Jacob v. Cotton

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedJanuary 10, 2022
Docket4:20-cv-03107
StatusUnknown

This text of Jacob v. Cotton (Jacob v. Cotton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jacob v. Cotton, (D. Neb. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

DAVID H. JACOB,

Plaintiff, 4:20CV3107

vs. MEMORANDUM ROSALYN COTTON, Chairperson, AND ORDER Nebraska Board of Parole; MARK T. LANGAN, Member, Nebraska Board of Parole; ROBERT TWISS, Member, Nebraska Board of Parole; LAYNE GISSLER, Member, Nebraska Board of Parole; and VIRGIL J. PATLAN, Member, Nebraska Board of Parole;

Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary, filed a Complaint on September 8, 2020, (Filing 1) challenging the Nebraska Board of Parole’s September 2019 deferral of Plaintiff’s parole hearing due to his “prior criminal record.” Charging the Board with violating his 14th Amendment right to due process, Plaintiff objects to the Board using his “prior criminal record” as its reason for deferring a full, public parole hearing because he has no prior criminal record, other than the criminal convictions for which he is currently incarcerated—three counts of second-degree murder and two counts of use of a firearm to commit a felony. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,111(1), (4) (Westlaw 2022) (allowing Board of Parole to defer for reconsideration parole decision).

Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File the First Amended Complaint (Filing 57) because Plaintiff’s “original pleading involves the Plaintiff’s 2019 review process” and “[t]he amended pleading adds the same constitutional claims for the Plaintiff’s 2020 and 2021 parole review processes.” The Plaintiff also seeks to add another Defendant who was involved in one or both of the later offender-review hearings. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s Motion, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (when party seeks to amend pleading after expiration of court’s scheduling deadline, party must show good cause); Plaintiff knew about the Board’s allegedly erroneous 2020 decision within two months of filing this lawsuit, but he did not file for leave to amend his Complaint in a timely fashion; and adding a claim related to Plaintiff’s 2021 offender-review hearing would prejudice Defendants because no discovery has been done on such claim, granting Plaintiff’s Motion “would reset the entire case,” and Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the 2021 hearing fail to state a claim. (Filing 59.)

BACKGROUND

The Progression Order in this case was entered on June 1, 2021, requiring all motions to amend pleadings to be filed on or before August 10, 2021; interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production or inspection to be served by July 1, 2021; depositions to be completed by September 7, 2021; and motions to compel discovery to be filed by September 21, 2021. (Filing 29 at CM/ECF p. 1.) That Order was amended on October 7, 2021, extending the dates for filing dispositive motions to January 5, 2022, and setting the final pretrial conference for April 19, 2022. (Filing 47.) Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 5, 2022. (Filing 61.)

On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Extend Deadline for Filing Amended Pleadings from August 10, 2021, until the end of the discovery process (September 21, 2021) because the incomplete discovery responses he had received as of that time “suggested a potentially further constitutional violation in this case” occurring in the Board’s November 5, 2020, review of Plaintiff’s case. (Filing 40.) On August 17, 2021, the court denied Plaintiff’s Motion without prejudice as premature (Filing 42) because of Plaintiff’s ongoing discovery discussions with Defendants’ counsel, a change in Defendants’ counsel of record, and because Plaintiff had until September 21, 2021, to compel additional discovery if necessary. 2 Instead of filing another motion for leave to file an amended complaint after the close of discovery, Plaintiff did not file another such motion until December 2, 2021. (Filing 57.)

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave” and that “[t]he court should freely grant [such] leave when justice so requires.” This standard is construed liberally, but “plaintiffs do not have an absolute or automatic right to amend.” United States ex rel. Lee v. Fairview Health Sys., 413 F.3d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 2005). Indeed, “[a] district court may appropriately deny leave to amend where there are compelling reasons such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment.” Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1065 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “In most cases, [d]elay alone is insufficient justification; prejudice to the nonmovant must also be shown.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, when a party seeks leave to amend a pleading outside of the time period established by a scheduling order (here, August 10, 2021), Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) first requires a showing of “good cause” to modify the scheduling order to allow such an amendment. Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008). After the movant has shown good cause to modify the scheduling order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), the court may then consider whether the amendment is permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Id. “The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the order’s requirements. While the prejudice to the nonmovant resulting from modification of the scheduling order may also be a relevant factor, generally, we will not consider prejudice if the movant has not been diligent in meeting the scheduling order’s deadlines.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 3 Through his Motion for Leave to File the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add two claims related to the Board of Parole’s 2020 and 2021 offender- review decisions and one Defendant who was involved in these decisions. Defendants object to amending the Complaint to add the 2020 claim because Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on September 8, 2020; the Board of Parole issued its allegedly erroneous decision just two months later on November 5, 2020; and the court’s Progression Order gave Plaintiff until August 10, 2021, to move to amend his Complaint, which he did not do. Defendants admit that Plaintiff’s claim regarding his 2021 offender-review hearing is not dilatory, presumably because the review occurred after the August 10, 2021, deadline to amend pleadings had passed. However, Defendants argue that allowing the 2021 claim in an Amended Complaint at this point would be prejudicial because no discovery has been done on this claim and granting leave to file an Amended Complaint would “reset the entire case.” (Filing 59.)

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Jacob v. Cotton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jacob-v-cotton-ned-2022.