 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. 22 § 1915A(b); see also id. § 1915(e)(2) (“[The court] shall dismiss 23 the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the 24 action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a 25 claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary 26 1 Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to 27 amend without approval from the district judge. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1991). 28 1 relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”); 2 accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) 3 (en banc). In addition, dismissal may be appropriate if a complaint 4 violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. McHenry 5 v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. North 6 Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 7 8 In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, a court is 9 generally limited to the pleadings and must construe “[a]ll factual 10 allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in 11 the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los 12 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal 13 quotation marks omitted). Moreover, pro se pleadings are “to be 14 liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards” than 15 those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 16 (2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, dismissal for failure to 17 state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a 18 cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a 19 cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 20 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 22 III. 23 DISCUSSION 24 25 Plaintiff claims that the Individual Defendants violated his 26 constitutional rights by denying him his medication and treatment 27 after he was transferred to the Orange County Central Men’s Jail. 28 (Complaint at 5, 7-10). The Court has reviewed the Complaint under 1 the aforementioned standards and has concluded the Complaint is 2 deficient and must be dismissed with leave to amend. 3 4 A. Plaintiff Fails to State Claims Against Orange County, Orange 5 County Health Care Agency, and Orange County Sheriff’s 6 Department 7 8 Plaintiff seeks damages from Orange County, Orange County 9 Health Care Agency, and Orange County Sheriff’s Department for the 10 actions and/or inactions of the Individual Defendants. A local 11 government entity “cannot be held liable solely because it employs 12 a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held 13 liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. 14 Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 15 Instead, a municipality, such as Orange County, or the departments 16 and agencies within these entities, is liable under § 1983 only 17 for constitutional violations occurring as the result of an 18 official government policy or custom. Collins v. City of Harker 19 Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992). To prove municipal 20 liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must show both a deprivation of 21 a constitutional right and a departmental policy, custom, or 22 practice that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional 23 violation. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 24 957 (9th Cir. 2008). There must be a “direct causal link between 25 a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional 26 deprivation.” Collins, 503 U.S. at 123 (citation omitted). 27 “[P]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity,” or 28 even a series of “isolated or sporadic incidents,” will not give 1 rise to liability under § 1983. Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 2 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Rather, 3 liability must be “founded upon practices of sufficient duration, 4 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional 5 method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 6 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 7 8 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation 9 pursuant to any policy, custom, or practice of Orange County, 10 Orange County Health Care Agency, or Orange County Sheriff’s 11 Department. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient 12 to establish municipal liability, and any claims against Orange 13 County, Orange County Health Care Agency, and Orange County 14 Sheriff’s Department are dismissed with leave to amend. 15 16 B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Lynd, 17 Maldonado, Guillen, or Barnes 18 19 Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Lynd, 20 Maldonado, Guillen, or Barnes in their individual capacities. 21 “[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he causes the 22 plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of his constitutional 23 rights.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (citation 24 and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); 25 Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 26 “To meet this causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish 27 both causation-in-fact and proximate causation.” Id.; see also 28 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1 1981). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and 2 focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 3 defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 4 constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 5 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 7 Here, with the exception of Defendant Spangenberg, Plaintiff 8 has not alleged facts demonstrating Defendants were “the actual 9 and proximate cause of any constitutional violation.” Leer, 844 10 F.2d at 634. That is, Plaintiff has not explained how Defendants 11 Lynd, Maldonado, or Guillen violated his constitutional rights. 12 Rather, Plaintiff merely states that Defendants Lynd, Maldonado, 13 and Guillen were present when Defendant Spangenberg said that he 14 would not process Plaintiff’s grievance regarding his medication, 15 and Defendant Lynd indicated that the Orange County Jail would not 16 necessarily continue Plaintiff’s medication and treatment. 17 (Complaint at 8-9). In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should 18 name as Defendants only those individuals he believes were the 19 cause of his injuries. 20 21 To the extent Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendant 22 Barnes based on his status as a supervisor, they also fail as a 23 matter of law. Liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a 24 theory of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, which makes 25 a supervisor liable for the wrongful acts of his or her 26 subordinates. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 27 1989); Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 28 banc), (“Supervisors aren’t vicariously liable for constitutional 1 violations under section 1983.”). To be held liable, a supervising 2 officer must personally take some action against the plaintiff or 3 “set in motion a series of acts by others . . . which he knew or 4 reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the 5 constitutional injury” on the plaintiff. Larez v. City of Los 6 Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation and 7 alterations omitted). In other words, a supervisor is liable for 8 subordinates’ constitutional violations only “if the supervisor 9 participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 10 violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 11 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 12 13 Again, Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence that Defendants 14 Lynd, Maldonado, Guillen, or Barnes acted personally to violate 15 his constitutional rights. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that 16 Defendants Lynd, Maldonado, and Guillen “carried out the actions 17 complained of, in the course and scope of [their] employment and 18 duties as. . . jail deput[ies],” and Defendant Barnes “is the chief 19 policymaker for the Orange County Sheriff’s Department and is 20 responsible for the county jail’s daily operations.” (Complaint 21 at 3-4). 22 23 Because the Complaint includes insufficient factual 24 allegations in support of these mere legal conclusions, Plaintiff’s 25 claims against Defendants Lynd, Maldonado, Guillen, and Barnes are 26 dismissed with leave to amend. 27 28 1 C. Plaintiff Fails to State an Official-Capacity Claim 2 3 Plaintiff names the Individual Defendants in both their 4 individual and official capacities. (Complaint at 3-4). Official 5 capacity claims are “another way of pleading an action against an 6 entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 7 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55). Thus, 8 Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants in their 9 official capacities are effectively claims against Orange County 10 and Orange County Sheriff’s Department. 11 12 Because official-capacity claims are treated as suits against 13 the entity, it is redundant to name multiple defendants of the same 14 agency in their official capacity. See, e.g., Rosas v. Baca, 2012 15 WL 933609, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (dismissing claims 16 against three of four individual defendants sued in their official 17 capacities as duplicative); Thomas v. Baca, 2006 WL 132078, at *1 18 (C.D. Cal Jan. 13, 2006) (dismissing claims against six of seven 19 individual defendants sued in their official capacities as 20 duplicative). Since Plaintiff names Orange County and Orange 21 County Sheriff’s Department as Defendants, any claims against the 22 Individual Defendants in their official capacity are redundant and 23 subject to dismissal. 24 25 Moreover, as explained in Section III.A., supra, any claims 26 against Orange County and Orange County Sheriff’s Department fail 27 because municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely 28 for the acts of its employees or subordinates, unless Plaintiff 1 alleges facts showing that the alleged conduct was caused by any 2 custom, policy, or practice of the County or its departments. See 3 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 4 IV. 5 CONCLUSION 6 7 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES 8 Plaintiff’s claims WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 9 10 If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he shall file 11 a First Amended Complaint no later than 30 days from the date of 12 this Order. The First Amended Complaint must cure the pleading 13 defects discussed above and shall be complete in itself without 14 reference to prior pleadings. See L.R. 15-2 (“Every amended 15 pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the 16 Court shall be complete including exhibits. The amended pleading 17 shall not refer to the prior, superseded pleading.”). This means 18 that Plaintiff must allege and plead any viable claims again. 19 20 In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature 21 of each separate legal claim and confine his allegations to those 22 operative facts supporting each of his claims. For each separate 23 legal claim, Plaintiff should state the civil right that has been 24 violated and the supporting facts for that claim only. Pursuant 25 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a 26 “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 27 is entitled to relief.” However, Plaintiff is advised that the 28 1 allegations in the First Amended Complaint should be consistent 2 with the authorities discussed above. In addition, the First 3 Amended Complaint may not include new Defendants or claims not 4 reasonably related to the allegations in the previously filed 5 complaints. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the 6 standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended 7 complaint, a copy of which is attached. 8 9 Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file 10 a First Amended Complaint, or failure to correct the deficiencies 11 described above, may result in a recommendation that this action, 12 or portions thereof, be dismissed with prejudice for failure to 13 prosecute and/or failure to comply with court orders. See Fed. R. 14 Civ. P. 41(b); Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 15 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The failure of the plaintiff eventually 16 to respond to the court’s ultimatum - either by amending the 17 complaint or by indicating to the court that it will not do so - 18 is properly met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal.”) 19 (citing Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 20 2004) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff is further advised that if he 21 no longer wishes to pursue this action in its entirety or with 22 respect to particular Defendants or claims, he may voluntarily 23 dismiss all or any part of this action by filing a Notice of 24 25 // 26 27 // 28 1 Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff’s 3 convenience. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: April 6, 2023 ______________/s/_____________ 8 ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28